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Abstract
My dissertation argues that the United States and China employ diplomacy to secure
international cooperation, but that their domestic politics render it more elusive.
International relations theory regards talk as cheap. It argues that states cannot employ
verbal communication to overcome structural conditions that ostensibly favor conflict. Can
a security-seeking state use diplomacy to aﬀect another’s assessment of shared interests and
elicit substantive cooperation? To answer this question, my first paper analyzes original
datasets of US-China diplomatic exchanges and American assessments of shared interests
with China. I find that, as diplomats have long observed, diplomacy is a forum for states to
exchange concessions that render both sides better oﬀ. Chinese diplomacy improves Amer-
ican assessments of shared interests and increases the probability of bilateral cooperation.
My second paper develops a theory of diversionary aggression in autocracies. When rent
transfers to political elites decline, leadership challenges become more likely. Autocrats may
inoculate themselves against these challenges by courting popular support with diversionary
foreign policy and nationalist propaganda. Using original data on elite transfers, diplomatic
interactions, and propaganda from China, I find broad support for the theory. As much as
40% of China’s conflict initiation toward the United States appears to be diversionary.
My third paper argues that American congressional politics reduce the president’s ability
to secure international cooperation. Using an original dataset of legislative hostility toward
China, I find that when Congress introduces legislation hostile to China, China penalizes the
president by reducing its willingness to cooperate by a factor of four. Most broadly, these
results suggest that the benefits accorded to democracies in international relations may be
iii
circumscribed under some conditions.
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1 | Small Events in High Politics
1.1 Introduction
Does diplomacy matter in international politics? The scholarly consensus is no. “Words
are cheap,” writes Thomas Schelling, “not inherently credible when they emanate from an ad-
versary.”1 Rationalists argue that only costly signals—like building arms, mobilizing forces,
or making audience cost generating threats—are credible enough to influence adversaries’
beliefs and behavior.2 Because diplomacy is costless, the argument goes, both aggressive and
pacific states should signal their willingness to cooperate, and so all states should discount
such talk.
In contrast to this consensus, there is a small but growing formal literature on costless
diplomatic signaling.3 Inspired by the folk theorem, these scholars observe that words—
however costless or cheap—constitute the foundation for reputations, which are valuable in
international politics.4 “The prospect of acquiring a reputation for lying,” Sartori (2005, 5)
explains, “keeps statesmen and diplomats honest.”5 Others suggest that diplomacy is im-
1Schelling (1980, 150).
2Fearon (1995, 1997, 1994); Kydd (2007).
3Tarar and Leventoglu (2009); Ramsay (2011); Trager (2010); Guisinger and Smith (2002); Kurizaki
(2007); Trager (2011). See the forthcoming review by Trager (2016).
4Jervis (1970); Dafoe, Renshon, and Huth (2014); Sartori (2002, 2005); Guisinger and Smith (2002). See
also the informal theory in Yarhi-Milo (2013) and the empirical evidence linking backing down to subsequent
dispute initiation in Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo (2015).
5Related models suggest that when cheap talk occurs on multiple topics, credible information transmission
is possible (Chakraborty and Harbaugh 2007; Trager 2011). Additionally, private threats may be credible if
states avoid public threats in order to avoid provoking public nationalism in the threatened state (Kurizaki
2007).
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portant for diﬀerent reasons. Constructivists argue that verbal communication can socialize
states and persuade them to interpret their interests diﬀerently. Critical theorists draw on
Habermas’ theory of communicative action to explain dialogue in international institutions.6
Still others suggest that diplomacy may be a product of diplomats’ partisan orientations or
that states may employ irrational “diplomacies of anger.”7
Can diplomacy change interstate perceptions and facilitate cooperation between sus-
picious, security-seeking states? I find that it does, and for reasons cited by diplomats
themselves: when governments believe they will require the cooperation of their foreign
counterparts in the future, they have strong incentives to establish reputations for honesty
now. The Cardinal of Richelieu thought a good reputation “so important to a great prince
that no possible gain could compensate for its loss.”8 “You might think we sit around and
consider whether to bluﬀ with the Chinese,” one retired American diplomat told me. “But
I can guarantee you, there was never an instance in which we discussed how much we could
get out of the Chinese if we bluﬀed.”9
Strong reputations enable states to pursue cooperation through diplomacy for the sake of
self interest. 19th century diplomats viewed diplomacy as négociation continuelle, “ongoing
negotiations” that served as a forum in which to pursue national interests. The goal of
diplomacy, so construed, is to trade policy concessions in order to serve long-term interests.
It is a forum in which states propose strategies to realize mutual gains and then negotiate
over their distribution. Although diplomacy may, in the long term, have beneficial eﬀects
for trust and goodwill between nations, its proximate cause is self interest. As one 1979 US
National Security Council (NSC) memorandum asked, “What are the Chinese doing for us?”
They were “helping to tie Moscow down,” it answered, “and much of what we are doing for
6The constructivist and critical literatures are large, but see, for example, Risse (2000); Krebs and Jackson
(2007); Johnston (2001); Müller (2004); Crawford (2009); Mitzen (2005).
7Rathbun (2014); Hall (2011).
8Hill (1961, 101).
9Thomas Christensen, interview with author, 12 January 2016.
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them out of seeming generosity is really to keep them afloat and in the game.10
Governments too view diplomacy as a critical tool of foreign policy. In 1871 there were
fewer than 200 diplomatic missions; today there are over 8,000.11 The new US embassy com-
pound in Beijing cost US$434 million, covers 10 acres, and employs nearly 1,000. Upon its
dedication the American ambassador said, “Our new embassy, together with the impressive
new Chinese embassy in Washington... are tangible symbols of the growth and importance
of our bilateral relationship.”12
These arguments generate a range of observable implications. If diplomacy is costly
rather than cheap, then verbal communication between states should aﬀect policymaker as-
sessments about the extent to which they share common interests. When states agree that
mutual gains may be possible, this favorable judgment will be reflected in internal deliber-
ations. More, diplomacy will increase the probability of cooperation from both parties.
I explore the eﬀect of diplomacy in US-China relations between 1969 and 1992, a period
which was characterized by intense, mutual suspicion, and during which cooperation was
both useful and fraught. The analysis draws from two original datasets. The first is a history
of China’s relations with the United States between 1949 and 2014. It is drawn from three
dozen primary and secondary sources and records 3,000 bilateral interactions across a host of
issue areas and sensitivity levels. I code daily episodes of diplomacy, criticism, cooperation,
and conflict. This dataset is, to my knowledge, one of only a handful on diplomacy and by
far the most extensive.13
The second dataset records senior American policymakers’ assessments of the extent to
which the United States shares interests with China. For the 1969-1979 period, I draw from
the Foreign Relations of the United States series, which is the oﬃcial record of declassified
10Aaron and Oksenberg (1979).
11Bayer (2006).
12Liu Shanshan (2008).
13I know of two other datasets on diplomacy. Trager (2015) finds that half the inferences drawn by British
foreign policy elites between the Crimean and First World wars were the result of diplomatic encounters,
defined as verbal or written speech acts. Trager (Forthcoming) records 1,100 demands, oﬀers, and assurances
made by European great powers between 1900 and 1914.
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policymaker discussions and memoranda. For the 1980-1992 period, I draw from tens of
thousands of documents yielded by two Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. I
employ computational methods to digitize the documents and extract day-level data on
American assessments of the extent of shared interests with China.
Reverse causality is a potential concern in estimating the relationships between diplo-
macy, assessments of common interests, and cooperation. Chinese diplomacy may encourage
American cooperation, but American cooperation renders Chinese diplomacy more likely.
Likewise, more favorable American assessments of shared interests with China may encour-
age American cooperation, but a history of cooperation may render favorable assessments
more likely. I attempt to overcome these sources of bias with dynamic causal inference. This
method is common in epidemiology and has been recently introduced to political science by
Blackwell (2013). By weighting observations according to the probability of diplomacy oc-
curring at any given point in time, it renders diplomacy as good as randomized conditional
on the observed history of recent interactions and other covariates. Reweighting the data in
this manner enables me to estimate the causal eﬀect of Chinese diplomacy upon American
assessments of shared interests and bilateral cooperation.
This paper advances our understanding of international relations by demonstrating that
in some circumstances, talk may aﬀect interstate perceptions and facilitate international
cooperation. Scholars have long struggled to measure the eﬀect of verbal communication in
international politics. The largest obstacle to this research agenda has been the absence of
primary data on the beliefs of policymakers. More, scholars have lacked high-quality data
on bilateral cooperation. Even if they studied the relatively crude measures of bilateral
cooperation that do exist, like trade flows or alliances, they would not have been able to
put that cooperation in the proper context, lacking data on diplomatic exchanges. Indeed,
a forthcoming book notes that “there is no large-N dataset that covers threats or other
diplomatic events that did not take place in the public eye.”14 Thus, scholars would not
have been able to understand the circumstances that yielded public cooperation.
14Trager (Forthcoming, 21).
4
By employing computational and archival methods to measure the beliefs of policymak-
ers and the private interactions between them, this paper suggests a range of important
questions for future research. When is verbal communication more or less likely to facilitate
cooperation? Do dyads or alliances that eﬀectively communicate secure better international
outcomes than those that do not? How do domestic politics aﬀect states’ ability to commu-
nicate? How does success in pursuing common interests aﬀect states’ ability to negotiate
over divergent interests? Does self-interested diplomacy yield goodwill over time?
This article proceeds as follows. Section 2 suggests that diplomacy is best understood as
a forum in which to pursue national interests, a belief common among diplomats. Section
3 introduces the original data on bilateral interactions and American assessments of China.
Section 4 tests the observable implications of the argument in a dynamic causal inference
framework. Section 5 concludes with suggestions for future research.
1.2 Understanding Diplomacy
1.2.1 An Intellectual History
In 1796, Edmund Burke coined the term “diplomacy.” Burke’s term has come to dominate
discourse, but has also, to a degree, obscured the fundamental purpose of the activity.
Before Burke, diplomacy was known as négociation continuelle: “ongoing negotiations.”
Seventeenth and eighteenth century diplomats had a stable understanding of the aims and
methods of diplomacy. Common interests, they agreed, were necessary for the emergence of
diplomacy.15 Had one state nothing to gain from another, cooperation would be impossible.
A state, then, employed diplomacy when it inferred another might share common interests.
If the other state agreed that interests were shared, negotiations began in which each side
attempted to secure its interests.
National interests, then, were paramount to these diplomats. “The chief prize of this
15This assumption is shared by the recent literature on costless diplomatic signaling. See, e.g., Sartori
(2002, 137).
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kind of ‘continuous negotiation’,” a diplomatic reference works concludes, “was obviously to
secure agreements congenial to one’s interests.”16 Abraham de Wiquefort wrote that the
“chief functions” of an ambassador were to convey information between princes, to gather
court secrets, and to “preserv[e] the interest of his master.”17 The Cardinal of Richelieu
wrote that “States receive so much benefit from uninterrupted foreign negotiations. . . that it
is unbelievable unless it is known from experience.” The diplomat’s art, in his view, was to
“find the right instant to attain his ends.”18
Indeed, Richelieu provided specific advice about how best to secure national interests.
Diplomats should provide convincing reasons to “men of genius,” but could capture the
sympathies of lesser men with trivial concessions. Sometimes diplomats should react harshly
to “imprudent remarks,” but other times they should have “an ear only for those remarks
leading toward the end in mind.” He forbade bluster due to the damage it could do to a
state’s reputation and advised secrecy to avoid interference by others.19
Overall, these diplomats shared three beliefs about diplomacy. Because diplomatic rep-
utations are valuable, verbal communication can aﬀect policymaker assessments. When
policymakers believe their state may share common interests with another, they become
more likely to cooperate. And finally, cooperation is likely to be reciprocated. A state
that incurs a reputation for defection will soon find few others willing to countenance the
exchange of policy concessions.
1.2.2 Diplomacy as Negotiation in US-China Relations
A range of anecdotal evidence suggests that diplomacy has played precisely this sort of
role in the US-China relationship. This subsection presents a range of archival evidence
that shows that American diplomats viewed themselves as negotiators trying to extract
16Berridge, Keens-Soper, and Otte (2001, 75).
17de Wicquefort (1716, 296).
18Hill (1961, 94-95).
19Berridge, Keens-Soper, and Otte (2001, 78).
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concessions from China. It then discusses the range of issues the two states negotiated
over, including economic, security, and human rights policy. Finally, it discusses the con-
tentious nature of many these exchanges, which supports an interpretation of diplomacy as
negotiation.
Reagan and Bush administration diplomats viewed themselves as negotiators pursuing
the national interest. Indeed, most personal files of NSC China staﬀ from this era involve
negotiating material: instructions, proposals, and counterproposals. One book-length report
from RAND entitled Chinese Negotiating Behavior appeared in many personal files. A NSC
memorandum advised Vice President Walter Mondale before a trip to China that
The Chinese do not engage in explicit horse-trading. Their initial bids also tend
to be close to their final price, and concessions come at the last minute. They
exhibit great patience and skill in extracting maximum concessions from their
adversaries but they never acknowledge these concessions. They never cease to
remind others of their own concessions, however.
It continued with advice about how best to pursue American interests in light of China’s
typical negotiating strategy:
. . . you should keep some items in reserve: certainly the President’s letter to
Hua and the Brown visit. You should keep the initiative in terms of setting the
agenda. And you should early on identify for them the items on which we expect
them to deliver so that you do not leave China unhappy: consulates, hydro-
electric agreement, commitment to enter into serious negotiations on aviation,
Chinese assistance and forbearance as we push the economic issues through the
Hill, Kampuchea, refugees, and Pakistan. You should subtly indicate there is
a chance you might leave China unhappy, and this would adversely eﬀect the
relationship for years to come.
Negotiations did not only involve economic issues. Some scholars expect that states
may more easily cooperate in economic policy, in which absolute gains benefit both parties,
than in security policy, in which relative gains considerations may make cooperation more
diﬃcult. To the contrary, China often requested and received security policy concessions
from the United States. In the mid-1970s, China wanted advanced military equipment
7
to balance the Soviet threat. Kissinger secretly facilitated China’s request. He publicly
denied knowledge of French and British military sales to China in order to insulate himself
from domestic criticism, but privately told Britain that the United States would look the
other way.20 In 1979, President Carter told French, West German, and British leaders that
he “would not be unhappy with a more relaxed Western attitude regarding Chinese arms
purchases.”21 He soon approved satellite and radar sales to China. The same year, Deng
requested American electronics to spy on Soviet nuclear tests. After negotiating the terms of
cooperation—that Chinese technicians would operate the equipment but that China would
share intelligence with the United States—the two countries jointly installed monitoring
equipment in western China in 1980.22
Other negotiations involved human rights issues. For example, in 1997, Jiang Zemin
“hinted” he might be willing to release a prominent Chinese dissident, Wei Jingsheng, if the
Clinton administration agreed not to “use” Wei against China and could get Wei to state that
he was leaving China voluntarily.23 After Wei was released, American oﬃcials “welcomed the
news on weekend talk shows,” then-National Intelligence Council East Asia oﬃcer Robert
Suettinger wrote, “but provided no details of the complex and extended negotiations that
had brought it about.”24
The negotiations that led to these outcomes were often contentious. The fact that they
were suggests that diplomats viewed these exchanges as a forum to advance national interests
in the short term. For example, in 2008, Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson was involved in
financial liberalization negotiations with China’s chief trade negotiator Wu Yi. “When my
team at Treasury and I heard we weren’t getting the equity caps concession,” he wrote, “we...
decided to invite Wu Yi and colleagues to dinner at my home to work on her some more.”
20Ross (1995, 89).
21Ross (1995, 148).
22Ross (1995, 147-151).
23Suettinger (2003, 340).
24Suettinger (2003, 340).
8
Paulson and Wu had a “loud” discussion on the patio, in which Paulson shouted, “You and
I promised each other that there wouldn’t be any surprises, but here I am, surprised and
embarrassed.”25
Another example of a contentious yet productive exchange was Secretary of State James
Baker’s meeting with Premier Li Peng in November 1991. One NSC member described the
exchange as “the worst meeting I’ve ever been in in my life,” while the American ambas-
sador called it “the tensest and most confrontational meeting I ever sat in on in China.”
Nonetheless, by the end of the trip, Baker conceded to China’s request to remove sanctions
on high-speed computers and satellite technology. In return, China agreed to observe the
Missile Technology Control Regime, to attempt to prevent the export of prison labor prod-
ucts to the United States, to investigate intellectual property rights theft, and to release two
“prominent” dissidents.26
1.2.3 Taking Stock
Diplomacy, and the negotiation that often follows, aims to secure national interests
through the exchange of policy concessions over time. As two NSC staﬀers explained, “mu-
tual eﬀorts are necessary to achieve our objective. ...it is in China’s interest to have good
relations with us; they need us as much as we need them.”27 Other theories suggest that
diplomacy may reflect domestic partisan concerns, that it may seek to reshape other states’
interests through persuasion or socialization, or that it may involve the irrational expression
of emotion. In contrast, I argue that diplomacy is fundamentally about reciprocal policy
concessions. It proceeds from common interests and helps states move toward the Pareto
frontier over the long-term. While diplomacy may have favorable long-term consequences
for trust and goodwill, it is most proximately a forum for pursuing mutual gains.
If diplomacy is a tool that states employ to identify common interests and negotiate
25Paulson (2015, 209-210).
26Suettinger (2003, 130-131).
27Aaron and Oksenberg (1979).
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policy concessions, then we should observe three trends in the historical record. First,
diplomacy must be able to aﬀect the beliefs of policymakers. Mainstream IR theory argues
that verbal communication can have no such eﬀect. For example, Andrew Kydd argues that
Mikhail Gorbachev’s initial eﬀorts to cooperate with the West were discounted because they
were costless; it was only when Gorbachev unilaterally cut 50,000 troops in Eastern Europe
that the United States believed that his move towards “defensive defense” was credible.28 In
contrast, I expect that diplomats are able to influence each other’s beliefs about common
interests in general. This yields the first hypothesis:
H1: Following a Chinese diplomatic overture, American policymakers should be
more likely to believe they share common interests with China.
Second, after receiving a diplomatic overture, a state will be more likely to grant a policy
concession. Because states know they will interact in the future, they will be willing to
make concessions now in order to secure concessions important to them in the future. Game
theorists find that cooperation under anarchy can be sustained by tit-for-tat strategies.29
As long as players expect to interact in the future, cheap signals increase the probability
of cooperation. I expect that the logic of iterated interaction should be as compelling for
states as it is for individuals. This yields the next hypothesis:
H2: Conditional on a recent diplomatic overture, the probability of American
cooperation with China will be higher than otherwise.
Finally, policy concessions are likely to be reciprocated. Indeed, archival evidence sug-
gests that reciprocation was often expected between the United States and China. For ex-
ample, in December 1989, Under Secretary of State Robert Kimmitt advised the president
that “The Chinese have been calling on us to take the first steps to rebuild the relationship,
28Kydd (2007).
29Axelrod and Hamilton (1981); Crawford (1998); Crawford and Sobel (1982); Farrell and Gibbons (1989);
Tingley and Walter (2011).
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implying but not saying outright that they will reciprocate should we move.”30 Similarly,
in May 1984, China oﬀered to make peaceful reunification overtures to Taiwan, conditional
on the United States terminating arms sales.31
Just as Baker’s decision to remove sanctions on military technology exports was rewarded
with Chinese concessions on nonproliferation, trade, and human rights, I suggest that diplo-
mats are likely to reciprocate each other’s concessions in general. Failure to do so would
harm their reputation, which would make it more diﬃcult for them to secure concessions
important to them in the future. This yields a final hypothesis:
H3: Conditional on a recent diplomatic overture, the probability of Chinese
cooperation with the United States will be higher than otherwise.
1.3 Data
1.3.1 Diplomatic Data
US-China Interactions, 1949-2014
To test the hypotheses, I constructed a dataset of over 3,000 bilateral interactions be-
tween 1949 and 2014 from three dozen primary and secondary sources listed in B. I drew
from historical volumes, policymaker memoirs, case studies, periodicals that follow Chi-
nese politics such as the China Leadership Monitor, declassified primary source documents,
and leaked American diplomatic cables from 1990 onwards provided by WikiLeaks.32 This
analysis is restricted to 1969-1992, the period covered by the policymaker assessment data
introduced below.
By hand coding some 10,000 pages of historical documents, I was able to capture private
encounters that do not appear in traditional event datasets. In my coding scheme, a bilateral
30Kimmitt (1989).
31Laux (1983).
32Wikileaks covers US-China relations between 2003 and the end of 2009 with the greatest frequency.
However, some cables cover the 1990-2002 period.
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interaction is an episode of contact between the two states. For example, in 1950 the United
States voted against replacing Taiwan with the People’s Republic in the United Nations.
Later that year, Premier Zhou Enlai sent Washington private, third party warnings not to
invade Korea through the Indian ambassador to China. In 1986, the Reagan administration
secretly requested Chinese assistance in arming the Nicaraguan contras. China complied.
After being lobbied by FedEx and UPS in 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton requested
that China reduce barriers to entering its postal market.
For all these episodes, I recorded the date of the interaction. When it was not possible
to identify the exact date, I identified the month that it occurred. I next recorded the source
and target of the interaction. Most international events are directional. For example, John
F. Kennedy oﬀered food aid to China, while Hank Paulson requested that China appreciate
the renminbi. Some, however, involve equal eﬀort by both parties, like negotiating or signing
an agreement. I duplicated these events so both sides received credit equally.
I then recorded the action itself: diplomacy, criticism, cooperation, or conflict. With
a few adjustments for IR theory discussed below, these categories are similar to the “quad
scores” employed in event datasets, which record verbal cooperation, verbal conflict, material
cooperation, and material conflict.
I define diplomacy as cooperation in word rather than deed. As shown in Table 1.1, it
includes positive statements, requests, meetings, negotiations, visits, explanations, reassur-
ances, oﬀers, statements of regret, proposals, and promises.
Cooperation, in contrast, entails material deeds. It includes audience cost generating
oﬃcial apologies, the release of imprisoned foreign nationals, concessions, the provision of
economic or humanitarian aid, the signing of oﬃcial agreements, presidential summits, and
yielding militarily.
Criticism entails negative verbal interactions. As shown in Table 1.2, it includes un-
friendly statements made by executive or congressional figures, the postponement of sched-
uled talks, the downgrading of diplomatic protocol for a visit, refusals, demands, warnings,
private threats, and public threats made by low ranking oﬃcials. In keeping with the IR
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Table 1.1: Positive Interactions
Action
Positive statement
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
Diplomacy
Request
Meet
Negotiate
Invite
Visit
Explain
Reassure
Oﬀer
Express regret
Propose
Promise
Apologize
9>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>;
Cooperation
Release nationals
Cooperative congressional action
Concede
Aid
Sign agreement
Hold summit
Yield militarily
* See Appendix A for examples.
literature I draw the line between criticism and conflict at audience cost generating leader
threats.33 Private threats between executives or their representatives are “cheap” because
they do not incur domestic audience costs. Low ranking or retired oﬃcials are not credible
sources of executive intent, thus, IR theory considers their threats cheap as well.
Conflict includes public leader threats, the obstruction of the other side’s initiatives,
the withdrawal of support, the cancellation of planned exchanges, punitive economic ac-
tions, hostile congressional acts, human rights violations, interfering in the other party’s
domestic aﬀairs, inciting anti-foreign nationalist protest, arresting the other state’s nation-
als, espionage, formally downgrading relations, and all forms of military claims, exercises,
and conflict.
Because Taiwan, Tibet, and Chinese dissidents are salient in the bilateral relationship,
I record American cooperation with these entities as conflict with China, and conflict with
33Fearon (1994); Weeks (2008). Some studies suggest that autocrats are only able to generate audience
costs by inciting domestic nationalist protests (Weiss 2013, 2014; Kinne and Marinov 2013). The results are
robust to this modification.
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Table 1.2: Negative Interactions
Action
Negative statement
9>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>;
“Criticism”
Congressional hearing
Postpone
Downgrade protocol
Refuse
Demand
Warn
Private threats
Public low ranking threats
Public leader threats
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
Conflict
Obstruct
Withdraw support
Cancel exchanges
Punitive economic action
Congressional act
Infringe upon human rights
Intervene on behalf of dissident
Incite protest
Arrest nationals
Espionage
Develop weapon system
Assert territorial claim
Proliferate
Downgrade relationship
Military exercise
Military conflict
* See Appendix A for examples.
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them as cooperation with China. Examples of all action types appear in Appendix A.34
I then recorded the issue area of the interaction, such as arms sales or intellectual
property rights, as well as its private or public venue. Finally, I recorded a description of
the event and its source.
Trends
Figure 1.1 visualizes the bilateral relationship since 1949. The top panel shows the
number of diplomatic, critical, cooperative, and conflictual interactions initiated by China
annually. The bottom panel shows the same data for the United States. Diplomacy is more
common than criticism and talk is far more common than action. The volume of bilateral
interaction expanded massively over the study period. This is unsurprising since the two
countries avoided oﬃcial contact before 1969 and normalized relations only in 1978. Two
gaps in the dataset—in the mid-1980s and the early 2000s—reflect sparsity in the primary
and secondary historical record. However, I expect that this source of measurement error is
classical.
The United States and China interacted diﬀerently in periods of common versus divergent
interests. Table 1.3 reports annual rates of diplomacy, cooperation, and conflict in two
periods. I define 1949-1968 as the period of “divergent interests” due to the strong Sino-
Soviet alliance. I define 1969-1989 as the period of “common interests,” beginning with the
Sino-Soviet split and ending with the fall of the Berlin Wall.
The tabulation is rough but instructive. When the two countries shared common in-
terests, bilateral diplomacy was 10 times as frequent and bilateral cooperation 5 times as
frequent. Bilateral conflict was slightly less frequent, averaging 0.95 conflicts per year com-
pared to 0.8. Overall, the table supports the basic presumption of diplomats and the costless
signaling literature: common interests facilitate diplomacy and cooperation.
34A note is appropriate on routine military patrols. There are many of these and they are diﬃcult to
record accurately. I record policy changes that alter military patrols—making them more aggressive, for
instance, or mandating them in new areas—rather than the specific patrols themselves. This is appropriate
because policymakers respond to changes in the other side’s assertiveness rather than to status quo patrols.
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Figure 1.1: Diplomacy Data
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Table 1.3: Annual Frequency of Bilateral Interactions by Period
Interests Change
Divergent Common
1949-1968 1969-1989
DiplomacyPRC 1.1 7.85 7.1⇥
DiplomacyUSA 0.95 11.35 12.0⇥
CooperationPRC 0.55 1.6 2.9⇥
CooperationUSA 0.4 2.8 7.0⇥
ConflictPRC 1 0.35 0.35⇥
ConflictUSA 0.85 1.25 1.5⇥
Comparisons
This dataset represents a significant advance over existing event datasets. The popular
Militarized Interstate Dispute dataset records only costly forms of conflict, not cooperation.
Daily event datasets such as GDELT or Gary King’s “10 million events” record bilateral
interactions with great frequency but tremendous noise. By my estimation, 20-30% of these
events are false positives or false negatives: respectively, events that were omitted by the
automated event coding process and events that were included mistakenly.
Additionally, I identified many more diplomatic action types than recorded in standard
event ontologies like Conflict and Mediation Event Observations (CAMEO). Existing on-
tologies were constructed from news wires, which omit some important types of diplomatic
interaction. Examples include demurring, canceling an invitation, postponing talks, ex-
pressing restraint, passing a congressional resolution, and sentencing or oﬀering asylum to
a dissident. Omissions are also considerable for classified military interactions. For ex-
ample, China has occasionally employed aggressive aircraft tails and submarine dogfights.
These episodes are very important, but appear only in policymaker memoirs and declassified
documents. Finally, many international negotiations take place out of the public eye and
escape the attention of news wires. Virtually all of the diplomacy discussed in Section 2, for
example, would not appear in standard event datasets.
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1.3.2 American Assessments of Shared Interests with China, 1969-1992
The second dataset records senior American policymaker assessments of the degree to
which the United States shared common interests with China. For the 1969-1981 period, I
draw from the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series. FRUS is the “oﬃcial
documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic
activity of the United States Government.”35 It consists chiefly of policymaker discussion
transcripts and memoranda.
FRUS eﬀectively operates with a 40-year declassification schedule. To gather more data
on American perceptions, I submitted Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests for
national security documents on China to the Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush presi-
dential libraries. From each, I received tens of thousands of pages of declassified documents.
I digitized all FRUS and FOIA documents that contained assessments of China between
1969 and 1992. These typically include meeting transcripts and memoranda between NSC
principals and deputies, the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Commerce, and the presi-
dent. They also include less common reports such as National Security Decision Directives.
Because FRUS is composed of the same material I accessed through FOIA, the two corpora
are very similar.
To convert documents into time series data on policymaker assessments of China, I iden-
tified each instance that a document referenced “China,” “Chinese,” “Beijing,” or a Chinese
leader’s name on day t. For each identifier, I then extracted the 10 words before and after
the reference. This is known as the “concordance method” and isolates the segment of speech
that refers directly to the identifier. Next, drawing on standard semantic dictionaries, I mea-
sured how fulsome or critical were these 20 words.36 The variable Assessmentt captures the
tone of policymaker deliberations about China. It measures the number of fulsome words,
35Phillips and Keefer (2006, iii).
36I employed the Positiv and Negativ dictionaries from Stone (2016). The results are robust to 30, 40,
and 50 word concordance segments. In order to ensure accurate matches, I used a snowball stemmer to
reduce dictionary entries and document words to their root stems. Before generating concordance segments,
I removed punctuation but not numbers.
18
divided by the number of fulsome plus critical words, in the 20-word segment.
Could the variable capture anything other than assessments of shared interests? For
instance, if positive tone indicated that American policymakers felt goodwill toward China
or trusted China, this might support a constructivist interpretation of diplomacy rather
than the interest based explanation of diplomacy that I propose. Based on my qualitative
reading of the documents, however, I concluded that this is not a concern. There were
virtually no expressions of abstract goodwill or trust in policymaker deliberations. While
policymakers sometimes praised China, they did so because China had done something that
served American interests. Similarly, American policymakers rarely discussed whether they
should or did trust China.37
Table 1.4 shows a document that positively assessed China. To illustrate how I score
positive and negative tone, I bold the identifier and then italicize the 10 words on either
side. Positive words are rendered in blue, while negative words are rendered in red. This
document contains 23 positive words and 3 negative words in the concordance segments,
and so registers a net positive coverage of 88.5%, considerably higher than the mean tone
of 68.5% over 1969-1992. By the standards of my corpus, this article is optimistic about
the extent of common interests. Indeed, the author states this explicitly: “we have seen a
substantial improvement in US-China relations. The Chinese fundamentally share our view
that a strong bilateral relationship serves our mutual interests.”
Table 1.5 shows a document with a pessimistic assessment of China. This passage
contains 3 positive words and 3 negative words in the concordance segments, and so registers
a net positive coverage of 50%, considerably lower than the sample mean of 68.5% over 1969-
1992. The low score reflects the author’s pessimistic assessment of the extent of common
37Indeed, Reagan and Bush era policymakers only used the term “trust” in reference to how Chinese
elites distrusted each other, how Chinese students distrusted the government, and how China distrusted
Japan and the USSR. In one case, a policymaker warned that reversing the Carter ban on contact with
Taiwanese oﬃcials would foster Chinese mistrust. In a 1981 memorandum on Taiwan policy, Ambassador
Lilley counseled Richard Allen to tell the Chinese that “They need to understand that trust works both
ways.” In 1984, an interagency study noted that “responsible behavior by the Chinese” in military areas
“will help reassure U.S. strategic planners and increase trust between us.” Chinese leaders did, however, tell
American policymakers they were “trustworthy” on several occasions.
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Table 1.4: Example Document: Common Interests
SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 7 , 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE
SUBJECT: Your Visit to China
Issue
Your trip to China will further document your leadership in establishing a peaceful
framework for relations among the world’s great powers. Moreover, the trip should
highlight a continuity of policy towards achievement of this end, drawing on past
accomplishments (Williamsburg Summit, Japan/Korea), and directed toward the future
(London Summit).
Facts
A secure, stable, and economically viable China is obviously essential to peace and
stability in the Pacific Basin. It is also central to eﬀective deterrence of Soviet
expansionism and hegemony in global terms. To achieve our objectives, the US should seek
to maintain solid bilateral and multilateral ties which contribute importantly to both
regional and global stability as well as to bilateral, economic, political, and security
arrangements. A good relationship with China also assists Taiwan as it helps dissuade
Beijing from taking hostile action against the Taiwanese.
Over the past year, we have seen a substantial improvement in US-China relations. The
Chinese fundamentally share our view that a strong bilateral relationship serves our
mutual interests. Premier Zhao’s January visit to the United States moved this process
forward and developed a personal rapport between you and the Chinese leadership; it
reinforced our common goals of blocking Soviet expansionism; it stimulated dialogue on
cooperative means to realize greater stability on the Korean peninsula; it renewed our very
useful agreement on science and technology exchange and resulted in a new agreement on
industrial cooperation; and it reemphasized our common commitment to expand economic
relations and to assist China in its modernization program.
These themes should be further developed and carried forward during your visit to China.
In addition, the visit should tangibly demonstrate our active interest in developing nations
and reaﬃrm our broader goal of seeking greater cohesion among the nations of the Pacific
Basin. ...
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Table 1.5: Example Document: Divergent Interests
SECRET/SENSITIVE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
May 24, 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: The President
From: Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Subject: Taiwan Arms Sales: Next Steps Following Vice President’s Visit
China’s de facto ruler, Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping has asked for something the US
Government cannot give: a private assurance that the United States will gradually reduce
and eventually cease arms sales to Taiwan “within a certain period of time.” He wants you
to do this privately, because he knows we will not do so publicly. We cannot comply, not
only because it would violate the TRA – unless caveated so heavily the Chinese would
surely reject it – but because we cannot deal with an issue of this nature on the basis of
secret understandings.
Despite the Vice President’s superb and successful eﬀort to improve the atmosphere, the
crisis in US-China relations therefore remains. In their treatment of the Vice President,
and statements to him, particularly those by Deng, the Chinese have shown a strong
desire to improve relations; but they continue to press us to accept, in principle, that arms
sales must one day end, and they seem determined to push for this bottom line, even at
the possible risk of a downgrading. ...
interests with China: “Deng Xiaoping has asked for something the US Government cannot
give.”
Broader trends in American assessments correspond to the historical record. Figure 1.2
shows average annual American assessments of China between 1969 and 1992. Policymakers
became more optimistic about the prospects for cooperation with China after the Sino-Soviet
split emerged in 1969. Assessments cooled in the two years prior to Mao Zedong’s death in
1976, a chaotic time for Chinese domestic politics that made international progress diﬃcult.
American assessments rebounded as Deng undertook reforms to open China to the world
economy in the late 1970s. They cooled in 1981, reflecting bitter disagreement over the terms
of a joint communiqué concerning arms sales to Taiwan. American policymakers remained
generally optimistic about the prospects for cooperation throughout the 1980s, a decade
of economic liberalization and security cooperation. American assessments became very
pessimistic after Tiananmen. China’s crackdown drastically reduced its common interests
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Figure 1.2: American Assessments of Shared Interests with China
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with a democracy. Assessments became more favorable between 1990 and 1992 as the two
sides sought to quietly rebuild the relationship despite congressional hostility to China.
1.4 Analysis
Subsection 1 explains dynamic causal inference. Subsection 2 estimates the eﬀect of
Chinese diplomacy upon senior American policymakers’ assessment of the degree to which
the United States shared common interests with China. Subsection 3 estimates the eﬀect of
Chinese diplomacy upon the probability of American cooperation with China. Subsection 4
estimates the eﬀect of Chinese diplomacy upon the probability of Chinese cooperation with
the United States. Subsection 5 presents robustness checks, including ordinary least squares
(OLS) models and a discussion of how often cooperation is actually preceded by diplomacy
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and updated assessments in the dataset.
1.4.1 Dynamic Causal Inference
In traditional single-shot causal inference, a group is treated and its outcome is compared
to that of an untreated group. The diﬀerence in outcomes is the average causal treatment
eﬀect. In many real-world settings, single-shot causal inference is impossible. For example,
a doctor treating a patient alters the treatment regimen based on its success. Democrats
campaigning for oﬃce decide to run negative advertisements based on whether they and
their rivals have done so in the past. China decides whether to initiate diplomacy based on
its recent interactions with the United States. In each case, the treatment—administering
medicine, going negative, or initiating diplomacy—is not randomized. In US-China rela-
tions, recent bilateral actions are “time-varying confounders”: they influence whether China
employs diplomacy in the future, and are aﬀected by whether China employed diplomacy in
the past.
Dynamic causal inference solves this problem with inverse probability of treatment
weighting (IPTW). The method is widely used in epidemiology and was recently introduced
to political science.38 The intuition behind it is quite simple. IPTW reweights observations
to make Chinese diplomacy as good as randomized conditional on the observed history. For
example, diplomacy is more likely when recent interactions have been positive. To remove
this source of time-varying confounding, we can give less weight to common strategies, so
that in the reweighted data all strategies have the same weight. That is, in the reweighted
data, China will be as likely to initiate diplomacy when recent relations have been poor as
when they have been friendly. In the reweighted data, the action sequences are balanced
across time-varying confounders. Thus, there is no omitted variable bias.39 The researcher
can then analyze the reweighted data as though they were randomized.
38Robins, Hernan, and Brumback (2000); Blackwell (2013).
39For a full discussion, see Blackwell (2013, 507). Also note: Dynamic causal inference is preferable
to another popular approach, structural equation modeling, because the latter requires a constant eﬀects
assumption to estimate dynamic causal eﬀects.
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The method enables causal inference conditional on two assumptions: sequential ignor-
ability and positivity. Sequential ignorability is fulfilled if, conditional on the past, Chinese
policymakers who decide to initiate diplomacy are similar to those who do not.40 Sequential
ignorability would be violated if an omitted variable besides recent interactions influenced
China’s decision to initiate diplomacy. Therefore I control for the other international and do-
mestic sources of Chinese diplomacy as best I can. Positivity is a technical requirement that
theoretically possible action sequences occur in the actual data. It would be violated, for
example, if China never initiated diplomacy. The positivity assumption is not problematic
because China initiated diplomacy many times over 1969-1992.
To employ the IPTW method, the researcher first explicitly models the probability of
treatment and then estimates the probability of the outcome based on the treatment his-
tory.41
1.4.2 Chinese Diplomacy and American Perceptions
The first hypothesis states that following a diplomatic overture, American policymakers
should be more likely to believe they share common interests with China. If diplomacy is
cheap, as some IR scholars suggest, it should not aﬀect American assessments of China.
But if American policymakers discuss China more favorably after a Chinese diplomatic
initiative, this is evidence that China has verbally communicated information that American
policymakers believe to be credible.
To test this hypothesis, first I model the probability of treatment, a dichotomous measure
of whether China initiated diplomacy on day t 1, as a function of international and domestic
factors. Recent bilateral interactions profoundly influence China’s propensity to initiate
diplomacy. I define Net cooperationUSA as the number of cooperative interaction the United
40More formally, the sequential ignorability assumption “states that action decision at time t is independent
of the potential outcomes, conditional on the covariate and action histories up to that point” (Blackwell 2013,
509).
41I employ the iptw_est() function in the causaldrf R package developed by Galagate and Schafer
(2015).
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States initiated less the number of conflictual interactions it initiated in the past fortnight. I
define Net diplomacyUSA as the number of diplomatic interactions the United States initiated
less the number of critical interactions it initiated in the past fortnight. Because Chinese
foreign policy may be path dependent, I include Net cooperationPRC and Net diplomacyPRC
in the past fortnight as well.
Other slow moving variables may influence China’s decision to initiate diplomacy. As
China grows more powerful, it may require fewer policy concessions from the United States
and may thus initiate diplomacy less frequently. Therefore I include the ratio of Chinese to
American military expenditures and Chinese GDP per capita. Because interdependent states
presumably cooperate more, I include the natural log of bilateral trade volume. I include
the average value of these variables over the past fortnight, although they are almost always
observed at the year level.
China may be less focused on its relationship with the United States when it is burdened
elsewhere. Therefore I include a dichotomous indicator of whether China is involved in an
ongoing militarized interstate dispute. This variable takes a value of 1 if China was involved
in a dispute within the past fortnight.
China’s domestic politics may also influence its foreign policy. Party congresses chart
new courses for Chinese foreign and domestic policy. China’s independence day is a cause
for nationalist celebration and might render China more aggressive abroad. I include di-
chotomous indicators for whether these days occurred within the past fortnight.
Finally, I include three sets of fixed eﬀects in separate models. Mao Zedong, Deng
Xiaoping, and Jiang Zemin brought diﬀerent priorities and negotiating strategies to foreign
aﬀairs. It would be unreasonable to constrain their probability of initiating diplomacy to
the same intercept. Therefore I include leader fixed eﬀects. American presidents engaged
with China diﬀerently, and so I include administration fixed eﬀects. Finally, I account for
unobserved sources of variation with year fixed eﬀects. The estimating equation for the
treatment model is thus:
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Logit (Diplomacy)PRCt 1 =  1(Net diplomacy)
PRC
t 1:t 14
+  2(Net cooperation)PRCt 1:t 14
+  3(Net diplomacy)USAt 1:t 14
+  4(Net cooperation)USAt 1:t 14
+  5(Ongoing MID)PRCt 1:t 14
+  6(Military expenditure)
PRC/USA
t 1:t 14
+  7(GDP per capita)PRCt 1:t 14
+  8(Log trade volume)PRC+USAt 1:t 14
+  9(Party Congress)PRCt 1:t 14
+  10(Independence day)PRCt 1:t 14
+  t
(1.1)
where  t represents leader, administration, or year fixed eﬀects depending on the model.
The treatment model yields the reweighted data. In the reweighted data, the probability of
Chinese diplomacy is as good as random, conditional on the of covariates.
I employ the reweighted data to estimate the outcome model. The outcome model
estimates the eﬀect of the treatment, Chinese diplomacy, upon the probability of improved
American assessments the following day. The outcome variable, Improved assessmentUSAt ,
is a dichotomous variable that takes a value of 1 if American assessments on a given day
were higher than their last observed value. Because the covariates have already been used
to reweight the data, they are not included as controls in the outcome model. Its estimating
equation is thus:
Logit (Improved assessment)USAt =  1(Diplomacy)
PRC
t 1 (1.2)
The results appear in Table 1.6. The top panel shows treatment estimates and the bottom
panel shows outcome estimates. Model (1) estimates the probability of Chinese diplomacy
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as a function of recent bilateral actions. Model (2) includes domestic and international
covariates. Model (3) includes administration fixed eﬀects. Model (4) includes leader fixed
eﬀects. Model (5) drops administration and leader fixed eﬀects in favor of year fixed eﬀects.
Because administrations, leaders, and years overlap considerably, it is diﬃcult to include
them all in the same model.
In the absence of fixed eﬀects, Chinese diplomacy appears to have no relationship with
American policymaker assessments in Models (1) and (2). But when administration-, leader-
, and year-level sources of variation are accounted for, Chinese diplomacy renders American
assessments more favorable. The eﬀect is precisely estimated (at the <1% significance
level) owing to the day-level data. More, the point estimate is relatively stable across the
three fixed eﬀect models. On average, an episode of Chinese diplomacy renders American
policymakers an estimated 12.2% to 14.2% more optimistic about the extent of shared
interests with China.42
In a real-world setting, this is a reasonably sized point estimate. Chinese diplomacy
should rarely produce a seachange in American assessments. Rather, American deliberations
about China become slightly more positive after a diplomatic proposal, reflecting Ameri-
can policymakers’ cautious optimism that American interests might be advanced through
negotiations.
The fact that there is any shift at all in American assessments following an episode of
Chinese diplomacy is evidence that verbal communication between states is not “cheap.” To
the contrary, Chinese diplomatic proposals lead American policymakers to view China more
favorably in their private discussions.
1.4.3 American Perceptions and American Cooperation
The second hypothesis states that once American policymaker assessments improve, the
probability of American cooperation with China will rise. This hypothesis captures the
42The outcome model is logistic, so these figures are calculated by exponentiating the coeﬃcients:
exp(0.155) and exp(0.132), respectively.
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Table 1.6: Causal Eﬀect of Chinese Diplomacy on American Perceptions (IPTW)
Treatment Model
DiplomacyPRCt 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Net diplomacyPRCt 1:t 14 0.5662⇤⇤ 6.902e-01⇤⇤ 2.103e+00⇤⇤⇤ 2.095e+00⇤⇤ 2.344e+00⇤⇤
(0.1855) (2.357e-01) (6.303e-01) (6.372e-01) (7.323e-01)
Net cooperationPRCt 1:t 14 -0.1111 -2.909e-01 -2.637e+00⇤ -2.624e+00⇤ -2.513e+00†
(0.9222) (9.131e-01) (1.319e+00) (1.325e+00) (1.395e+00)
Net diplomacyUSAt 1:t 14 -0.2867 -3.155e-01 -1.329e+00⇤ -1.325e+00⇤ -1.556e+00⇤
(0.2925) (3.398e-01) (5.787e-01) (5.802e-01) (6.542e-01)
Net cooperationUSAt 1:t 14 -0.8546⇤ -8.424e-01† -1.286e+00⇤ -1.282e+00⇤ -1.670e+00⇤
(0.3626) (4.804e-01) (5.571e-01) (5.577e-01) (7.250e-01)
Ongoing MIDPRCt 1:t 14 -1.126e+00 -4.137e-02 -6.733e-02 -1.730e+00
(1.095e+00) (1.647e+00) (1.678e+00) (3.386e+00)
Military expenditurePRC/USAt 1:t 14 -3.348e+00 -4.095e+01
⇤ -4.062e+01⇤ -6.917e+01
(1.099e+01) (2.027e+01) (2.062e+01) (2.568e+05)
GDP per capitaPRCt 1:t 14 -8.948e-04 -2.006e-03 -2.136e-03 1.290e+00
(4.395e-03) (1.775e-02) (1.784e-02) (4.112e+02)
Log trade volumePRC+USAt 1:t 14 -1.652e-01 2.460e-01 2.423e-01 -1.657e+01
(2.678e-01) (5.294e-01) (5.321e-01) (1.653e+04)
Party congressPRCt 1:t 14 -1.516e+01 -1.631e+01 -1.633e+01 -1.647e+01
(4.360e+03) (1.437e+04) (1.443e+04) (1.728e+04)
Independence dayPRCt 1:t 14 -1.438e+01 -1.510e+01 -1.510e+01 -1.434e+01
(2.093e+03) (7.829e+03) (7.790e+03) (7.459e+03)
Constant -4.7433⇤⇤⇤ -1.549e+00 -2.786e+00 -2.546e+00 -7.751e+02
(0.4580) (5.516e+00) (2.511e+01) (2.529e+01) (2.651e+05)
Administration fixed eﬀects No No Yes Yes No
Leader fixed eﬀects No No No Yes No
Year fixed eﬀects No No No No Yes
Observations 644 644 640 640 640
AIC 84.23 94.11 85.48 89.47 114.44
Outcome Model
Improved AssessmentUSAt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DiplomacyPRCt 1 -0.076410 0.041718 0.132340⇤⇤ 0.132424⇤⇤ 0.115334⇤⇤⇤
(0.127865) (0.131696) (0.043260) (0.043457) (0.023744)
Constant -0.001295 -0.001292 -0.001113 -0.001112 -0.001311
(0.007435) (0.007435) (0.007437) (0.007437) (0.007459)
Note: †p<0.1; ⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤p<0.01
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idea that diplomacy elicits negotiations, which, if successful, lead to an exchange of policy
concessions.
To test this hypothesis, first I model the treatment: average American assessments of
shared interests with China within the past fortnight. In contrast to the first hypothesis
test, I measure American assessments as the mean deviation from their average level. I
do so in order to be able to show how much a given improvement in assessments aﬀects
the probability of cooperation. After all, policymaker assessments may change a little or
a lot: this presumably weighs heavily in deciding whether or not to cooperate with China.
From an econometric standpoint, it is not problematic to employ mean deviations, because
American assessments of China were not trended over the period.43 Because the treatment
variable is continuous rather than dichotomous, I estimate the treatment model with OLS.
I model American assessments in the past fortnight as a function of that fortnight’s
values of all the abovementioned covariates. I do so because American assessments are
influenced by the recent bilateral history of interactions, slow moving variables that capture
shifting power dynamics and interdependence, and Chinese domestic variables that American
policymakers might believe to aﬀect prospects for cooperation. In addition, I control for
American perceptions in the previous fortnight (t   15 : t   28). American assessments
might be path dependent, so it is important to include this lagged measure. The estimating
equation for the treatment model is thus:
43Figure B.1 in Appendix B shows day-level assessments between 1969 and 1992.
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OLS (Assessment)USAt 1:t 14 =  1(Net diplomacy)
PRC
t 1:t 14
+  2(Net cooperation)PRCt 1:t 14
+  3(Net diplomacy)USAt 1:t 14
+  4(Net cooperation)USAt 1:t 14
+  5(Ongoing MID)PRCt 1:t 14
+  6(Military expenditure)
PRC/USA
t 1:t 14
+  7(GDP per capita)PRCt 1:t 14
+  8(Log trade volume)PRC+USAt 1:t 14
+  9(Party Congress)PRCt 1:t 14
+  10(Independence day)PRCt 1:t 14
+  11(Assessment)USAt 15:t 28
+  t + ✏
(1.3)
where, as before,  t represents leader, administration, or year fixed eﬀects depending
on the model. The treatment model enables me to reweight the data to make observed
American assessments as good as random, conditional on the set of covariates in the model.
Next, I use the reweighted data to estimate the eﬀect of American assessments in the
past fortnight upon the probability of American cooperation. The outcome variable is a
dichotomous measure of whether the United States cooperated with China on a given day.
The estimating equation for the outcome model is thus:
OLS (Cooperation)USAt =  1(Assessment)
USA
t 1:t 14
+ ✏
(1.4)
The results appear in Table 1.7. Model (1) estimates American assessments of China
as a function of recent bilateral actions. Model (2) includes domestic and international
covariates. Model (3) includes administration and leader fixed eﬀects. Model (4) drops
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administration and leader fixed eﬀects in favor of year fixed eﬀects. As before, because
administrations, leaders, and years overlap considerably, it is diﬃcult to include them all in
the same model.
In the absence of fixed eﬀects, American assessments of shared interests with China
appear to have no relationship with subsequent American cooperation with China in Model
(1). But when administration and leader sources of variation are accounted for, improved
assessments increase the probability of American cooperation in Models (2) and (3). Again,
owing to the day-level data, the eﬀect is precisely estimated (at the <1% significance level).
When year fixed eﬀects are used instead of leader and administration fixed eﬀects in Model
(4), the eﬀect is just shy of conventional significance levels (p = 0.11).
The estimated eﬀect is relatively stable across the three fixed eﬀect models. A one per-
centage point increase in American assessments in the previous fortnight renders American
cooperation on a given day an estimated 0.7 to 1.3 percentage points more likely. This
appears to be a small estimated eﬀect, but recall that the first IPTW model showed that an
episode of Chinese diplomacy improved American perceptions by 12.2% to 14.2% on aver-
age. If American policymaker assessments increased by this percentage starting from their
mean value, then cooperation would become 5.9% to 10.9% more likely.
In a real-world setting, this is a moderately sized eﬀect, considering that international
cooperation is rare and usually takes several rounds of negotiations to achieve. When Amer-
ican policymakers discuss China more favorably in their internal deliberations, this reflects
their assessment that cooperation with China might be possible. These discussions often
lead to negotiations, which are sometimes successful. On average, when American poli-
cymakers have stronger beliefs that the United States and China share common interests,
cooperation is more likely.
1.4.4 American Cooperation and Reciprocal Chinese Cooperation
The third hypothesis states that American cooperation should increase the probability
of Chinese cooperation. To test this hypothesis, first I model the treatment: a dichotomous
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Table 1.7: Causal Eﬀect of American Perceptions on American Cooperation (IPTW)
Treatment Model
AssessmentUSAt 1:t 14
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Net diplomacyPRCt 1:t 14 0.0004082 1.417e-03 2.126e-04 -9.881e-04
(0.0014435) (1.427e-03) (1.430e-03) (1.432e-03)
Net cooperationPRCt 1:t 14 -0.0018088 -5.206e-03 1.357e-03 -5.683e-03
(0.0053265) (5.193e-03) (5.307e-03) (5.057e-03)
Net diplomacyUSAt 1:t 14 -0.0083669⇤⇤⇤ -8.524e-03⇤⇤⇤ -7.394e-03⇤⇤⇤ -4.661e-03⇤⇤⇤
(0.0014822) (1.440e-03) (1.488e-03) (1.404e-03)
Net cooperationUSAt 1:t 14 -0.0056476† -6.893e-03⇤ -9.344e-03⇤⇤ -7.475e-03⇤
(0.0033932) (3.324e-03) (3.417e-03) (3.274e-03)
Ongoing MIDPRCt 1:t 14 2.613e-02⇤⇤⇤ 1.186e-02⇤⇤ -1.063e-03
(3.570e-03) (4.587e-03) (5.098e-03)
Military expenditurePRC/USAt 1:t 14 6.801e-02 2.539e-01
⇤⇤⇤ 8.860e-01†
(4.610e-02) (6.301e-02) (4.878e-01)
GDP per capitaPRCt 1:t 14 -3.530e-05⇤ 1.569e-04⇤⇤⇤ -4.214e-05
(1.686e-05) (2.397e-05) (2.572e-04)
Log trade volumePRC+USAt 1:t 14 1.359e-02
⇤⇤⇤ 1.502e-02⇤⇤⇤ 8.574e-02⇤⇤⇤
(8.695e-04) (1.565e-03) (1.715e-02)
Party congressPRCt 1:t 14 -4.202e-02⇤ -5.756e-02⇤⇤⇤ -3.304e-02⇤
(1.705e-02) (1.672e-02) (1.656e-02)
Independence dayPRCt 1:t 14 -2.113e-02⇤ -1.993e-02⇤ -2.262e-02⇤⇤
(8.290e-03) (8.749e-03) (7.937e-03)
Constant 0.0046376⇤ -7.298e-02⇤⇤ -4.339e-01⇤⇤⇤ -2.676e-01
(0.0018092) (2.317e-02) (3.542e-02) (2.156e-01)
Administration fixed eﬀects No No Yes No
Leader fixed eﬀects No No Yes No
Year fixed eﬀects No No No Yes
Observations 5323 5317 4394 5294
Outcome Model
CooperationUSAt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AssessmentUSAt 1:t 14 0.021117† 0.013125⇤⇤⇤ 0.006738⇤⇤⇤ 0.031229
(0.011036) (0.003702) (0.001737) (0.019632)
Constant 0.007213⇤⇤⇤ 0.007050⇤⇤⇤ 0.005238⇤⇤⇤ 0.008086⇤⇤⇤
(0.001437) (0.001459) (0.001066) (0.002201)
Note: †p<0.1; ⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤p<0.01
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measure of American cooperation within the past fortnight. I model it as a function of disag-
gregated bilateral interactions and the abovementioned covariates. I disaggregate bilateral
interactions because my explanatory variable, American cooperation, is disaggregated. To
control for net values of interaction variables alongside a pure measure of American coopera-
tion would be unusual. In addition, I control for the level of American assessments of China
within the past fortnight, because these directly influence the United States’ propensity to
cooperate with China. Finally, I control for American cooperation in the previous fortnight
(t   15 : t   28) because American foreign policy may be path dependent. The estimating
equation for the treatment model is thus:
Logit (Cooperation)USAt 1:t 14 =  1(Diplomacy)
PRC
t 1:t 14
+  2(Criticism)PRCt 1:t 14
+  3(Cooperation)PRCt 1:t 14
+  4(Conflict)PRCt 1:t 14
+  5(Diplomacy)USAt 1:t 14
+  6(Criticism)USAt 1:t 14
+  7(Cooperation)USAt 15:t 28
+  8(Conflict)USAt 1:t 14
+  9(Ongoing MID)PRCt 1:t 14
+  10(Military expenditure)
PRC/USA
t 1:t 14
+  11(GDP per capita)PRCt 1:t 14
+  12(Log trade volume)PRC+USAt 1:t 14
+  13(Party Congress)PRCt 1:t 14
+  14(Independence day)PRCt 1:t 14
+  15(Assessment)USAt 1:t 14
+  t
(1.5)
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where, as before,  t represents leader, administration, or year fixed eﬀects depending on
the model.
Next, I use the reweighted data to estimate the eﬀect of American cooperation in the
past fortnight upon the probability of Chinese cooperation on a given day. The estimating
equation for the outcome model is thus:
Logit (Cooperation)PRCt =  1(Cooperation)
USA
t 1:t 14 (1.6)
The results appear in Table 1.8. Model (1) estimates American cooperation with China
as a function of recent bilateral interactions and American assessments of common interests.
Model (2) includes domestic covariates, international covariates, and administration fixed
eﬀects. Model (3) drops administration fixed eﬀects in favor of year fixed eﬀects.
The evidence indicates that American cooperation in the past fortnight renders Chinese
cooperation on a given day an estimated 0.7% more likely. This is a small point estimate but
is realistic in a real-world context. International cooperation is a rare event and generally
takes many rounds of negotiations to realize. The fact that American cooperation within the
past fortnight—a extremely brief period in international relations—renders Chinese cooper-
ation significantly more likely the following day to any extent is evidence that reciprocation
matters in international politics.
1.4.5 Robustness Checks
Tables B.1 and B.2 in Appendix B estimate the above relationships in an OLS setting.
I find that Chinese diplomacy in the past fortnight is significantly associated with improved
American assessments on day t. American assessments in the past fortnight are significantly
associated with a higher probability of American cooperation on day t. However, I find no
evidence that American cooperation in the past fortnight is significantly associated with a
higher probability of Chinese cooperation on day t.
This paper has proposed a three step framework: that diplomacy leads to more favorable
34
Table 1.8: Causal Eﬀect of American Cooperation on Chinese Cooperation (IPTW)
Treatment Model
CooperationUSAt 1:t 14
(1) (2) (3)
DiplomacyPRCt 1:t 14 0.0127929† -0.0087409 -0.0230176⇤⇤⇤
(0.0066652) (0.0069461) (0.0069103)
CriticismPRCt 1:t 14 -0.0080312 -0.0125272⇤ -0.0117392†
(0.0057982) (0.0061321) (0.0060509)
CooperationPRCt 1:t 14 0.3413108⇤⇤⇤ 0.3152997⇤⇤⇤ 0.3333178⇤⇤⇤
(0.0181427) (0.0184616) (0.0180483)
ConflictPRCt 1:t 14 -0.0874392† -0.0620939 -0.0313723
(0.0476045) (0.0474762) (0.0460134)
DiplomacyUSAt 1:t 14 0.0122837⇤ 0.0198953⇤⇤⇤ 0.0172534⇤⇤
(0.0060166) (0.0060168) (0.0058930)
CriticismUSAt 1:t 14 0.0522178⇤⇤⇤ 0.0521478⇤⇤⇤ 0.0536211⇤⇤⇤
(0.0089478) (0.0090847) (0.0087124)
CooperationUSAt 15:t 28 -0.0009489 -0.0101290 -0.0445770⇤⇤⇤
(0.0135079) (0.0135280) (0.0132818)
ConflictUSAt 1:t 14 -0.0026992 0.0040701 -0.0062061
(0.0172767) (0.0178387) (0.0175343)
Ongoing MIDPRCt 1:t 14 0.0236033† 0.0394549⇤
(0.0129120) (0.0162530)
Military expenditurePRC/USAt 1:t 14 -0.4762452
⇤⇤ 17.4205332⇤⇤⇤
(0.1788632) (1.5288804)
GDP per capitaPRCt 1:t 14 -0.0004018⇤⇤⇤ 0.0004340
(0.0000649) (0.0006695)
Log trade volumePRC+USAt 1:t 14 0.0065450
† -0.2960729⇤⇤⇤
(0.0037195) (0.0552568)
Party congressPRCt 1:t 14 0.3197121⇤⇤⇤ 0.3417840⇤⇤⇤
(0.0497516) (0.0483321)
Independence dayPRCt 1:t 14 0.0241641 0.0346640
(0.0263891) (0.0253956)
AssessmentUSAt 1:t 14 -0.0944559⇤ -0.0669973 -0.0250851
(0.0398812) (0.0439685) (0.0432684)
Constant 0.1264084⇤⇤⇤ 0.7039126⇤⇤⇤ -2.5798889⇤⇤⇤
(0.0281268) (0.1074839) (0.4807650)
Administration fixed eﬀects No Yes No
Year fixed eﬀects No No Yes
Observations 5,530 5,460 5,495
Outcome Model
CooperationPRCt
(1) (2) (3)
CooperationUSAt 1:t 14 0.0065154† 0.0061262† 8.388e-03⇤⇤⇤
(0.0033325) (0.0035391) (2.546e-03)
Constant 0.0043044⇤⇤⇤ 0.0050882⇤⇤⇤ 1.045e-06⇤⇤⇤
(0.0004043) (0.0005079) (1.945e-07)
Note: †p<0.1; ⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤p<0.01 ⇤⇤⇤p<0.001
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assessments of common interests, that improved assessments lead to cooperation, and that
cooperation leads to reciprocal cooperation. How often does this sequence occur in the data?
To answer this question, let us define the “diplomacy sequence” as an act of Chinese
diplomacy followed by improved American perceptions of China within a 28-day window.
Between 1969 and 1992, the United States cooperated with China 70 times. For 64 of these
observations I have policymaker assessment data within the past 28 days. Of these 64, 30
were preceded by the diplomacy sequence. That is, nearly half the time the United States
cooperated with China, it had recently updated its assessment of common interests after a
Chinese diplomatic initiative. In the same period, China cooperated with the United States
48 times. For 42 of these observations I have policymaker assessment data within the past
28 days. 21 of these were preceded by the diplomacy sequence.
These patterns suggest that diplomacy leads policymakers to update their assessments
of the extent of shared interests and then to negotiate the terms of cooperation. Half the
time the two states cooperated between 1969 and 1992, China had employed diplomacy and
the United States had favorably updated its assessments of common interests within the
past 28 days. Though I do not have Chinese assessment data, presumably some of the other
episodes of bilateral cooperation were preceded by American overtures and updated Chinese
assessments.
1.5 Conclusion
This study contributes to the IR literature by confirming that under some conditions,
diplomacy—traditionally understood as “cheap”—may generate favorable bilateral assess-
ments of shared interests and, ultimately, cooperation between states. Experimental economists
and theoretical biologists have found robust support that cheap talk matters in human trans-
actions and in the natural world. To them—and to most diplomats—these results will come
as no surprise. Nonetheless, the assumption that talk is cheap has been influential in IR for
the past 20 years. Only recently have formal theorists begun to suggest that diplomacy may
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not be cheap when states face infinite horizons in which their reputations matter.
Future research should proceed in several directions. First, more data on policymaker
beliefs and interactions are necessary to advance the diplomatic research agenda. For ex-
ample, what are the network eﬀects of perceptions and reputations? Theoretical biologists
find that groups that learn to communicate outcompete others. Can the same be said for
states or alliances in the international system? For example, when a state sullies its reputa-
tion in one bilateral relationship, do policymakers in other relationships become pessimistic
about the prospects for cooperation? In short, IR scholars should continue to mine national
archives.
Second, future research should clarify scope conditions for when diplomacy is eﬀective.
Though I find that diplomacy influenced policymaker assessments and facilitated cooperation
in US-China relations between 1969 and 1992, it is not always eﬀective. For instance,
Mao’s signal to President Truman not to enter the Korean War was disastrously ignored.
Diplomacy’s failures may be more consequential than its successes. Scholars should explore
the sources of diplomatic success in a cross-national context. What strategies can render
diplomacy credible even in the presence of domestic instability or uncertainty about a state’s
aims?
Finally, researchers should employ these methods to test constructivist arguments. In
focusing on diplomats’ pursuit of short-term national interests, I have set aside the important
question of whether self-interested diplomacy builds trust and goodwill over time. Can
diplomacy shape a state’s understanding of its own interests, or how best to pursue them?
Some diplomats believe that it can.44 States also generally have common interests in some
areas and divergent interests in others. Does successful diplomacy in some areas render
conflict in other areas less likely? In short, a focus on policymaker beliefs and private
interactions between states may oﬀer numerous new ways of examining IR theory.
44Christensen (2015).
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2 | Diversionary Aggression and Elite Welfare Shocks
in Autocracies: Evidence from China
“A rising market eases contradictions; a falling market sharpens contradictions.”
—A Chinese commentator, 20031
2.1 Introduction
How is foreign policy in autocracies conditioned by shocks to political elites: the key
figures whose support the autocrat needs to survive? Surprisingly little scholarship exists
on this question. Drawing on selectorate theory, international relations scholars suggest
that institutions that empower a broad class of political elites limit the autocrat’s power
and render his foreign policy nearly as pacific as that of his democratic counterparts.2
However, the institutional approaches employed by international relations scholars generally
overlook elite power struggles in autocracies. Power struggles are endemic to autocracies,
comparativists observe, even beneath the veneer of institutions that privilege the autocrat.3
This observation dates to ancient times: Xenophon’s Hiero complains that the tyrant’s life is
one of perpetual fear. Across Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East, autocrats create
1Quoted in Naughton (2003, 35).
2Peceny, Beer, and Sanchez-Terry (2002); Peceny and Beer (2003); Reiter and Stam (2003); Peceny and
Butler (2004); Lai and Slater (2006); Weeks (2008, 2012); Mattes and Rodríguez (2014); Magaloni (2008);
de Mesquita et al. (2003).
3Svolik (2009, 2012); Boix and Svolik (2013); Egorov and Sonin (2011).
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duplicate government portfolios, build informant networks, and organize compulsory social
networks to discourage elite leadership challenges.4 These findings share a common premise:
the contract between autocrat and elite is written in terms of rent transfers. When transfers
decline, so does elite support for the autocrat.
To explore how economic shocks to elite welfare aﬀect foreign policy in autocracies,
this paper presents a theory in which autocrats draw support from both elites and the
public. Indeed, the two can be substitutes. The dual bases of the autocrat’s support
enlarge his strategy set in ways that are particularly salient for foreign policy. When elite
support flags, he may bolster public support to discourage leadership challenges. Popular
support counteracts such threats because it deters leadership challenges through the threat
of revolution. Because plotters know they would face a hostile public if they successfully
challenged a popular leader, the expected payoﬀ of a challenge is lower. Therefore, popular
aﬀection for the regime—or the appearance thereof—deters potential challengers. Although
contemporary scholars generally regard autocrats as having to satisfy both their elites and
the population, Machiavelli observed that the two are substitutes:
one of the most eﬃcacious remedies that a prince can have against conspiracies
is not to be hated and despised by the people, for he who conspires against a
prince always expects to please them by his removal; but when the conspirator
can only look forward to oﬀending them, he will not have the courage to take
such a course, for the diﬃculties that confront a conspirator are infinite.5
More recently, Barbara Geddes captured this intuition when she suggested that an auto-
crat who faces coup threats may build countervailing political forces such as a mass civilian
party.6
To generate popular aﬀection, I argue, autocrats may employ diversionary foreign policy.
Diversion entails the initiation of an international dispute to generate a rally around the flag
4Carter (2015c,b); Crassweller (1966); Kapuscinski (1989); Aikins (2012); Staﬀ (2012).
5Machiavelli (2012, Ch. XIX).
6Geddes (2009). Similarly, Milan Svolik suggests that dictators must resolve two conflicts: threats from
the masses and threats from elites (Svolik 2012). If anything, elite threats are the more serious: two thirds
of autocrats deposed since World War II were removed by insiders (Svolik 2009, 477-478).
39
eﬀect. By demonizing an out-group, the leader increases in-group identification and his own
popularity.7
Of course, executives enjoy a range of policy options to resolve political crises. When
elites suﬀer economic shocks, for instance, the autocrat might increase direct transfers.
However, this is expensive and risky, given public frustration with corruption. Alternatively,
the autocrat might generate public support by providing public goods. However, this is
expensive and time consuming. By contrast, diversionary foreign policy is inexpensive and
readily implemented. And if the autocrat can signal to his diversionary target that the
7Simmel (1955); Coser (1956). A recent review calls diversionary theory âĂĲcompelling” but the em-
pirical evidence “decidedly mixed” (Baum and Potter 2008, 48). The literature on diversionary aggression
is large but a brief review serves here. Several studies find evidence of diversionary aggression, including:
DeRouen (2000); DeRouen and Peake (2002); Clark (2003); Howell and Pevehouse (2005); Fordham (1998);
Hess and Orphanides (1995); James and Hristoulas (1994); James and Oneal (1991); Morgan and Bickers
(1992); Ostrom and Job (1986); Levy (1989a,b); Oneal and Tir (2006); Tir (2010); Bennett (2000); Dassel and
Reinhardt (1999); Davies (2002); Enterline and Gleditsch (2000); Gelpi (1997); Heldt (1999); Lebow (1981);
Mansfield and Snyder (1995); Russett (1990); Levy (1988). Yet skeptics have amassed opposing evidence:
Chiozza and Goemans (2003, 2004); Foster and Palmer (2006); Moore and Lanoue (2003); Meernik (2004);
Potter (2007); Gowa (1998); Leeds and Davis (1997); Lian and Oneal (1993); Meernik (2000); Meernik and
Waterman (1996); Johnston (1998); Lai and Reiter (2005). Others outline scope conditions for diversionary
aggression. It is more likely between states with pre-standing rivalries (McLaughlin and Prins 2004), when
leaders are accountable (Kisangani and Pickering 2011), and in mature democracies, consolidating autocra-
cies, and transitional polities (Pickering and Kisangani 2005). It is less likely when states avoid provoking
troubled adversaries (Leeds and Davis 1997; Miller 1999; Clark 2003; Fordham 2005). Rallies are more
likely when conflict is supported by Security Council authorization (Chapman 2011; Chapman and Reiter
2004), and in the presence of media attention, popular leadership, divided government, non election years,
and first terms (Baker and Oneal 2001; Colaresi 2007). States are more likely to divert when targets evoke
feelings of fear or greed from the domestic audience (Jung 2014). Traditional enemies may elicit diversionary
aggression driven by rally logic, while powerful targets elicit diversionary aggression driven by “gambling for
resurrection” (Haynes 2015).
Emerging research on diversion in autocracies is most relevant to this study. Some argue that because
autocrats can contain domestic unrest with repression, they need not divert (Gelpi 1997; Kisangani and
Pickering 2011). In contrast, Pickering and Kisangani (2010) suggest that because single party regimes
spend more on public goods than personalist or military regimes, they are relatively cash constrained and
may employ diversion during a domestic crisis. The authors find that signs of elite unrest such as government
crises and purges are associated with the use of external force cross nationally.
Qualitative China scholars argue that domestic politics are important in explaining China’s foreign pol-
icy. However, they generally focus on public rather than elite discontent. Ross (2009) attributes China’s
aggression in the South and East China Seas to the public’s “naval nationalism.” Shirk (2007) argues that
China’s domestic instability is dangerous for the United States. Christensen (1996, 204-205) attributes
Mao’s decision to shell Quemoy in 1958 to the need to create a wartime atmosphere to consolidate domestic
agricultural collectivization.
However, other China scholars are skeptical about the relationship between public discontent and conflict
initiation. Drawing on theories of omnibalancing, Fravel (2008) argues that China’s internal threats require
policymaker attention and therefore create incentives for compromise abroad. In a detailed study of protests,
Weiss (2014) finds that the Party manages nationalist protests to serve its ends and does not change its
foreign policy in response to protester demands.
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apparent aggression served only to placate domestic concerns, then diversion entails few
international costs as well.
The theory generates several observable implications. Because the autocrat intends to
generate public support, he initiates newsworthy conflict rather than that which is unob-
servable. Because diversion aims to make leadership challenges costlier, it is accompanied by
propaganda designed to foster popular aﬀection for the autocrat and the impression thereof.
And because the autocrat seeks to avoid international retaliation, he subsequently adopts
cooperative policies to placate his diversionary target.
I test the theory in the context of China. I focus on China’s foreign policy toward the
United States: its strongest potential adversary, and thus the state most likely to produce
a rally for the autocrat. China is an appealing case for several reasons. First, it oﬀers
a unique opportunity to measure elite transfers. In the early 1990s, by privatizing state
owned enterprises (SOEs), the autocrat transferred enormous equity to elites. Indeed, the
stock market became the Party’s central rent distribution mechanism. Yet because few
poor and middle class citizens invest in the stock market, and because stock returns have
little eﬀect upon unemployment, there is virtually no connection between stock returns and
public interests. Second, the threat of elite challenges is serious in China. Leaders face
“incessant threats to their authority.”8 And finally, the WikiLeaks cables aﬀord rare insight
8Shih (2008, 48). Elite politics are the heart of Chinese politics. A classic study states, “The informal
dimension has always been paramount” (Dittmer and Wu 1995, 467). Shili, informal power, exists astride and
sometimes ahead of quanli, oﬃcial power. Elite factions characterized Chinese politics under Mao Zedong
and Deng Xiaoping and continue to animate them today. Andrew Nathan defines a faction as “a vertically
organized structure composed of face-to-face (rather than corporate) clientelist ties between leaders and led”
(Dittmer and Wu 1995, 472). See also Nathan (1973); Fewsmith (2015); Bo Zhiyue (2010). The autocrat
requires the support of elites below him, most importantly, the seven in the Politburo Standing Committee
and 20 in the Politburo.
Examples of elite leadership challenges in China are numerous. They usually stem from civilian political
elites rather than the military. In 1978, Deng Xiaoping peacefully sidelined Mao’s appointed successor,
Hua Guofeng. In the early 2000s, Shanghai mayor Chen Liangyu was purged after criticizing President Hu
Jintao’s leadership credentials to other Politburo members (US Embassy Beijing 2006). In 2013, Chongqing
mayor Bo Xilai was purged not because his wife murdered a British businessman, many China scholars
believe, but because he attempted to assassinate President Xi Jinping. Indeed, Xi once spoke explicitly
about the dangers of elite politics. In 2000, he said, “People who have little experience with power, those
who have been far away from it, tend to regard these things as mysterious and novel. But I look past the
superficial things: the power and the flowers and the glory and the applause. I see the detention houses, the
fickleness of human relationships. I understand politics on a deeper level” Osnos (2015).
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into diplomatic communication between the US and Chinese governments. As a result, the
paper is able to marshal case study evidence in support of the chief causal mechanism.
This, indeed, is a significant asset, for the cross-national empirical evidence in support of
diversionary aggression is decidedly mixed.
The empirics employ three original datasets. The first records elite transfers since 1990
with the monthly Shanghai Stock Exchange composite index. The second measures Chinese
propaganda published in the oﬃcial newspaper, the People’s Daily. It was gathered with
the computer programming language Python. The third dataset is a diplomatic history of
China’s relations with the United States since 1990. It is drawn from two dozen primary
and secondary sources and records 2,000 bilateral interactions across a host of issue areas
and severity levels.
The evidence suggests that when elite transfers through the Shanghai Exchange decline
by 5% to 15%—which happens in a quarter of months—China initiates 1.5 to 2 times as
much conflict as usual. Therefore, as much as 40% of China’s conflict initiation toward the
United States may be diversionary.
This study adds to an emerging literature that carefully connects domestic and interna-
tional realities in autocracies.9 Partly because research in autocracies is diﬃcult, scholarship
on autocratic foreign policy has not caught up to that on democratic foreign policy, which
gives full attention to the subnational sources of international behavior.10 The emerging
research agenda this article joins focuses more closely on these factors and yields a richer
explanation of the international behavior of autocracies.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the theory and oﬀers a series of
observable implications. Section 3 introduces the diplomatic data, justifies stock returns as a
measure of elite transfers, and tests the implications empirically. Section 4 uses policymaker
accounts and WikiLeaks cables to show that after the Chinese stock market crashed in
2010, China adopted diversionary foreign policy toward the United States, communicated
9Carter (2015a,d); Goemans and Marinov (2014).
10For a recent review, see Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2012).
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the short term nature of its policy to American oﬃcials, and adopted private reassurance
behavior after the domestic crisis passed. Section 5 concludes.
2.2 Theory
Building on extant work, especially Pickering and Kisangani (2010), I develop a theory
of why elite unrest may result in diversion in autocracies. Consider a simple political envi-
ronment in which the autocrat draws from two sources of support, elites and the public. He
purchases the support of these groups through transfers and public goods provision, respec-
tively.11 When transfers decline, elites are forced to consider the transfers they might receive
under alternative leadership. Because some elites may expect to benefit more from alter-
native leadership, they become more likely to challenge the autocrat. The autocrat seeks
to discourage such challenges because they threaten his personal power. He may employ
diversion to generate public support. Public support discourages elites from challenging the
autocrat because if they were successful, they might face the threat of popular rebellion.
This yields the first hypothesis:
H1: When elite transfers decline, the autocrat initiates more conflict with his
diversionary target.
If, as the theory predicts, the autocrat diverts to discourage elite challenges, then we
should expect him to attempt to broadcast his increased support—and to foster the national-
ism that renders elite conspiracies so costly—through his propaganda apparatus. Autocrats
have long believed propaganda crucial to regime survival. Joseph Goebbels, the architect
of Nazi Germany’s propaganda apparatus, considered it a science.12 He wrote, “A dicta-
tor’s first task is to make what he wants popular, bringing the will of the nation in tune
11In the Chinese context, elites are the highest ranking party members—princelings and senior oﬃcials
who can credibly challenge the autocrat—and the public includes the rest of the citizens.
12For a distillation of Goebbels’ 6,800 page diary into 19 core principles, see Doob (1950).
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with his own will. Only then will the broad masses support him in the long run and join his
ranks.”13 Joseph Stalin used Pravda to threaten potential elite challengers with purges.14 In
the past decade, autocrats across Africa and Asia have developed sophisticated propaganda
strategies to generate public support despite the open information environment fostered by
globalization.15
Propaganda provides a multiplier eﬀect for diversionary foreign policy. It can both
popularize and editorialize conflict. By creating the impression of public support for the
autocrat, it can reduce the expected utility of leadership challenges. Thus, when leadership
challenges arise, the autocrat will employ propaganda to discourage them. The propaganda
apparatus will emphasize how well the autocrat serves popular interests and how widely
he is supported by the people. Informed elites may not believe the propaganda, but they
will know that it shapes popular beliefs and therefore will update their assessment of the
autocrat’s popularity.16 This yields the next hypothesis:
H2: When elite transfers decline, propaganda emphasizes the autocrat’s public
popularity.
The theory also yields hypotheses about the nature of diversion. Most obviously, it will
be newsworthy. Diversion serves no use if it is unobserved by the public. A state can harm
another’s interests in many private ways, such as denying requests or engaging in aggression
which remains classified. These forms of interaction are highly consequential, but because the
autocrat diverts to increase popular support, diversionary conflict will be public. Moreover,
it will occur in newsworthy, nationalism-generating areas, such as deploying the military
or asserting territorial claims. The autocrat will avoid conflict initiation in areas that are
important to its diversionary target but less nationalism-generating, such as economic aﬀairs,
13Goebbels (1932).
14Roxburgh (1987).
15Baggott and Carter (2015).
16See e.g. Truex (2014).
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and in areas that are unlikely to win domestic approval, such as punishing the diversionary
target on human rights issues. This yields the next hypothesis:
H3: Diversion takes forms that are public and nationalism-generating.
As the autocrat is strategic with his domestic audience, so too is he strategic with
foreigners. Diversion must first produce a rally and second avoid retaliation from the target
of diversionary aggression. In the language of the theory, the autocrat balances the desire
for a rally against the risk of international retaliation. After the autocrat employs diversion,
he faces international consequences. Diversion risks teaching the target of diversion that
the autocrat aims to upset the status quo. Therefore, the autocrat should remedy his
target’s suspicions after the domestic crisis passes. The most obvious way to do so is with
cooperation: reassuring the target verbally and coming to its assistance materially. I expect
that the autocrat will employ such charm oﬀensives after diverting to recenter his target’s
prior about the autocrat’s intentions. Moreover, those charm oﬀensives will be private rather
than public, lest the autocrat’s citizens penalize him for backing down. This yields the final
hypothesis:
H4: After a diversionary episode, the autocrat will adopt private cooperative
initiatives to help his target recenter its prior about the autocrat’s intentions.
2.3 Empirical Approach
To test the theory, I focus on China: on the struggles between its political elite and
paramount leader, and how these struggles manifest themselves in its bilateral relationship
with the United States. Section 2.3.1 introduces the original diplomatic data, which record
all bilateral interactions between China and the United States since 1990. To measure elite
transfers, I exploit the fact that Chinese elites were compensated during the sample period
with shares in state owned enterprises. This is explained in Section 2.3.2. Sections 2.3.3
through 2.3.6 assess the theory’s observable implications.
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2.3.1 Diplomatic Data
I constructed a dataset of over 2,000 bilateral interactions between 1990 and 2014 from
two dozen primary and secondary sources listed in Appendix C. I drew from secondary
sources, policymaker memoirs, case studies, periodicals that follow Chinese politics such as
the China Leadership Monitor, declassified primary source documents, and leaked American
diplomatic cables provided by WikiLeaks.17
In my coding scheme, a bilateral interaction is an episode of contact between the two
states. For example, in 1950 the United States voted against replacing the Chinese National-
ists with the People’s Republic in the United Nations. Later that year, Premier Zhou Enlai
warned the United States not to invade Korea through the Indian ambassador to China.
In 1957, Mao Zedong criticized the United States publicly in Moscow, proclaiming that the
east wind prevails over the west wind. In 1980, the two countries cooperated to install
monitoring equipment in western China to spy on the Soviets. In 1986, the Reagan ad-
ministration secretly requested Chinese assistance in arming the Nicaraguan contras; China
complied. In 1994, Secretary of State Warren Christopher canceled ceremonial appearances
on his planned trip to Beijing in retaliation for human rights abuses. After being lobbied
by FedEx and UPS in 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton requested that China reduce
barriers to entry in the Chinese postal market.
For all these episodes, I recorded the date of the interaction. When it was not possible
to identify the exact date, I identified the month that it occurred. I next recorded the source
and target of the interaction. Most international events are directional. For example, John
F. Kennedy oﬀered food aid to China, while Hank Paulson requested that China appreciate
the renminbi. Some, however, involve equal eﬀort by both parties, like negotiating or signing
an agreement. I duplicated these events so both sides received credit equally.
I then recorded the action itself. Diplomacy involves friendly verbal overtures, whereas
cooperation involves material cooperation. Criticism involves negative verbal interactions,
17Wikileaks covers US-China relations between 2003 and the end of 2009 with the greatest frequency.
However, some cables cover the 1990-2002 period.
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Table 2.1: Types of Conflict
Action
Negative statement
9>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>;
Criticism
Congressional hearing
Postpone
Downgrade protocol
Refuse
Demand
Warn
Private threats
Public low ranking threats
Public leader threats
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
Conflict
Obstruct
Withdraw support
Cancel exchanges
Punitive economic action
Congressional act
Infringe upon human rights
Intervene on behalf of dissident
Incite protest
Arrest nationals
Espionage
Develop weapon system
Assert territorial claim
Proliferate
Downgrade relationship
Military exercise
Military conflict
* See Appendix A for examples.
whereas conflict involves material conflict.18 Conflictual event types appear in Table 2.1.
Cooperative event types appear in Table 2.2. Examples of all event types appear in Ap-
pendix A.19
I then recorded the issue area of the interaction, such as arms sales or intellectual
property rights, as well as its private or public venue. Finally, I recorded a description
18 In keeping with the literature, I drew the line between criticism and conflict at audience cost generating
leader threats (Fearon 1994; Weeks 2008). Some studies suggest that autocrats are only able to generate
audience costs by inciting domestic nationalist protests (Weiss 2013, 2014; Kinne and Marinov 2013). The
results are robust to this modification.
19A note is appropriate on routine military patrols. There are many of these and they are diﬃcult to
record accurately. I record policy changes that alter military patrols—making them more aggressive, for
instance, or mandating them in new areas—rather than the specific patrols themselves. This is appropriate
because policymakers respond to changes in the other side’s assertiveness rather than to status quo patrols.
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Table 2.2: Types of Cooperation
Action
Positive statement
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
Diplomacy
Request
Meet
Negotiate
Invite
Visit
Explain
Reassure
Oﬀer
Express regret
Propose
Promise
Apologize
9>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>;
Cooperation
Release nationals
Cooperative congressional action
Concede
Aid
Sign agreement
Hold summit
Yield militarily
* See Appendix A for examples.
of the event and its source. Because Taiwan, Tibet, and Chinese dissidents are salient in
the bilateral relationship, I record American cooperation with these actors as conflict with
China (and vice versa).
The primary outcome variable in this study is Chinese conflict initiation, which is sub-
stantive bilateral conflict in military, diplomatic, economic, or human rights areas. Figure 2.1
visualizes the outcome variable since 1990. The red line shows the number of conflicts that
China initiated with the United States each year. The dataset records 171 episodes of con-
flict that occurred in 58 months.20 The measure has high construct validity: conflict peaked
during the standoﬀ at sea over chemical weapons proliferation in 1993, the 1995 Taiwan
Strait crisis, the 1999 accidental US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, the 2001
collision between a Chinese fighter jet and a US spy plane, and China’s “assertive” behavior
in 2010.21
20Episodes of conflict are, unsurprisingly, clustered.
21While some of these crises were exogenous, like the Belgrade bombing or the aircraft collision, the results
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Figure 2.1: Chinese Conflict Initiation Toward US
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I eschewed existing event datasets for straightforward reasons. The popular Militarized
Interstate Dispute dataset records only three US-China conflicts since 1990—one involving
the 1995 Taiwan Strait Crisis and two involving the 2001 spy plane collision. In reality,
there have been many episodes of serious contention over this period—most prominently, a
standoﬀ at sea over nuclear proliferation in 1993, the accidental US bombing of the Chinese
embassy in Belgrade in 1999, and China’s assertive behavior in 2010.
Daily event datasets such as GDELT or Gary King’s “10 million events” record bilat-
eral disputes with much greater frequency, but with tremendous noise. By my estimation,
20-30% of these events are false positives or false negatives: respectively, events that were
omitted by the automated event coding process and events that were included mistakenly.
Additionally, I identified many more diplomatic action types than recorded in standard event
ontologies like Conflict and Mediation Event Observations (CAMEO). Existing ontologies
were constructed from news wires, which omit some important types of diplomatic interac-
tion. Examples include: demurring, canceling an invitation, postponing talks, expressing
restraint, passing a congressional resolution, or oﬀering asylum to a dissident.
Moreover, much diplomacy takes place out of the public eye and is captured only in pol-
icymaker accounts. For example, China allowed dissidents to quietly emigrate to the United
States, sent diplomats to Pyongyang to pressure North Korea on US policy priorities, and
agreed to the US request to not dump treasury bonds in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis.
Omissions are also considerable for classified military interactions. For example, China has
occasionally initiated aggressive aircraft tails and submarine dogfights. These episodes are
highly significant, but appear only in policymaker memoirs or declassified documents. By
hand coding some 10,000 pages of historical documents, my original dataset is the most
complete account of the bilateral relationship since 1990.
are not driven by exogenous shocks to international politics. Theoretically, although an exogenous crisis may
occur, a state’s response to it is conditional on many things, including domestic politics. Moreover, many
of the conflicts that China initiated in the dataset were not associated with exogenous crises. This is shown
in Figure C.1 in the appendix, which reproduces Figure 2.1 at the monthly level.
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2.3.2 Measuring Elite Transfers
As in the post-Soviet states, the privatization of state owned enterprises (SOEs) in
China became a convenient way for the autocrat to transfer rents to elites in the 1990s.
Privatization created three streams of transfers to elites. First, the Party set artificially
low share prices for SOE initial public oﬀerings (IPOs). It appointed chosen elites to SOEs
and oﬀered management buyout provisions to ensure they would benefit from arbitrage.
As a result, high-level oﬃcials and their families were “among the biggest beneficiaries” of
management buyout provisions.22 “About 10 or 15 years ago,” Gu Xuewu comments, “those
in power sold many state-owned companies to people who were close to them. At a very
low price.”23
The shares retained by elites after an IPO generated dividends. But most importantly,
the Party employed corporate financing arrangements to allow elites to benefit from subse-
quent arbitrage opportunities. SOEs provide 40-50% of the financing for the IPOs of other
SOEs. The Party appoints “strategic investors” and therefore controls access to arbitrage
opportunities. For example, China Unicom’s IPO was financed by strategic investors with
few ties to the communications industry: Beijing Capital Airport Group, Shanghai Auto,
Sinochem, and COFCO Foods, a food distributor.
More, the Party has repeatedly intervened to restore elite transfers when they have
declined. After a policy announcement depressed returns in 2001, the Party canceled the
policy in question, established an investor protection fund, halted IPOs, increased foreign
investment quotas, and raised interest rates on bank loans. In September 2004, Premier
Wen Jiabao pledged that the state would support the stock market. In December 2005,
he declared the financial sector “critical to national security.”24 Most recently, after the
Shanghai Exchange lost a third of its value in June 2015, the state spent over a trillion
22He Qinglian (2015).
23Rimmele (2012).
24Walter and Howie (2006, xvii-xi).
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US dollars trying to stabilize the market. Indeed, its liquidity provision eﬀorts were so
vast that it was forced to devalue the renminbi in August for the first time in two decades.
Generations of American policymakers considered that goal practically unattainable. China
devalued again only a few weeks later.
Because of this precedent, elites hold the autocrat responsible for stock returns. The state
has provided an “implicit guarantee to prop up the market,” according to economist Barry
Naughton.25 Leaked cables reveal that in August 2007, a Chinese financial researcher told
American embassy personnel that the Shanghai Exchange was a “policy market” “controlled
by the central government and subject to political tinkering.” First and foremost, the Party
aimed “to maintain a ‘Harmonious Society’ among the retail investors.” What this meant
was that “the government wanted to avoid getting blamed for any negative outcomes from its
policy.”26 One Western analyst concluded that “There’s an expectation of the government
adjusting policy to suit the market, in a cheerleading fashion.”27 A Chinese equity analyst
said, “We just calmly wait for the government’s next step to see if there will be more positive
incentives to invest.”28
In contrast, stock returns have virtually no relationship with public welfare. This is
evident from two facts. First, contrary to some reporting in the popular financial press,
there are very few retail investors in China. Economists estimate there are between 500,000
and 2 million active investors.29 The estimate is conservative because many brokers operate
hundreds of illegal “ghost accounts” opened with villagers’ identification cards purchased
in the countryside. In short, between 0.001% to 0.1% of China’s population invests in its
securities market: an extremely small proportion of the population.
Second, although SOEs account for nearly 30% of urban employment, urban employment
25Naughton (2007, 474).
26US Embassy Beijing (2007b).
27Deng (2015).
28Walter and Howie (2006, 219).
29See Walter and Howie (2006, p. 10 and Ch. 7) for a fascinating account. Green (2003) cites similar
statistics.
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Figure 2.2: Stock Returns and Urban Unemployment
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is not sensitive to SOE stock market performance. SOE employment is centrally regulated
due to the legacy of “iron rice bowl” welfare policies. The Party does not allow SOEs
to engage in mass layoﬀs during downturns. Figure 2.2 shows that there is virtually no
relationship between stock returns and urban unemployment.
Today, SOEs account for 40% of China’s GDP and the vast majority of its equity market:
65% of firms and 89% of market capitalization.30 Stock returns are extraordinarily volatile.
The worst month on the Shanghai Exchange lost 31% while the best month gained 177%.31
30Pei (2012, 34), Piotroski and Wong (2012, 219).
31Why would the autocrat choose to deliver rents through such a volatile mechanism? Only the least
significant stream of rents—dividends—is aﬀected by volatility. For IPOs and corporate financing, the
regime selects which elites benefit and sets initial share prices. If the stock market is performing poorly, the
regime can simply set initial share prices lower than usual, enabling more arbitrage.
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Average monthly returns were 2% with a standard deviation of 17 percentage points. In
contrast, S&P 500 returns during the period were much less volatile, ranging from losses of
20% to gains of 12%.
2.3.3 Evidence for diversion
The first hypothesis suggests the autocrat will initiate more conflict with the United
States when elite transfers decline. To test this hypothesis I explore the impact of the
percentage change in the Shanghai Stock Exchange in month t 1 on the number of conflicts
that China initiates toward the United States in month t. Conflict data are drawn from my
bilateral event dataset. The monthly percent change in the SSE composite index is drawn
from the exchange.32
I employ a count model to examine Chinese conflict initiation as a function of stock
market performance, recent bilateral interaction, and other covariates. To control for popular
dissatisfaction, I include monthly consumer price inflation.33 I control for the six month
period leading up to a party congress, as these events are the focal point of Chinese elite
politics and often result in the announcement of new policies that could simultaneously
aﬀect stock returns and conflict initiation. Party congresses are held every fifth autumn.
To account for the possibility that financial crises migrate across borders, I include US
stock market returns.34 It is important to include this variable because Dow losses might
simultaneously depress the Shanghai Stock Exchange and generate Chinese critiques of US
economic policy. Finally, I include year and month fixed eﬀects to account for unobserved
sources of variation (e.g., if Beijing initiates more conflict in October due to National Day
32Shanghai Stock Exchange (2015). The composite index is analogous to the S&P 500. In 2010, the
exchange also began reporting data for the SOE 50 and SOE 100 indices, which track the performance of
the 50- and 100-largest SOEs, respectively. These indices are almost perfectly correlated with the composite
index over 2010-2015, as shown in Appendix C. This is to be expected, as SOEs account for 89% of market
capitalization. I use the Composite Index in the analysis because it is available for a wider time frame.
33Neither Unemployment nor GDP growth can be used to measure public economic interests, as they were
recorded annually for most of the sample and exhibited relatively little variation.
34Data on monthly S&P 500 returns are drawn from Standard and Poor (2013).
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celebrations). The estimating equation is thus
neg bin (PRC conflict)t =  1( SSE)t 1
+  2(Number of PRC-USA conflicts)t 1
+  3(Number of USA-PRC conflicts)t 1
+  4(PRC consumer price inflation)t 1
+  6(Party Congress)t:t 6
+  8( S&P 500)t 1
+  y +  t + ✏
(2.1)
where  y represents year fixed eﬀects and  t represents month fixed eﬀects. Augmented
Dickey-Fuller tests indicate that Chinese conflict initiation and SSE returns are stationary.
A one month lag minimizes the Akaike information criterion (AIC).
Results appear in Table 2.3. Model (1) shows that SSE returns are inversely correlated
with Chinese conflict initiation in a bivariate context. The relationship is robust to the
introduction of recent bilateral interactions in Model (2), Chinese domestic factors in Model
(3), US stock returns in Model (4), and year and month fixed eﬀects in Models (5-6).
The results are visualized in Figure 2.3. I simulate values of predicted Chinese conflict
initiation at various levels of SSE returns: the mean monthly return of 2% and at losses
of 5%, 10%, and 15%. Other variables are held at their means. For ease of simulation, I
employ Model (4), which contains all control variables save year and month fixed eﬀects,
yet is quite similar to Models (5-6) which do employ fixed eﬀects.
The simulation indicates that when stock returns decline by 5% to 15%, China initiates
1.5 to 2 times as much conflict as usual. Since 1990, China has initiated one conflict every ten
months, on average. When a negative shock occurs, China initiates one conflict every three
to five months. Therefore, as much as 40% of China’s conflict initiation may be diversionary.
Losses of 5% to 15% are not atypical in the Chinese context. Figure 2.4 shows a kernel
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Table 2.3: Evidence for Diversion
Dependent variable:
PRC conflictt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
  SSEt 1  3.933⇤  5.047⇤⇤  4.756⇤⇤  4.771⇤⇤  4.216⇤⇤  4.535⇤⇤
(2.194) (2.254) (2.244) (2.260) (2.108) (2.142)
PRC conflictt 1 0.353 0.215 0.198  0.072 0.059
(0.225) (0.212) (0.208) (0.193) (0.192)
USA conflictt 1 0.201 0.075 0.081 0.113  0.033
(0.377) (0.346) (0.340) (0.305) (0.298)
CPIt 1 0.041 0.040  0.003  0.002
(0.029) (0.028) (0.091) (0.090)
Party Congresst:t 6  2.331⇤  2.159⇤  1.151  1.609
(1.269) (1.227) (1.461) (1.513)
  S&P500t 1 0.095 0.038 0.021
(0.062) (0.061) (0.055)
Constant  1.682⇤⇤⇤  1.851⇤⇤⇤  5.890⇤  5.852⇤  0.670  32.687
(0.219) (0.234) (3.054) (3.007) (9.593) (4,037,414)†
Year fixed eﬀects No No No No Yes Yes
Month fixed eﬀects No No No No No Yes
Observations 288 288 240 240 240 240
Log Likelihood  133.165  131.545  119.982  118.849  100.239  91.592
Akaike Inf. Crit. 270.329 271.091 251.965 251.698 254.477 259.183
⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
† In Model (6), the standard error for the constant is very large because after including month fixed
eﬀects, there is not enough variation to generate a meaningful estimate for the constant. This does
not aﬀect the interpretation of the other coeﬃcients in the model.
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Figure 2.3: SSE Shocks and Chinese Conflict Initiation
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density plot of monthly SSE returns since 1990 in red. For comparison, monthly S&P 500
returns since 1990 are shown in blue. S&P 500 returns are normally distributed. However,
SSE returns are characterized by an abundance of extremely positive and extremely negative
returns. Indeed, as shown by the shaded areas, the SSE lost 5% or more of its value in a
quarter of months. Overall, the evidence suggests that China’s conflict behavior is extremely
responsive to SSE downturns, which occur regularly. More, there is no evidence that Chinese
foreign policy responds to one plausible indicator of public interests, inflation.
Robustness Checks
Results are robust to several diﬀerent approaches presented in Appendix C. First, re-
sults are robust to placebo tests. Above, elite transfers are operationalized as a continuous
variable. Instead, in Tables C.1 and Tables C.2 I operationalize them as dichotomous shocks
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Figure 2.4: Kernel Density Plot of SSE Returns
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of +/  5%, 10%, or 15%. Negative shocks are associated with conflict but not with co-
operation. Positive shocks are associated with neither outcome. Indeed, this is what one
should expect: the theory describes how declining transfers lead the autocrat to employ
diversionary foreign policy, but proﬀers no reasons why ample transfers would make the
autocrat pursue a more cooperative foreign policy with the United States.
Second, results are robust to subsetting the data to make reverse causality as unlikely
as possible. In the research design above, reverse causality would be a problem if investors
anticipated conflict and withdrew from the market before it occurred. If investors had this
anticipatory power, declines in share prices caused by sell oﬀs would precede conflict and
render the result spurious.
Investors can anticipate conflict in two ways. First is through conflict in the previous
period, which is already in the model. Second is through China’s statements about its future
behavior. If China threatens to initiate conflict in the next period, investors might exit the
market. Therefore I record all Chinese threats toward the United States. I include private
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threats in addition to public threats, since rumors about diplomatic developments could
conceivably spread through the small group of Chinese political elites. China issued 16 such
threats in 13 months between 1990 and 2010. Table C.3 shows that the result is robust to
dropping observations in which China threatened the United States privately or publicly in
t  1.
Investors might also decide to sell based on American threats toward China, which
occurred 24 times (publicly or privately) between 1990 and 2010. The result is robust
to dropping observations in which either side threatened the other in t   1.35 Thus, the
relationship between elite transfers and conflict initiation persists even when investors have
virtually no information with which to anticipate future conflict. This suggests the result
is not driven by an informational omitted variable which enables investors to anticipate
bilateral conflict and dump stocks before it occurs.
Third, results are robust to operationalizing the outcome variable diﬀerently. Conflict
rarely occurs, and when it does, its importance may be dwarfed by the volume of coopera-
tion in other areas. Therefore I develop a measure of Net conflict to capture the bilateral
relationship’s overall tendency:
(Net conflict)t =
(conflict + criticism)t
(conflict + criticism + cooperation + diplomacy)t
(2.2)
While this measure may capture the overall tenor of the bilateral relationship better
than a simple count of conflict, it yields fewer observations for analysis because months with
zero events prompt division by zero and fall out of the model. ADF tests indicate the new
outcome variable is stationary and a one month lag minimizes the AIC. An OLS model is
appropriate. Table C.4 shows that the result is robust. When elite transfers decline, the
overall relationship becomes more conflictual.
Fourth, results are robust to additional control variables. I include a dummy variable for
35This more restrictive model entails dropping 26 months (since the United States and China sometimes
threatened each other in the same month).
59
NPC Meetings, the National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political Consultative
Conference meetings that occur each March. These meetings are far less important than
party congresses, but nonetheless could plausibly aﬀect China’s foreign policy. Next, I
control for whether a given month experienced a popular crisis. Crises like corruption
scandals, large protests, sensitive anniversaries, natural disasters, epidemics, and product
safety scandals increase public dissatisfaction with the regime. The popular crisis variable
is thus much like inflation in the main analysis: if the autocrat diverts for public interests
rather than elite interests, this variable should be significant, and should cast doubt upon
the theory. A list of popular crises appears in Table C.5. Finally, I control for elites’ other
main source of illicit wealth. While the stock market has been the primary vehicle of elite
transfers in contemporary China, elites have access to other rents. Construction bribes are
the most important among these. When companies break ground on new facilities, they are
expected to bribe oﬃcials. Results are robust to approximating bribe volume with monthly
changes in new floorspace construction. This model is temporally limited, however, because
floorspace construction data are only available from China’s National Bureau of Statistics
since 2002.36 Results are robust to the inclusion of all additional covariates, as shown in
Table C.4.
2.3.4 Propaganda
The Chinese autocrat enjoys direct control over the oﬃcial newspaper, the People’s
Daily.37 The third hypothesis argues that because diversion aims to discourage leadership
36More fundamentally, I exclude construction bribes from the main analysis for theoretical reasons. Elites
hold the autocrat responsible for stock market rents because of his interventionist precedent, however, they
cannot reasonably hold him accountable for construction bribes paid by individuals.
37Mao, for example, personally revised draft editorials. In the 1990s, Jiang Zemin launched an initiative to
“guide public opinion” with tighter reporting controls and the Patriotic Education Campaign, which revised
curricula and encouraged “red tourism” to foster loyal citizens. In the 2000s, Hu Jintao spearheaded a
revised program to “channel public opinion.” In the 2010s Xi Jinping elevated the eﬀort to a “struggle for
public opinion” in the face of robust online political discussion (Qian Gang 2013). These pressures are only
intensifying. In 2013, Xi called for a “strong army” to “seize the ground of new media” (Huang and Zhai
2013). Scholars find that China employs online propagandists to delete posts about collective action (King,
Pan, and Roberts 2013).
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Figure 2.5: Propaganda
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challenges, propaganda should emphasize the leader’s popularity when elite transfers de-
cline. To test this hypothesis, I gathered the corpus of nearly 4,000 articles containing the
phrases “party-mass relations” (dangqun guanxi), “social stability” (weiwen), and “serving the
masses” (fuwu qunzhong) published by the People’s Daily between 1990 and 2012. These
terms have been identified as important in the secondary literature and feature prominently
in the newspaper.38
Figure 2.5 shows the temporal popularity of these terms. Discussion of party-mass rela-
tions has held constant—about 5 articles per month—over the period. In the 2000s, discus-
sion of “serving the masses” rose exponentially, from 5 to 50 articles per month. Discussion
of “social stability” also increased over the period.
I formatted these documents for text analysis in the programming language Python. Be-
38Zhang Yong (2000); Stern and O’Brien (2012).
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cause “party-mass relations” is a neutral term, I used the concordance method, which records
the share of positive words in the ten words on either side of the term.39 I computed the
percentage of positive words in all concordance segments published each month.40 Because
“serving the masses” and “social stability” are normatively charged terms, I simply recorded
the frequency with which they were mentioned each month.
I model propaganda as a function of bilateral events and domestic factors. The estimating
equation is identical to that in Section 2.3.3 save two changes. The outcome variable is the
number of references to a given term in month t. I control for the number of references to
the term in t 1. When the outcome is positive coverage of “party-mass relations,” I employ
an OLS model with the same covariates.
Table 2.4 presents the results. The evidence suggests that declining transfers are associ-
ated with more positive coverage of “party-mass relations” and more frequent discussion of
“serving the masses” and “social stability.” The results are visualized in Figure 2.6. When
transfers decline by 10%, the propaganda apparatus publishes 11% more on “serving the peo-
ple,” 20% more on “social stability,” and discusses “party-mass relations” 8% more positively.
All results are significant at the 95% level.
Overall, the results suggest that declining transfers compel propaganda about how the
autocrat serves the masses and is supported by them. Propaganda may improve public
assessments of the regime because many Chinese citizens are nationalist. But also, because
elites believe citizens are nationalist, propaganda will lead them to update their assessment
of public support for the regime.
2.3.5 Diversion in the public eye
However, when the autocrat is motivated by the desire for public support, he will employ
foreign policy that is observable to the public and which will generate a nationalist rally.
These policies will take military forms—such as announcing weapons systems, proliferating,
39Results are robust to using the 5 or 20 words on either side of the term.
40Dong and Dong (2015).
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Table 2.4: Propaganda Model
Dependent variable:
Positive relationst Refs to servingt Refs to stabilityt
OLS negbin
(1) (2) (3)
  SSEt 1  0.053⇤⇤  1.090⇤⇤  1.004⇤⇤
(0.025) (0.444) (0.409)
Positive coveraget 1 0.001
(0.075)
Number of referencest 1 0.014⇤⇤⇤ 0.002
(0.001) (0.002)
PRC conflictt 1  0.002  0.099 0.026
(0.006) (0.088) (0.072)
USA conflictt 1  0.007  0.400⇤⇤⇤  0.169
(0.007) (0.134) (0.110)
CPIt 1 0.003  0.065⇤⇤⇤ 0.005
(0.002) (0.010) (0.034)
Popular crisest 1 0.028 0.457⇤⇤ 0.079
(0.019) (0.212) (0.211)
Party Congresst:t 6  0.017  0.152 0.032
(0.016) (0.186) (0.186)
Lianghuit 1  0.010 0.159 0.188
(0.014) (0.216) (0.188)
  S&P500t 1 0.002⇤  0.018 0.021
(0.001) (0.016) (0.015)
Constant  0.203 8.564⇤⇤⇤ 0.437
(0.240) (1.081) (3.561)
Year fixed eﬀects Yes No No
Month fixed eﬀects Yes No No
Observations 199 240 240
R2 0.178
Adjusted R2 0.038
Log Likelihood  804.260  979.913
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,628.520 2,019.827
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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Figure 2.6: SSE Shocks and Chinese Propaganda
Loss of 10%
4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18
Predicted Refs to Serving the People
No shock
Shock9.8
11.0
Loss of 10%
15 25 35 45
Predicted Refs to Social Stability
No shock
Shock
26.7
31.9
Loss of 10%
0.11 0.13 0.15 0.17
Positive Coverage of Party Mass Relations
No shock
Shock0.13
0.14
64
or initiating exercises or conflicts—or high profile diplomatic forms—such as obstructing
American initiatives, withdrawing support, canceling exchanges, or downgrading the rela-
tionship. Diversion will not occur in low politics. Issues like WTO negotiations, though
important, are unlikely to arouse nationalist sentiment. Nor will diversion involve human
rights issues. Human rights cases are important to the United States, but they are often
negotiated privately. Moreover, Chinese citizens may not view punishing the United States
on human rights issues as a compelling defense of national interests.
Table 2.5 reproduces the analysis in Section 2.3.3 but disaggregates Chinese conflict
initiation into military, diplomatic, economic, and human rights areas. Models (1-4) show
that diversion occurs in military and diplomatic aﬀairs but not in economics or human
rights. Figure 2.7 visualizes the results. Overall, the newsworthy character of Chinese
conflict initiation suggests it targets nationalist citizens rather than American interests.
Conflict initiation can be further disaggregated into moderate and severe levels. From
Table 2.1, moderate conflict includes obstructing American policies, withdrawing support,
canceling exchanges, punitive economic actions, congressional actions, infringing upon hu-
man rights, inciting protests, and arresting the other country’s nationals. In contrast, severe
conflict includes selling arms to Taiwan, espionage, developing weapons systems, asserting
territorial claims, proliferating, downgrading the relationship, conducting military exercises,
and engaging in armed conflict.
Models (5-6) show that declining transfers generate severe conflict rather than moder-
ate conflict. Figure 2.8 visualizes the results. This supports my theoretical expectations:
Severe conflict is especially likely to generate a rally because it sharpens ingroup-outgroup
diﬀerences.
2.3.6 Unlearning diversion
The final hypothesis contends that to avoid containment, the autocrat should help the
United States unlearn the lessons of diversion. Chinese leaders have long been wary of
provoking American containment. Partly because many American politicians believe that
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Figure 2.7: SSE Shocks and Chinese Conflict by Issue Area
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Figure 2.8: SSE Shocks and Chinese Conflict by Severity Level
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China aims to challenge American hegemony, Chinese leaders have been meticulous about
presenting their country’s rise as peaceful. After China held military exercises in the Taiwan
Strait in 1995, Vice Minister of Foreign Aﬀairs Liu Huaqiu traveled to Washington and told
National Security Adviser Anthony Lake that the exercises “were normal and no threat to the
United States.”41 In January 2007, China conducted a missile test that destroyed a weather
satellite and created the largest collection of space debris in history. The American response
was stern. “It wasn’t clear what their intent was,” said General Peter Pace. “When the intent
isn’t clear, and when there are surprises and you confuse people, you raise suspicions.”42
When China conducted another test three years later, Xinhua announced the exercise the
day it was conducted and described it as “defensive in nature.” The following day, the
Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs repeated the assurance and added that the test did not create
any debris.43 These examples illustrate that when the United States becomes suspicious of
Chinese motives, Beijing often employs reassurance behavior. They make clear that China
is sensitive to American perceptions.
To assess the hypothesis that China employs diplomacy to recenter American perceptions
after diverting, I examine whether conflict in month t  1 is associated with cooperation in
month t, conditional on a negative transfer shock occurring in month t 2. That is, I subset
the dataset to observations characterized by decline in transfers of at least 5% in t 2. This
allows me to examine the impact of specifically diversionary conflict upon the autocrat’s
propensity to initiate verbal or substantive cooperation in the next period:
@PRC Cooperationt
@PRC Conflictt 1
       SSEt 2   0.05
Because the analysis now spans three months, I included lagged variables in t   1 and
41Suettinger (2003, 254).
42Mulvenon (2007, 5).
43Mulvenon (2010, 1-2).
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Figure 2.9: Post-Diversion Cooperation
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The data are subset to simulate the eﬀect of conflict in t on cooperation in t + 1 conditional on a negative
transfer shock occurring in t  1.
t   2. I also introduce the interaction term   SSEt 2 ⇥ PRC conflictt 1, which captures
the additional degree to which conflict is diversionary beyond the 5% decline stipulated by
the subset.
Table 2.6 presents the results and Figure 2.9 visualizes them. Conditional on a negative
transfer shock, conflict is associated with verbal cooperation the following month. It is
not associated with substantive cooperation the following month. This suggests that the
autocrat employs a verbal charm oﬀensive to recenter American perceptions after diverting.
However, he does not employ public forms of cooperation that might be penalized by his
domestic audience.
2.4 Case Study
2.4.1 Summary
There is little direct evidence of diversionary aggression in the scholarly literature, since
leaders who employ it would never actually admit it. Indeed, admitting that conflict is
diversionary would undermine its objective. In this respect, China’s bilateral relationship
with the United States constitutes a particularly attractive case study. For the WikiLeaks
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Table 2.6: Unlearning Diversion
Dependent variable:
PRC cooperationt PRC diplomacyt
(1) (2) (3)
  SSEt 1 3.908 0.048  3.244
(4.212) (6.073) (4.648)
PRC conflictt 1  0.263 0.555⇤⇤ 1.225⇤⇤⇤
(0.196) (0.229) (0.420)
USA conflictt 1 0.395  0.233  1.426⇤⇤
(0.466) (0.435) (0.580)
CPIt 1 0.097⇤⇤⇤ 0.036 0.033
(0.026) (0.036) (0.043)
Popular crisest 1  0.001 0.215 0.133
(1.147) (0.607) (0.694)
Party Congresst:t 6 2.414⇤⇤ 1.570⇤⇤ 1.961⇤⇤⇤
(0.973) (0.634) (0.469)
Lianghuit 1  36.160⇤⇤⇤  0.968⇤  0.773
(0.495) (0.569) (0.878)
  S&P500t 1 0.108  0.036  0.105⇤⇤
(0.118) (0.065) (0.052)
  SSEt 2 4.199⇤⇤
(2.072)
PRC conflictt 2  0.185
(0.166)
USA conflictt 2  0.484
(0.653)
  SSEt 2 ⇥ PRC conflictt 1 8.646⇤⇤⇤
(1.653)
Constant  11.982⇤⇤⇤  3.693  3.777
(2.986) (3.559) (4.285)
Observations 63 63 63
Log Likelihood  35.031  100.403  96.403
Akaike Inf. Crit. 88.061 218.805 218.806
⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Analysis restricted to observations with decline of   5% in SSE in t  2.
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cables that were released in 2010 and 2011 provide an unprecedented opportunity to observe
diversionary aggression from primary source documents. And, indeed, one particularly well
documented episode in 2010 aﬃrms that diversionary aggression proceeds exactly as the
quantitative evidence above suggests.
In the first months of 2010 the Shanghai Exchange plummeted, as shown in Figure 2.10.
Meanwhile, GDP growth increased and unemployment declined. As returns fell, China
initiated high profile conflicts with the United States. However, China secretly warned the
United States to expect aggression over the next few months and that its bellicosity would
be temporary. It continued to cooperate with the United States on issues that could be kept
private. Propaganda mirrored foreign policy. When the market sustained its steepest losses
that spring, the level of social stability propaganda was three times as high as during the rest
of the year.44 After the stock market stabilized in July, China reassured the United States
privately. Through diversion and reassurance, as well as the careful separation of public
and private interactions, China was able to navigate its domestic crisis without damaging
bilateral relations.
2.4.2 The crash
The Shanghai index faltered in late 2009, but recovered toward the end of the year.
In January 2010, Defense Secretary Robert Gates visited Beijing and President Hu visited
Washington. Both meetings were considered successful. In late January, the White House
announced a $6 billion Taiwan arms sales package. The package was conservative in com-
parison to its predecessors and American oﬃcials took pains to ensure all equipment “could
reasonably be described as ‘defensive’.”45 The arms sale was unwelcome but expected by
the Chinese. While Ambassador Zhou Wenzhong “relayed Beijing’s anger over the sale,” he
“noticed not only what was authorized for sale to Taiwan but also what was not authorized.”
Zhou told American oﬃcials he “believed that would mitigate Beijing’s reaction.” More, he
44Propaganda about serving the people was more volatile, but also peaked that spring.
45Gates (2014, 415).
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Figure 2.10: 2010 Crash and “Assertive China”
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proposed steps to improve bilateral relations. National Security Council senior director for
East Asian aﬀairs Jeﬀrey Bader recalls,
I came out of the breakfast thinking for the first time that Hu would in fact come
to Washington for the Nuclear Security Summit, that that event could restore
positive momentum to the relationship, and that the damage would be relatively
short lived.46
Shortly thereafter the Shanghai index began to plummet. Chinese policy changed
abruptly. Beijing’s rhetoric over the sale “sharpened considerably,” Bader wrote. In late
January, China publicly threatened unusually strong retaliation for the arms sale, including
a ban on Boeing, the largest US exporter to China. However, Bader “did not see a serious
prospect of the Chinese carrying through on these threats.”47 Beijing also made headlines
by canceling Secretary Gates’ upcoming visit.48
46Bader (2012, 73-74).
47Bader (2012, 74).
48In mid-February, President Obama met with the Dalai Lama. This might seem to be a provocative act
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As these troubling events were unfolding, the editor of China’s most nationalist state-
aﬃliated newspaper, the Global Times, met with American embassy oﬃcials in Beijing.
Such a high ranking Party member would not have met with American oﬃcials without the
approval of the Chinese leadership. He told embassy oﬃcials “not to be concerned” about
China’s recent policies. Ambassador John Huntsman cabled a summary of this meeting to
Washington:
The Chinese government had a clear vision of China’s interests, [theGlobal Times
editor] said, and it was most important to maintain a “favorable foreign policy
environment" for the government to pursue pressing economic and social devel-
opment goals at home. A good relationship with the United States was essential,
a view he had heard recently expressed by Chinese oﬃcials. China’s statements
criticizing the United States on the Google case, Internet freedom, Taiwan arms
sales and the President’s planned meeting with the Dalai Lama were all “neces-
sary to satisfy the Chinese people,” but China’s actions in 2010 would be aimed
at preserving China’s relationships with the rest of the world. Quoting a Chi-
nese phrase used to describe Deng Xiaoping’s strategy for mollifying ideological
Communists with socialist rhetoric while pursuing capitalist economic reforms,
[the editor] said we should expect China in its 2010 foreign policy to “put on the
left turn signal in order to turn right.”
Other Party members communicated similar messages in early 2010. A senior fellow
at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences told embassy oﬃcials that the Chinese media
was “deliberately misleading the public to sell more newspapers.” As a result, Huntsman
predicted that China would “stomp around and carry a small stick” over the coming months.
“This attitude,” he told Washington, “has more form than substance and is designed to play
to Chinese public opinion.”49
After sending private assurances, China initiated public conflict. In March, US policy-
makers were presented with a “lengthy presentation” on China’s rights in the South China
but in fact was not. The Dalai Lama had visited Washington in autumn, but Obama declined to meet with
him then to avoid provoking China before President Hu’s visit in January. It was the first time an American
president had declined to meet with the Dalai Lama since 1991, and it incurred substantial domestic costs
for the president. More, the February meeting was held in the White House Map Room—considered part
of the presidential residence—rather than the Oval Oﬃce. This “was considered by many observers to be a
sign of Washington’s acknowledgement of Beijing’s political sensitivities” (CNN 2010).
49US Embassy Beijing (2010).
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Sea, newly deemed a “national priority.” On Taiwan, they were presented with a series of
“ritualistic demands.”50 After the meetings, the Western press deemed Beijing “incensed.”51
The Chinese press described bilateral relations as “strained” and “at a low point.”52 Chinese
policymakers told journalists the United States was trying to contain China. Of course, the
accusation made Asian headlines.53 In response, a senior Obama administration oﬃcial told
reporters, “With these issues, such as arms sales to Taiwan and meetings with Dalai Lama,
there are things said for domestic consumption.”54
The claim, however, slid beneath the mounting discussion of bilateral tension. In May,
Beijing scuttled an American UN initiative to blame North Korea for the sinking of a South
Korean vessel in March.55 When Secretary of State Hillary Clinton traveled to Beijing later
that month, she claimed that Chinese leaders described the South China Sea to her as a “core
interest” and “warned they would not tolerate outside interference.”56 Clinton believed the
meetings to be a “carefully choreographed summit.” Rear Admiral Guan Youfei, who, she
believed, had “gotten at least a tacit go-ahead from his military and party bosses,” “stood
up and launched into an angry rant accusing the United States of trying to encircle China
and suppress its rise.”57 A senior Chinese oﬃcial told reporters, “It may not have been
politically correct, but it wasn’t an accident. ...The army follows the Party. Do you really
think that Guan did this unilaterally?”58 After the meetings, the Western press concluded
the two sides had made “modest progress” on economic issues. In contrast, the Chinese
50Bader (2012, 76-77).
51Wall Street Journal (2010).
52Cheng Guangjin and Tan Yingzi (2010); Yan Feng (2010).
53Huang (2010).
54Batson, Poon, and Oster (2010).
55Clinton (2014, 56).
56Clinton (2014, 76). Other American diplomats did not reportedly hear this claim from Chinese oﬃcials,
however.
57Clinton (2014, 76).
58Pomfret (2010b).
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press emphasized that Beijing had demanded that Washington “respect its core interests
and major concerns.”59
In June, China continued to block American eﬀorts to punish North Korea in the United
Nations. China watchers concluded “That China is becoming more assertive on many for-
eign policy issues is widely recognized by both Western and Chinese observers.”60 Indeed,
discussion of “assertive China” quintupled in US news articles in 2010.61
More, what cooperation transpired in this period was assiduously kept private. In April,
China finally agreed to American requests to work together on an Iran resolution at the
United Nations. China had one condition: that it would not announce its assistance pub-
licly.62
2.4.3 The recovery
In July, the stock market reversed course. So too did China’s foreign policy. Conflict
subsided. Diplomacy and then cooperation rose. Beijing agreed to support a Security
Council statement condemning North Korea. In August, Chinese oﬃcials clarified that they
“had not authoritatively called the South China Sea a ‘core interest.” ’63 In September,
China employed “quiet diplomacy” to inform US oﬃcials that it “was willing to begin expert
talks on a code of conduct in the South China Sea.”64
The charm oﬀensive culminated with meetings in Beijing that month. Organization
Department Minister Li Yuanchao gave National Security Adviser Tom Donilon a “lengthy
personal presentation explaining in detail why China would not challenge the United States
59Landler and Wines (2010); Xinhua News Agency (2010).
60Swaine (2010, 8).
61Johnston (2013, 12). This article rebuts ahistorical critiques of Chinese foreign policy as newly assertive
in 2010. However, Johnston’s point that Chinese assertiveness is not new does not contradict the thesis
advanced here that episodes of assertiveness result from domestic conditions.
62Bader (2012, 78).
63Bader (2012, 106).
64Bader (2012, 106).
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for global leadership and why there was no inevitable conflict in their interests.” He as-
sured Donilon of China’s “unyielding opposition” to North Korea’s nuclear weapons pro-
gram. Simultaneously, General Xu Caihou informed American policymakers that China
would resume military exchanges with the United States.65 Bader recalls,
The Chinese reaction in all the meetings was a steady drumbeat of references to
their desire for cooperation with the United States. By the time we left, even
Donilon knew the Chinese word for cooperation, hezuo, having heard it many
times. Little was said about Taiwan and even less about Tibet.66
In an October meeting at the Asian defense ministers forum in Hanoi, Defense Minister
Liang Guanglie quietly reinvited Secretary Gates to Beijing.67 Xinhua reported the meet-
ing but not the invitation. Gates met with President Hu in Beijing later that month. In
November, President Obama met President Hu at the G20 meeting in Seoul. Shortly there-
after, State Councilor Dai Binguo traveled to North Korea on the United States’ behalf to
warn Pyongyang not to respond to ongoing South Korean military exercises. The assistance
went unreported in China. In December, Beijing accepted an outstanding oﬀer for Presi-
dent Hu to visit Washington. The visit in January was successful. Observers noticed the
improvement in bilateral relations. In February, Swaine noted that “In recent weeks, Beijing
seems to have stepped back from the most strident and activist words and actions of winter
2009-2010.”68
2.4.4 Taking stock
This case shows that in 2010, China pursued a foreign policy of diversion and reassur-
ance. That year, Beijing initiated four times as much conflict when elite transfers were
falling compared to when they were rising. Social stability propaganda peaked when the
65Bader (2012, 116, 118).
66Bader (2012, 118).
67Gates (2014, 524).
68Swaine (2011, 9).
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market suﬀered its steepest declines. While American embassy cables that year routinely
attributed China’s aggressive foreign policy to domestic problems, they failed to distinguish
between mass and elite interests. Certainly, Chinese operatives had few interests in hint-
ing at regime instability by clarifying the contours of leadership struggles. However, the
remarkable fact that stocks crashed while employment and GDP growth improved suggests
that elite transfers, not popular economic interests, were the source of the aggression that
China warned was “necessary to satisfy the Chinese people.”69
More, patterns in public versus private interaction suggest that Chinese behavior in late
2010 was not regression to the mean. Instead, it was strategic. As elite transfers fell in
the first half of the year, Beijing warned American oﬃcials to expect diversionary foreign
policy. Then it employed diversion and propaganda while continuing to cooperate with the
United States privately. Thereafter, it successfully reassured American policymakers once
the domestic crisis had passed.
2.5 Conclusion
This study contributes to the literature on autocratic foreign policy by demonstrating
that the economic interests of political elites condition autocrats’ international behavior.
In China, the economic interests of political elites may be responsible for 40% of China’s
conflict initiation toward the United States. When elite transfers through the Shanghai Stock
Exchange decline by 5% to 15%, China initiates 1.5 to 2 times as much conflict as usual
the following month. More, Chinese propaganda is most likely to emphasize public support
for the autocrat when elite transfers decline, suggesting that the autocrat is principally
interested in inoculating himself against elite leadership challenges.
The theory may explain the foreign policy of other autocracies as well. Former am-
bassador Michael McFaul argues that financial sanctions have diminished Vladimir Putin’s
ability to transfer rents to elites, and that this may explain Putin’s popular adventures
69Similarly, inflation cannot explain China’s foreign policy in 2010 because it rose almost continually
throughout the year, making the mid-year reversal in Chinese foreign policy incongruous.
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abroad.70
Future research should proceed in three directions. First, scholars might consider how
the opinions and living standards of a broader segment of the population condition foreign
policy in other autocracies. Chinese foreign policy responds strongly to elite interests, but
is the public sometimes more influential—for example, when urban bias is lower, rendering
popular economic interests more uniform?
Second, I focus on Chinese behavior toward the United States, yet China may target other
countries for diversion as well. Indeed, many other embassies complained to Ambassador
Huntsman about such behavior in 2010. In particular, anti-Japanese statements are popular
with Chinese citizens.71 Future research might consider how autocrats choose between
diversionary targets.
Finally, researchers should consider whether diversion may target domestic groups. In
China, the autocrat sometimes initiates propaganda campaigns that portray local oﬃcials
as corrupt. The center’s prosecution of high level corruption cases has been very popular.
“Domestic diversion” has precedent elsewhere: Mexico’s single party presidents periodically
attacked business elites to bolster their popularity among ordinary people.72 Thus, diversion
might emerge in the domestic class politics of autocracies as well.
This research agenda is pressing because if economic projections are correct, China may
employ diversion more frequently in the future. The relative economic position of Chinese
elites will deteriorate as China increases household consumption as a share of GDP.73 In the
long run, slowing GDP growth will depress stock returns and the autocrat will run out of
SOEs to privatize, diminishing the value of the Shanghai Exchange as a vehicle for transfers.
Such dynamics led elites in post-Soviet countries to oppose reform because of their interests
70Robins-Early (2015).
71See the interesting account in Pomfret (2010a), which suggests that Chinese policymakers engaged in at
least some diversion toward Japan while the Shanghai Exchange plummeted in April and May 2010. The
Japanese foreign minister said of his Chinese counterpart Yang Jiechi, “He’s always been a peace lover. I
guess the Chinese felt like yelling.”
72See e.g. Gonzáles (2008).
73Keck (2014); Naughton (2012).
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in the rents from partial privatization.74 Chinese elites may become similarly discontented
in an era of normal growth. The autocrat might attempt to ameliorate their discontent by
topping oﬀ transfers outside the stock market, but this will be diﬃcult because the public is
increasingly critical of corruption. In short, popular demands for clean government combined
with elite demands for new transfers will put future Chinese leaders in a diﬃcult position.
Lacking tools to placate elites, they may resort to diversion more frequently.
74Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992); Huang (2008); Pei (2006).
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3 | The Influence of Congress upon America’s China
Policy
3.1 Introduction
How does legislative opposition condition the executive’s ability to conduct foreign pol-
icy? Many international relations (IR) scholars argue that divided government is advan-
tageous for foreign policy. Legislative opposition may improve an executive’s bargaining
position because ratification requirements restrict the universe of possible international
agreements.1 This is commonly known as the “Schelling conjecture”—that an executive
can reference a hawkish legislature to extract concessions from his bargaining partner. Leg-
islative opposition may also improve the credibility of executive statements, because if the
executive promised too much to his negotiating partner, opposition politicians would soon
object.2 More, democratic leaders may be especially likely to uphold international agree-
ments because they face domestic audience costs for transgressing them.3 This observation
dates to Machiavelli, who wrote, “Instances might be cited of treaties broken by princes for
a very small advantage, and of treaties which have not been broken by a republic for a very
great advantage.”4 Legislatures, then, may be beneficial because they bestow credibility
upon executives negotiating abroad. And indeed, empirical studies find that legislatures
render states more pacific, better warfighters, more durable alliance members, and able to
1Schelling (1980); Putnam (1988). For a recent review on treaty compliance, see Simmons (2010).
2Schultz (1998). Also see Martin (2000).
3Fearon (1994); Tomz (2007).
4Machiavelli (1970, 1.58).
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negotiate lower tariﬀs.5
Other scholars question the benefits of legislatures in international relations. Milner
(1997) argues that domestic groups introduce veto points and therefore never make inter-
national cooperation more likely. Milner and Rosendorﬀ (1997, 120) demonstrate that the
Schelling conjecture “holds only when the legislature is not too hawkish.” In their model,
legislative opposition reduces the prospects for international cooperation and shifts agree-
ments toward the legislature’s ideal point. While there are relatively few empirical studies
that support this view, one study finds that if Senate treaty consent is diﬃcult to secure,
foreign countries may “simply disregard US demands or abandon the negotiations entirely.”6
Another study finds that increasing the number of domestic veto players decreases the like-
lihood of forming a preferential trade agreement by 50 percent. “[D]omestic politics,” the
authors conclude, “may be a greater obstacle to international co-operation than political or
military relations among states.”7
This article explores one way in which legislative influence upon democratic foreign policy
may be detrimental. If the legislature harms the interests of a foreign country, the foreign
country may punish the executive in international negotiations and reduce his ability to
realize gains from international cooperation. The foreign country may punish the executive
for a number of reasons. If legislative hostility harms the foreign country, it may seek to
deter the legislature from adopting such behavior in the future. Similarly, if the foreign
country suspects that the executive may be colluding with the legislature to increase his
bargaining leverage, then it should deter the executive from doing so lest it receive poor
bargains in the future.
Additionally, legislative hostility may force the foreign leader to take a stand lest she
suﬀer domestic audience costs for appearing weak. In response to legislative hostility, the
5This is a large literature, but see, for example, Howell and Pevehouse (2005); Powell and Pevehouse
(2007); Kriner (2010); Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999); Gaubatz (1996); Russett and Oneal (2001); Choi
(2010); Leeds (1999); Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorﬀ (2002, 2000).
6Kelley and Pevehouse (2015, 541).
7Mansfield, Milner, and Pevehouse (2007, 432).
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foreign country’s citizens may demand that their leader stand up for national interests and
prestige. Empirical studies suggest that citizens care about the distributional implications of
international negotiations and the nation’s reputation.8 Therefore, the foreign leader may be
forced to adopt a tougher bargaining position to avoid being penalized by her constituency.
Finally, the foreign country may view the legislative-executive divide as an opportunity to
move negotiations closer to its ideal point. Legislative opposition renders failure to reach an
agreement costly for the executive, whose domestic political capital is at stake. As National
Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft told President George H.W. Bush, “An ugly confrontation
with Congress and Beijing awaits us ...a majority in both houses will be eager to humiliate
our China policy.”9 Scholars of American politics find that divided government enables
more credit claiming by the successful party.10 These stakes give the executive an interest
in signing any international agreement, and the foreign leader may sense the opportunity
to shift the terms of cooperation toward her ideal point. This may render international
cooperation more elusive for the executive, or achievable but on less favorable terms. For all
three reasons—deterrence, domestic audience costs, and strategic opportunity—legislative
opposition to the executive’s foreign policy may reduce the nation’s ability to realize the
gains from international cooperation.
I explore the relationship between legislative opposition and international cooperation
in the context of US-China relations. What is the eﬀect of anti-Chinese legislation upon
China’s willingness to cooperate with the United States? Historically, the gap between
congressional and presidential preferences on China has been wide. Since the early 1970s,
American presidents have consistently pursued engagement with China, while Congress has
condemned Chinese human rights and trade practices. American presidents have vetoed
several China bills. Congress has attempted to override three vetoes.
The analysis employs two original datasets. The first is a complete history of China’s
8Tomz (2007).
9Scowcroft (1990).
10Nicholson, Segura, and Woods (2002).
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relations with the United States between 1949 and 2014. It is drawn from three dozen
primary and secondary sources and records 3,000 bilateral interactions across a host of issue
areas and severity levels. I record daily episodes of diplomacy, criticism, cooperation, and
conflict. The second dataset includes 2,758 congressional actions on China since 1973. It
is drawn from the congressional register. It includes all resolutions, bills, amendments,
and laws introduced or enacted in either chamber. I record whether or not each piece of
legislation was hostile toward China.
Ascertaining the direction of causality can be diﬃcult: does congressional hostility render
China less likely to cooperate, or does Chinese recalcitrance generate congressional hostility?
My identification strategy exploits the congressional calendar as an instrument for anti-
Chinese legislation. The volume of congressional activity varies dramatically throughout
the calendar year, and predictably. It is most common after the State of the Union address
and before Memorial Day, Independence Day, the August congressional recess, and the fiscal
year funding deadline of 1 October. Indeed, the volume of total legislation in these periods is
more than two standard deviations greater than average. Because the congressional calendar
generates exogenous variation in the volume of total legislation, it generates exogenous
variation in anti-Chinese legislation. Thus, high-volume days can be exploited to circumvent
endogeneity concerns about congressional hostility and Chinese foreign policy toward the
United States. The evidence suggests that congressional hostility toward China reduces the
probability of Chinese cooperation with the United States by a factor of four.
This paper advances our understanding of the relationship between domestic institutions
and international relations. Scholars writing in the democratic peace tradition suggest that
democratic institutions may enable states to secure more favorable international outcomes.
However, the consequences of strategic legislative behavior remain relatively unexplored,
due in part to the diﬃculty of addressing reverse causality concerns.11 This study provides
11Indeed, most empirical research focuses on the implications of fixed institutional features for international
cooperation. A considerable body of work focuses on the number of domestic veto players, for example. See
e.g. Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorﬀ (2000); Tsebelis (2002); Kastner and Rector (2003); Mansfield, Milner,
and Pevehouse (2008); Henisz and Mansfield (2006).
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evidence that when the legislature opposes the executive’s foreign policy agenda, the nation
as a whole may realize fewer gains from international cooperation.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the data on bilateral interactions
and congressional hostility toward China. Section 3 justifies the congressional calendar as
an instrument for anti-Chinese legislation and then presents the analysis. Section 4 draws
on new archival evidence from the Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Obama administrations
to show that American policymakers believed that China punished them for congressional
hostility. Section 5 considers scope conditions and concludes.
3.2 Data
3.2.1 Bilateral Data
US-China Interactions, 1949-2014
To test whether congressional hostility reduces the president’s ability to secure interna-
tional cooperation, I constructed a dataset of over 3,000 bilateral interactions between 1949
and 2014 from three dozen primary and secondary sources listed in Appendix D. I drew
from secondary sources, policymaker memoirs, case studies, periodicals that follow Chinese
politics such as the China Leadership Monitor, declassified primary source documents, and
leaked American diplomatic cables from 1990 onwards provided by WikiLeaks.12 In all,
I coded a diplomatic history of interactions between China and the United States. This
analysis is restricted to 1973-2014, the period covered by the legislative data introduced
below.
By hand coding some 10,000 pages of historical documents, I was able to capture pri-
vate encounters that do not appear in traditional event datasets. In my coding scheme, a
bilateral interaction is an episode of contact between the two states. For example, in 1950
Premier Zhou Enlai sent the United States private, third party warnings not to invade Korea
12Wikileaks covers US-China relations between 2003 and the end of 2009 with the greatest frequency.
However, some cables cover the 1990-2002 period.
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through the Indian ambassador to China. In 1980, China and the United States cooperated
to install monitoring equipment in western China to spy on the Soviets. In 1986, the Rea-
gan administration secretly requested Chinese assistance in arming the Nicaraguan contras.
China complied. After being lobbied by FedEx and UPS in 2009, Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton requested that China reduce barriers to entry in its postal market.
For all these episodes, I recorded the date of the interaction. When it was not possible
to identify the exact date, I identified the month that it occurred. I next recorded the source
and target of the interaction. Most international events are directional. For example, John
F. Kennedy oﬀered food aid to China, while Hank Paulson requested that China appreciate
the renminbi. Some, however, involve equal eﬀort by both parties, like negotiating or signing
an agreement. I duplicated these events so both sides received credit equally.
I then recorded the action itself: diplomacy, criticism, cooperation, or conflict. With
a few adjustments for IR theory discussed below, these categories are similar to the “quad
scores” employed in event datasets, which record verbal cooperation, verbal conflict, material
cooperation, and material conflict. I define diplomacy as cooperation in word rather than
deed. As shown in Table 3.1, it includes positive statements, requests, meetings, negotia-
tions, invitations, visits, explanations, reassurances, oﬀers, statements of regret, proposals,
and promises.
Cooperation entails material deeds. It includes audience cost generating oﬃcial apolo-
gies, the release of imprisoned foreign nationals, concessions, the provision of economic or
humanitarian aid, the signing of oﬃcial agreements, presidential summits, and yielding mil-
itarily.
Criticism entails negative verbal interactions. As shown in Table 3.2, it includes un-
friendly statements by representatives of the executive branch, the postponement of sched-
uled talks, the downgrading of diplomatic protocol for a visit, refusals, demands, warnings,
private threats, and public threats made by low ranking oﬃcials. In keeping with the IR
literature I draw the line between criticism and conflict at audience cost generating leader
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Table 3.1: Positive Interactions
Action
Positive statement
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
Diplomacy
Request
Meet
Negotiate
Invite
Visit
Explain
Reassure
Oﬀer
Express regret
Propose
Promise
Apologize
9>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>;
Cooperation
Release nationals
Concede
Aid
Sign agreement
Hold summit
Yield militarily
* See Appendix A for
examples.
threats.13 Private threats between executives or their representatives are “cheap” because
they do not incur audience costs. Public threats from low ranking or retired oﬃcials are
“cheap” as well, since these individuals are not close to the executive branch.
Conflict includes negative material interactions. These include public leader threats,
the obstruction of the other side’s initiatives, the withdrawal of support, the cancellation
of planned exchanges, punitive economic actions, human rights violations, interfering in
the other party’s domestic aﬀairs, inciting anti-foreign nationalist protest, arresting the
other state’s nationals, espionage, formally downgrading relations, and all military claims,
exercises, and conflict.
Because Taiwan, Tibet, and Chinese dissidents are salient in the bilateral relationship,
I record American cooperation with these actors as conflict with China (and vice versa).
13Fearon (1994); Weeks (2008). Some studies suggest that autocrats are only able to generate audience
costs by inciting domestic nationalist protests (Weiss 2013, 2014; Kinne and Marinov 2013). The results are
robust to this modification.
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Table 3.2: Negative Interactions
Action
Negative statement
9>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>;
Criticism
Postpone
Downgrade protocol
Refuse
Demand
Warn
Private threats
Public low ranking threats
Public leader threats
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
Conflict
Obstruct
Withdraw support
Cancel exchanges
Punitive economic action
Infringe upon human rights
Intervene on behalf of dissident
Incite protest
Arrest nationals
Espionage
Develop weapon system
Assert territorial claim
Proliferate
Downgrade relationship
Military exercise
Military conflict
* See Appendix A for examples.
Examples of all action types appear in Appendix A.14
I then recorded the issue area of the interaction, such as arms sales or intellectual
property rights, as well as its private or public venue. Finally, I recorded a description of
the event and its source. The dataset excludes interactions between Congress and China
to avoid double counting. Congressional action towards China is captured in the second
dataset.
Figure 3.1 visualizes the bilateral relationship since 1949. The top panel shows the
number of diplomatic, critical, cooperative, and conflictual interactions initiated by China
each year. The bottom panel shows the same data for the United States. Diplomacy is more
14A note is appropriate on routine military patrols. There are many of these and they are diﬃcult to
record accurately. I record policy changes that alter military patrols—making them more aggressive, for
instance, or mandating them in new areas—rather than the specific patrols themselves. This is appropriate
because policymakers respond to changes in the other side’s assertiveness rather than to status quo patrols.
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common than criticism and talk is far more common than action. The volume of bilateral
interaction has expanded massively over the study period. This is unsurprising because the
two countries avoided oﬃcial contact before 1969 and normalized relations only in 1978. Two
gaps in the dataset—in the mid-1980s and the early 2000s—reflect sparsity in the primary
and secondary historical record. However, I expect that this source of measurement error is
classical.
Comparisons
I eschewed existing event datasets for several reasons. The popular Militarized Interstate
Dispute dataset records only costly forms of conflict, not cooperation. Daily event datasets
such as GDELT or Gary King’s “10 million events” record bilateral interactions with much
greater frequency, but with tremendous noise. By my estimation, 20-30% of these events are
false positives or false negatives: respectively, events that were omitted by the automated
event coding process and events that were included mistakenly. Additionally, I identified
many more diplomatic action types than recorded in standard event ontologies like Conflict
and Mediation Event Observations (CAMEO). Existing ontologies were constructed from
news wires, which omit some important types of diplomatic interaction. Examples include
demurring, canceling an invitation, postponing talks, expressing restraint, or oﬀering asylum
to a dissident. These have all been important in US-China relations but do not appear in
standard ontologies. Omissions are also considerable for classified military interactions. For
example, China has occasionally initiated aggressive aircraft tails and submarine dogfights.
These episodes are very important, but appear only in policymaker memoirs or declassified
documents.
Furthermore, many international negotiations take place out of the public eye and escape
the attention of news wires. For example, the United States and China famously conducted
third party diplomacy through Pakistan in 1969, when President Yahya Khan relayed Wash-
ington’s message that the United States sought dialogue with China rather than Chinese
isolation. Months later, American ambassador Walter Stoessel made contact with Chinese
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Figure 3.1: Diplomacy Data
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ambassador Lei Yang in Warsaw, who invited him to the Chinese embassy for discussions.
Stoessel expressed American hopes to reduce forces on Taiwan, and Lei emphasized China’s
willingness to discuss “any idea or suggestion presented by the United States on the basis
of the five principles of peaceful coexistence.”15 Washington proposed a high-level meeting.
In October 1970, Chairman Mao invited American journalist Edgar Snow to view National
Day celebrations beside him. During the festivities, Mao privately told Snow that China
would welcome an oﬃcial visit from President Nixon. The rest, of course, is history. In order
to understand public international outcomes, it is crucial to record the private interactions
that led to them.
3.2.2 Congressional Data
Legislative data are drawn from www.congress.gov, the oﬃcial website for US legislative
information. I collected all 2,758 pieces of legislation on China between 1973 and 2015.16
The dataset includes all resolutions, bills, amendments, and laws introduced or passed in
either chamber. I coded each piece of legislation according to a dichotomous classification:
whether or not it was hostile toward China.
A substantial proportion of legislation is overtly provocative toward China. Most com-
monly, it condemns China’s human rights record. For example, S.Res. 451, introduced in
May 2014, was entitled “A resolution recalling the Government of China’s forcible disper-
sion of those peaceably assembled in Tiananmen Square 25 years ago, in light of China’s
continued abysmal human rights record.”
Other legislation may not provoke China in the title of the bill but contains hostile
language within. This is often the case with appropriations bills. For example, the 2016
national security appropriations bill provided $8 million to support Tibetan cultural tradi-
15Ross (1995, 32-33, 28).
16The legislative actions in the dataset explicitly reference “China.” Congress may entertain legislation
that aﬀects Chinese interests but which does not explicitly reference “China.” For example, it might advance
Chinese interests by lowering steel tariﬀs or harm Chinese interests by raising them. To assess this, one
would have to code all 393,466 legislative actions between 1973 and 2015: a massive undertaking indeed.
Nonetheless, I expect that this source of measurement error will be classical.
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tions in China. H.R. 3694, the “STOP Organ Traﬃcking Act,” condemned organ traﬃcking
worldwide but noted that it is particularly prevalent in China. China believes that bills like
these interfere in its domestic aﬀairs.
Still other legislation criticizes China for economic reasons. H.R. 1575, introduced in
April 2005, threatened “To authorize appropriate action if the negotiations with the People’s
Republic of China regarding China’s undervalued currency and currency manipulation are
not successful.”
Finally, some legislation condemns executive policy toward China. For example, S.J. Res
19 introduced in April 2015 was “A joint resolution to express the disfavor of Congress re-
garding the proposed agreement for cooperation between the United States and the People’s
Republic of China.” These actions criticize China and administration policy at once.
Overall, the dataset records 602 pieces of legislation that were hostile toward China be-
tween 1973 and 2015.17 Figure 3.2 shows the annual number of hostile legislative actions.
Congressional hostility toward China increased dramatically after Tiananmen, tapered dur-
ing President Clinton’s first term, and increased after the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis.
Since then, congressional hostility toward China has trended downward with considerable
volatility.
3.3 Analysis
3.3.1 The Calendar Year and Congress
Reverse Causality Concerns
Congress often criticizes China because of Chinese policy decisions. But Chinese foreign
policy also responds to congressional criticism. In a naïve logistic setting, congressional
hostility would thus be correlated with the error term. This would generate biased and
inconsistent estimates. Indeed, Table D.1 in the appendix demonstrates that in this setting,
17I also recorded 95 pieces of legislation that were favorable toward Chinese interests between 1973 and
2015. I employ these in a robustness check that examines Congress’ net hostility toward China.
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Figure 3.2: Congressional Hostility Toward China
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congressional hostility is significantly associated with more Chinese cooperation in a bivari-
ate context, and is insignificantly related to Chinese cooperation in the presence of other
covariates. We cannot be confident in these results because of reverse causality concerns.
However, if some other variable (known as the instrument) generates exogenous variation
in congressional hostility, then endogeneity concerns may be circumvented. The observed
relationship between the instrument and congressional hostility may be used to obtain pre-
dicted values of congressional hostility. Then, the predicted values may be used as an ex-
planatory variable for Chinese cooperation. The predicted values are presumably exogenous,
because they represent the share of congressional hostility explained only by variation in the
instrument. Thus, if a valid instrument may be found, one may circumvent the endogeneity
concerns that characterize Congress’ relationship with China.
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The Instrument
The congressional calendar provides such an instrument. Legislative activity is strongly
influenced by the congressional calendar. To assess the rate of legislative activity across
the calendar year, I scraped all 393,466 legislative actions between 1973 and 2015 from
www.congress.gov with the computer programming language Python. I computed the
average number of actions per day and the average number of actions that were hostile to
China per day. These trends are shown in Figure 3.3.18
Legislative activity, the figure reveals, varies dramatically over the calendar year. It falls
to zero during the congressional recess in August, the holiday season in December, and the
holiday weekends of Presidents’ Day, Memorial Day, Independence Day, and Thanksgiving.
It spikes in advance of important (but arbitrary) calendar deadlines.
The dotted line shows a threshold for high volume days: those with an average level of
legislative activity that is two standard deviations higher than the average level in the whole
sample. On average, 23 pieces of legislation are acted upon per day in Congress. To meet
the threshold, Congress must act upon 50.5 pieces of legislation in a given day. Congress
typically meets this threshold on only seven days in the calendar year: 5 February, 20 May,
25 June, 30 July – 1 August, and 28 September.
The first burst occurs after the president’s State of the Union address in early February.
The address renders legislative action more likely because it brings lawmakers to Washington
and sparks congressional debate over the president’s priorities. The second and third bursts
occur before Memorial Day and Independence Day. Publications that follow the Hill note
that these weeks tend to be busy before members of Congress return to their home districts.19
The fourth burst occurs at the end of July before Congress goes into recess for the month
of August. Rollcall describes this period as “among the most fevered fortnights of the
18For technical reasons, I drop observations from the first month of new congressional sessions (i.e., every
other January since 1973). New sessions are characterized by a tremendous amount of administrative action
unrelated to China. Figure D.1 in Appendix D plots daily average legislation including and excluding the
first month of new sessions. In constructing my instrument, I excluded these months.
19See, for example, Leeds (2013).
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Figure 3.3: Daily Bill Frequency
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The blue line shows the average number of legislative actions per day between 1973 and 2015. The red
line shows the average number of legislative actions that are hostile to China per day between 1973 and
2015. The dotted line shows the threshold employed as the instrument. Observations above the threshold
represent days with high legislative volume, defined as more than two standard deviations more than the
average level of legislative activity. In the sample, legislative activity averages 23.0 actions per day. One
standard deviation is 13.8 actions. The threshold is 50.5 actions.
legislative year.”20 The final burst precedes the beginning of the fiscal year on 1 October.
Federal agencies must be funded before this date to operate. This burst reflects eleventh
hour work on appropriations bills.
These calendar dates generate variation in the volume of total legislation and, by exten-
sion, anti-Chinese legislation. As shown in Figure 3.3, anti-Chinese legislation tracks total
legislation closely. The correlation coeﬃcient between the two time series is 0.78.
20Hawkings (1015).
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The Exclusion Restriction
To be valid, an instrument may not violate the exclusion restriction. Could these dates
aﬀect Chinese foreign policy toward the United States in any way other than through the
congressional calendar? As legislators prepare to return to their home districts for Inde-
pendence Day weekend and the August recess, these summer days pass in China like any
others. The Chinese fiscal year begins on 1 January, not 1 October. Because nothing unusual
happens in China in these three periods, they do not violate the exclusion restriction.
There are two potential violations of the exclusion restriction. The first obtains in early
February, when the president gives the State of the Union address. Intuitively, it is possible
that China could take issue with the tone of the address and hence refuse to cooperate. In
fact, all addresses between 1973 and 2011 were neutral or positive in tone toward China.21
Nonetheless, the oﬃcial Chinese newspaper has occasionally published a critical response to
the address. Therefore I exclude the State of the Union from the instrument.
The second potential violation of the exclusion restriction obtains in late May. As legis-
lators prepare to return to their home districts for Memorial Day weekend, China tightens
its domestic security in preparation for the 4 June anniversary of the killings in Tiananmen
Square. On 4 June, Congress usually introduces resolutions to commemorate those who
died in the square. This does not violate the exclusion restriction because the eﬀect of the
date goes through Congress. However, the White House sometimes issues a statement about
Chinese human rights problems on the same day. If China became less willing to cooperate
with the United States because of the statement, the exclusion restriction would be violated.
Indeed, China sometimes criticizes the statement directly. Even though the statement oc-
curs after the Memorial Day high volume period, Chinese policymakers might anticipate it
and adjust their behavior in May. Then, late May would be associated with both abundant
legislation and Chinese recalcitrance. This would violate the exclusion restriction. Thus, I
exclude the Memorial Day period from the instrument.
21All addresses are archived by Peters and Woolley (2016).
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Table 3.3: Instrument
Dates Source of Congressional Activity
20 – 25 June Independence Day weekend
25 July – 1 August August congressional recess
23 – 28 September Fiscal year deadline
In short, Independence Day, the August congressional recess, and the fiscal year deadline
generate exogenous variation in the volume of legislation but do not otherwise influence
Chinese foreign policy. Therefore I construct a dichotomous instrument for anti-Chinese
legislation, High volume dayt, which records a value of 1 each 25 June, 30 July – 1 August,
and 28 September, and for the five days that precede each of these dates. Table 3.3 lists
these days for convenience.
Table 3.4 shows the first stage of the IV model: the relationship between high volume
days and hostile legislation.22 The model reports the bivariate relationship between the
instrument on day t and congressional hostility toward China on day t. Both variables
are dichotomous and the model is logistic. The evidence shows that congressional hostility
toward China is 1.9 times as likely during high volume days.23 The eﬀect is precisely
estimated owing to the day-level data and is significant at the p < 2e  16 level.
3.3.2 Estimation
This subsection estimates whether congressional hostility decreases the probability of
Chinese cooperation with the United States in an IV framework. The outcome variable is Net
cooperationPRCt . It is a dichotomous indicator of whether China initiated more cooperation
toward the United States on a given day than conflict. A net measure of cooperation less
conflict is preferable to a measure of cooperation alone, because the bilateral relationship
includes many streams of negotiation. For instance, suppose Congress criticized Chinese
human rights on day t. On day t + 1, China refused to release a dissident, froze cultural
22I report a logistic model for ease of interpretation. In practice, the ivprobit package in Stata estimates
a probit model for the first stage. The results are essentially identical.
23This number is calculated from exp( ), since the model is logistic.
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Table 3.4: Congressional Hostility Toward China on High-Volume Days
Dependent variable:
Congressional hostilityt
High volume dayt 0.665⇤⇤⇤
(0.132)
Constant  3.266⇤⇤⇤
(0.044)
Observations 15,492
Log Likelihood  2,534.342
Akaike Inf. Crit. 5,072.684
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
exchanges, and signed a transportation agreement. A net measure would correctly reflect
the deterioration of the overall relationship, whereas a measure of cooperation alone would
incorrectly register an improvement.
The explanatory variable is Congressional hostility t. It is a dichotomous record of
whether Congress introduced legislation hostile to China on a given day. The instrument is
High volume dayt, which records whether a given day fell within one of the three periods of
unusually abundant legislative activity.
I control for other international and domestic factors that may influence China’s level
of cooperation with the United States. Recent bilateral interactions profoundly influence
China’s stance toward the United States. Net cooperationUSA records the number of cooper-
ative acts the United States initiated less the number of conflictual interactions it initiated.
Net diplomacyUSA records the number of diplomatic interactions the United States initi-
ated less the number of critical interactions it initiated. Because Chinese policy may be
path dependent, I include Net cooperationPRC and Net diplomacyPRC as well. I observe
these variables within the past 28 days. This is a relatively long window, but interstate
interactions occur infrequently.
Other slow moving variables may influence China’s propensity to cooperate. As China
grows more powerful, it may be less inclined to cooperate. Therefore I include the ratio of
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Chinese to American military expenditures and Chinese GDP per capita. Because interde-
pendent states cooperate more, I include the natural log of bilateral trade volume. I include
the average value of these variables over the past 28 days, although they are almost always
observed at the year level.
China may be more likely to cooperate with the United States when it is burdened
elsewhere. Therefore I include a dichotomous indicator of whether China is involved in an
ongoing militarized interstate dispute. This variable takes a value of 1 if China was involved
in a dispute within the past 28 days.
China’s domestic politics may also influence its tendency to cooperate. Party congresses
chart new courses for Chinese foreign and domestic policy. China’s independence day is a
cause for nationalist celebration and might render China more aggressive abroad. I include
dichotomous indicators for whether these events took place in the past 28 days.
Finally, I include three sets of fixed eﬀects in separate models. Mao Zedong, Deng Xi-
aoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping brought diﬀerent priorities and negotiating
strategies to the world stage. It would be unreasonable to constrain their response to con-
gressional hostility to the same intercept. Therefore I include leader fixed eﬀects. American
administrations had diﬀerent foreign policy agendas that influenced China’s tendency to
cooperate. Thus I include administration fixed eﬀects. Finally, I account for unobserved
sources of variation with year fixed eﬀects.
Because the outcome and explanatory variables are dichotomous, I employ probit models
to estimate the first and second stages of the IV model.24 The estimating equation is:
24I employ the ivprobit package in Stata.
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Probit (Net cooperation)PRCt =  1(
V
Congressional hostility)t
+  2(Net Cooperation)USAt 1:t 28
+  3(Net Cooperation)PRCt 1:t 28
+  4(Net Diplomacy)USAt 1:t 28
+  5(Net Diplomacy)PRCt 1:t 28
+  6(Military expenditure)
PRC/USA
t 1:t 28
+  7(GDP per capita)PRCt 1:t 28
+  8(Log trade volume)PRC+USAt 1:t 28
+  9(Ongoing MID)PRCt 1:t 28
+  10(Party Congress)PRCt 1:t 28
+  11(Independence day)PRCt 1:t 28
+  t + ✏
(3.1)
where  t represents a set of leader fixed eﬀects, administration fixed eﬀects, or year fixed
eﬀects depending on the model.
Table 3.5 presents the second stage results. Predicted congressional hostility is robustly
associated with decreased Chinese cooperation. The point estimate is relatively stable across
a variety of models. Model (1) presents the bivariate relationship. Model (2) introduces the
recent history of bilateral interactions. Model (3) introduces other covariates: the military
expenditure ratio, Chinese GDP per capita, logged trade volume, and China’s dispute in-
volvement, party congresses, and independence days. Model (4) includes fixed eﬀects for
Chinese leaders. Model (5) includes administration fixed eﬀects. Model (6) includes year
fixed eﬀects.
In order to interpret the coeﬃcients from a probit regression, one must compute the
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marginal eﬀects of the regressors. I do this in Stata. The estimated marginal eﬀect of
congressional hostility upon the probability of Chinese cooperation ranges from -3.6 (Model
6) to -4.2 (Model 5). That is, congressional hostility renders Chinese cooperation 3.6 to 4.2
times less likely. This is, obviously, an enormous estimated eﬀect. Admittedly, cooperation
occurs relatively infrequently: on average, China cooperates with the United States once
every five months. Nonetheless, the eﬀect of congressional hostility upon China’s propensity
to cooperate on any given day is very large and precisely estimated owing to the day-level
data. The evidence suggests that legislative opposition strongly and significantly decreases
the likelihood of international cooperation.
3.3.3 Robustness Checks
The results are robust to operationalizing the outcome variable in two diﬀerent ways.
While I believe that Net cooperation is the appropriate outcome variable, the results are
robust to defining the outcome variable as cooperation alone. CooperationPRCt records
whether China engaged in substantive cooperation with the United States on a given day.
ConcessionsPRCt is more focused still: it records whether China conceded to a specific recent
American request. I record 95 Chinese concessions in the dataset. Overall, congressional
hostility reduces broad and focused measures of Chinese cooperation.
The results are also robust to controlling for each type of event instead of their net
values. They are also robust to observing the controls in diﬀerent time frames: the past 7,
14, or 21 days instead of 28.
A final robustness check concerns the instrument itself. Congress occasionally introduces
legislation favorable toward Chinese interests. Of the roughly 2,700 pieces of legislation I
coded, 95 were favorable (compared to 602 unfavorable). The results are robust to con-
structing a net measure of congressional hostility toward China, defined as the number
of unfavorable pieces of legislation on a given day less the number of favorable pieces of
legislation that day.
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Table 3.5: IV Results: Chinese Cooperation
Second Stage
Dependent variable:
Net cooperationPRCt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Congressional hostilityt -4.49⇤⇤⇤ -4.631⇤⇤⇤ -4.601⇤⇤⇤ -4.530⇤⇤⇤ -4.719⇤⇤⇤ -4.318⇤⇤⇤
(0.559) (0.514) (0.824) (0.836) (0.702) (0.813)
Net cooperationUSAt 1:t 28 -0.121⇤⇤⇤ -.118⇤⇤⇤ -0.113⇤⇤⇤ -0.102⇤⇤⇤ -0.117⇤⇤⇤
(0.032) (0.038) (0.038) (0.035) (0.043)
Net cooperationPRCt 1:t 28 -0.031 0.029 0.029 0.021 0.010
(.020) (.022) (0.022) (0.019) (0.022)
Net diplomacyUSAt 1:t 28 0.031⇤⇤⇤ 0.031⇤⇤⇤ 0.030⇤⇤⇤ 0.031⇤⇤⇤ 0.023⇤⇤⇤
(0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Net diplomacyPRCt 1:t 28 0.010 .011 0.010 0.002 0.009
(0.008) (.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013)
Military expenditurePRC/USAt 1:t 28 0.639
⇤ 0.243 -0.207 8.021
(0.347) (0.454) (0.578) (7.381)
GDP per capitaPRCt 1:t 28 -0.0001 -0.00007 0.00002 -0.00003
(0.00007) (0.00008) (0.00006) (0.0009)
Log trade volumePRC+USAt 1:t 28 0.163
⇤⇤⇤ 0.128⇤⇤⇤ 0.003 -0.319
(.060) (0.069) (0.066) (0.553)
Ongoing MID (initiated)PRCt 1:t 28 0.054 0.048 0.113⇤⇤ 0.138⇤⇤
(0.046) (0.047) (0.057) (0.070)
Party congressPRCt 1:t 28 0.124 0.117 0.153 0.193
(0.146) (0.148) (0.144) (0.169)
Independence dayPRCt 1:t 28 -0.123 -0.122 -0.124 -0.161
(0.118) (0.118) (0.114) (0.116)
Constant -0.932⇤ -0.863⇤ -2.600⇤⇤ -2.321⇤⇤ -0.950 -1.592
(0.559) (0.513) (1.047) (0.996) (0.836) (4.841)
Leader fixed eﬀects No No No Yes No No
Administration fixed eﬀects No No No No Yes No
Year fixed eﬀects No No No No No Yes
Observations 15,492 15,464 12,783 12,468 12,774 8,372
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 26.5 25.2 29.1 28.9 28.7 27.7
101
3.4 Qualitative Evidence
Archival evidence from the Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Obama administrations
accessed through two FOIA requests and WikiLeaks demonstrates that American policy-
makers believed that China punished them for congressional hostility. They attributed
Chinese behavior to domestic audience costs. Indeed, Chinese policymakers referenced “the
feelings of one billion Chinese people” frequently when protesting congressional action. But
because it was strictly in Chinese policymakers’ interest to claim that they faced domestic
audience costs so they could extract policy concessions from the United States, it is diﬃcult
to adjudicate whether those audience costs were genuine. Indeed, I find suggestive evidence
that Chinese policymakers may have occasionally misrepresented their understanding of the
American political system in order to improve their bargaining position.
3.4.1 The Tiananmen Era
Even before Tiananmen rendered Congress a constant concern for Chinese policymak-
ers, they demonstrated a deep understanding of the role of the legislature in American
government. In 1984, the deputy chief of mission at the Chinese embassy in Washington,
Zhao Xixin said that though Congress “is not for the moment inclined to repeal the Taiwan
Relations Act,” the White House is “never powerless in formulating and implementing US
foreign policy, if American history is any guide.”25 In 1989, Under Secretary of State for
Political Aﬀairs Robert Kimmitt noted that the Chinese “carefully diﬀerentiate between rel-
ative ‘good guys’ (the President and ‘old friends’ like Nixon and Kissinger) and ‘bad guys’
(Congress, USIA, the media).”26
During the 1980s, Chinese policymakers regularly asked the president to “intercede to
block resolutions.” Noting that “the Dalai Lama’s lobby in the US was very eﬀective,” Zhao
said he “hoped the US government would thwart moves to introduce counterproductive
25Foreign Broadcast Information Service (1984).
26Kimmitt (1989).
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resolutions” such as those criticizing China’s crackdown on Tibetan protesters in March
1989. Indeed, he warned, “If Congress continued, it would certainly hurt friendly US-China
relations.”27
The events of 4 June heightened these considerations. A week after the killings, Am-
bassador James Lilley cabled Washington that “We have to deal with the variable of the
uncontrolled American reaction to China. Our media, our academics, disappointed busi-
nessmen, congressmen will all attack China and will go well beyond USG policy. Some
Chinese will see an anti-Chinese conspiracy and they will attack us in kind.”28 Two days
later, Lilley emphasized that “Congressional resolutions, media and VOA coverage, individ-
ual critical statements by influential Americans and our occasional private intervention all
make us vulnerable to a counter-attack. The Chinese have at all levels signalled us to watch
our step or else.”29
Lilley’s intuition was right: American citizens and legislators were appalled. Congres-
sional hostility toward China more than doubled in 1989 and 1990. Over the summer,
China repeatedly demanded “that the USG act to stem congressional interference in China’s
internal aﬀairs.”30 In July, China summoned the American ambassador to convey this ex-
pectation. The Assistant Foreign Minister said that China was concerned
with the six [bills] that attack China and interfere in its internal aﬀairs. This
we cannot accept. ...Such activities by the US Congress hurt the feelings of 1.1
billion Chinese people, and repeated interference in China’s domestic aﬀairs will
do damage to our relations. ...We hope the US Government will act to stop
Senate and House interference in our internal aﬀairs.
President Bush was obviously unable to halt such “interference.” In July, Chinese oﬃcials
complained that
27US Embassy Beijing (1989e).
28US Embassy Beijing (1989b)
29US Embassy Beijing (1989a).
30US Embassy Beijing (1989g).
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In considering the 1990 Foreign Relations authorization bill from 19 to 20 July,
the US Senate successively adopted amendments on the “future of Taiwan,” “fu-
ture of Tibet,” “future of Hong Kong,” “Tiananmen Square Park,” etc., attacking
China’s just action of quelling the counter-revolutionary rebellion, distorting and
slandering China’s policies on Taiwan, Hong Kong, Tibet, and population, and
wantonly interfering in China’s internal aﬀairs. We express our utmost indigna-
tion at and lodge a strong protest against this.
. . . The successive adoption by the US Congress of bills interfering in China’s
internal aﬀairs has brought a continuous escalation of the anti-China wave and
is thus bound to hurt most deeply the national feeling of the Chinese people and
seriously undermine Sino-US relations.31
In October, Chinese ambassador Zhu Qizhen met with Brent Scowcroft as Congress at-
tempted to impose economic sanctions on China. Zhu said that he “did not expect the votes
being so lopsided.” He asked Scowcroft whether he thought the Pease and Solomon amend-
ments might pass and whether he expected a lame duck session. Scowcroft acknowledged
the possibility and Zhu warned that “if either of the resolutions becomes law, it will have
a disruptive impact on economic relations and create a new grave situation in our bilateral
relations.”
Less than a week later, Zhao Xixin repeated the message to American embassy oﬃcials in
Beijing. In particular, he protested a resolution that congratulated the Dalai Lama on being
awarded the 1989 Nobel Peace Prize, an amendment to the State Department authorization
bill entitled “Chinese fleeing coercive population control policies,” and a resolution calling
for further sanctions. He urged the administration “to prevent Congress from passing any
legislation interfering in China’s internal aﬀairs lest Sino-American relations suﬀer further
damage.”32
In late November, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu threatened that if President
Bush failed to veto the Pelosi Bill, China would suspend the Fulbright program in China
and other educational and volunteer exchanges.33 “The US government,” he said, “bears
31US Embassy Beijing (1989g).
32Eagleburger (1989).
33US Embassy Beijing (1989c).
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unshirkable responsibility for the adoption of the bill by Congress.”
American policymakers became pessimistic about the prospects for bilateral cooperation
that fall. Embassy oﬃcials attributed China’s inflexibility in foreign aﬀairs to its domestic
audience costs. They advised Washington that “the Chinese leadership bristles at US con-
gressional criticism, and believes making any conciliatory gesture towards the US will open
it to attack domestically on nationalistic grounds.” They explained that
It is important that the US understand that Chinese nationalism cannot tolerate
foreign interference for any reason. ...The Chinese leadership can distinguish
between private mass media in the US, the Congress, and the administration.
They do not mind criticism in the media, but they see Congress as a part of the
government even though it is not under the control of the administration and
congressional criticism troubles them.34
A few weeks later, Ambassador Lilley complained to Washington, “Too bad congress
couldn’t have gotten its act together in August. Now we find ourselves running in the
opposite direction from most of our allies and giving additional jolts to the Chinese just
when we have some chance to turn things around a bit.”35
As the fall turned to spring, the embassy continued to document the “tired litany of ways
that the Congress and others had wounded the feelings of the Chinese people.”36 It was clear
that the prospects for bilateral cooperation had diminished. Scowcroft told the president,
“China has reneged on the scorecard of positive steps since the Pelosi veto fight.”37
Anecdotal evidence suggests that Chinese policymakers may have strategically obfus-
cated their understanding of the separation of powers. In December 1989, Jiang Zemin
told American oﬃcials that “I don’t say that I have a full grasp of the relationship between
congressional activities and power of the presidency.”38 Such pronouncements were eﬀective
34US Embassy Beijing (1989d).
35US Embassy Beijing (1989f).
36US Embassy Beijing (1990b).
37Scowcroft (1990).
38Meeting between General Secretary Jiang Zemin and National Security Advisor Scowcroft (1990).
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with at least some policymakers. While on a trip to Beijing in 1990, Congressman Ichord
told Jiang that recent People’s Daily articles revealed that the Chinese “simply did not know
how the American system works.” Ironically, Jiang Zemin slipped an American aphorism
into the discussion: “he who laughs last, laughs best.”39 Unfortunately, because the relevant
Chinese archives are closed, we cannot determine whether Chinese oﬃcials believed they
benefited from congressional opposition. The Clinton administration soon judged they did,
however. In the mid-1990s, President Clinton complained to Henry Kissinger, “God damn
the Chinese. We bend over backwards to accommodate their domestic politics. Why can’t
they do the same for ours?”40
3.4.2 Obama Administration
Due to declassification schedules, internal documents are not yet available from the
Clinton and George W. Bush administrations. However, WikiLeaks reveals that Obama
administration oﬃcials fielded similar complaints from China. In June 2007, MFA Director
General Liu Jieyi told American embassy chargé d’aﬀaires Daniel Piccuta that
Some people in the United States make an issue of Darfur and attack China base-
lessly for domestic political reasons. If the proposed Congressional resolutions
are adopted, they would send the wrong signal to the outside world and seri-
ously damage United States-China cooperation on Darfur. The PRC urges the
United States to stop consideration and passage of the resolutions. The United
States administration should correctly guide Congress, the media and the public
to better understand China’s constructive role on Darfur.
. . . Special Representative Liu Guijin will have a diﬃcult time coordinating with
the United States amidst all the “finger-wagging.”
To this, Picutta replied much as Lilley had before him: that “Congress is a separate
branch of the United States Government and is free to pass non-binding resolutions as it
wishes.”41 A year later, Chinese policymakers requested that the Obama administration “use
39US Embassy Beijing (1990a).
40William J. Clinton Presidential Library archives.
41US Embassy Beijing (2007a).
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its influence and urge Congress to refrain from issuing ‘anti-China’ resolutions” concerning
violence in Tibet.42
Clearly, the triangular relationship between Congress, the White House, and China has
been longstanding. Congressional criticism of China, driven in part by domestic economic
issues, leads China to punish the White House and makes international cooperation more
diﬃcult to achieve.
3.5 Conclusion
This study contributes to the IR literature by showing that whatever American policy-
makers’ diplomatic overtures to their Chinese counterparts, congressional hostility toward
China has consistently rendered China far less likely to cooperate with American requests.
When the US Congress adopted hostile behavior toward China between 1973 and 2014,
China’s probability of cooperating with the United States was reduced by a factor of four.
It may be rational for China to punish the United States for congressional hostility for a
number of reasons. Because China expects to interact with the United States in the future, it
should attempt to deter congressional behavior that harms its interests. Because China may
face domestic audience costs for not standing up for Chinese interests, it should punish the
United States for congressional hostility. And because China may sense that congressional
opposition to the president jeopardizes his political capital and renders an agreement more
pressing, it may seize the opportunity to shift the terms of international cooperation toward
its ideal point.
Future research should proceed in several directions. This article suggests three rea-
sons why a state might punish a foreign executive for foreign legislative hostility: iterated
interaction, domestic audience costs, and strategic opportunity. I have not attempted to
adjudicate between these mechanisms. A deeper understanding of them would generate pre-
dictions about when international negotiations are more or less aﬀected by domestic politics.
42American Embassy Beijing, Untitled Cable, 27 March 2008, WikiLeaks.
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Ideally, this research agenda should be pursued in a cross-national context. In showing that
legislative hostility toward China impairs the president’s short term bargaining position,
I have not shown that legislative hostility uniformly constrains an executive. Milner and
Rosendorﬀ (1997)’s formal model suggests that there is a threshold below which legislative
opposition aids executives, as Schelling predicted, and above which it constrains executives.
Is there an optimal amount of legislative opposition to executive foreign policy? What
domestic or international factors determine that optimal level?
Future research should also explore why the US Congress has demonstrated so much
hostility toward China. Is congressional hostility to China driven by genuine concern for
the human rights of its citizens? Or are American legislators chiefly motivated by the
economic concerns of their constituents, and use anti-Chinese rhetoric to posture themselves
for reelection?
Finally, I have not explored the long-term eﬀects of legislative opposition upon a foreign
country’s policies. While congressional criticism of Chinese human rights and trade practices
render China less likely to cooperate in the short term, perhaps they aﬀect Chinese behavior
in the long term. Less favorable routine agreements are perhaps a small price to pay for
long-term strategic goals that the legislature is as justified in setting as the executive. This
diﬃcult question is left for future research.
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A | Example Event Appendix
A.1 Diplomacy
A.1.1 Positive statement
"On June 7, an MFA spokesperson pointed out that China and the United States were
going to settle the aircraft collision incident through joint eﬀorts and expressed the hope that
Sino-American relations would return to their normal path because China had allowed the
United States to ship back the U.S. airplane and the two sides had resolved the incident."
(Zhang Tuosheng 2006, 407)
A.1.2 Request
“the foreign minister asked if I’d call the referendum a provocation again, this time in
front of the Chinese press.” (Rice 2011, 647)
A.1.3 Meet
“I had also put a lot of thought into the person I would meet with first, and the province’s
Communist Party secretary, Xi Jinping, was the perfect choice. A rising political star, Xi
had been an extraordinarily eﬀective leader in promoting Zhejiang’s private sector, and I
thought that a meeting with him would send another strong signal to Beijing.” (Paulson
2015, 189)
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A.1.4 Negotiate
"From the 6th through the 9th, the Ambassador usually had two meetings per day with
Assistant Foreign Minister Zhou [to resolve the EP-3 crisis]." (Blair and Bonfili 2006, 383)
A.1.5 Invite
‘Shortly thereafter [Edgar Snow attended National Day celebrations with Mao], Mao
told Snow that he would welcome an oﬃcial visit to China from President Nixon.” (Ross
1995, 28)
A.1.6 Visit
“The first Strategic Economic Dialogue was held in Beijing on December 14 and 15, 2006.
The 28-member delegationâĂŤthe greatest number of Cabinet members and agency heads to
travel in a single group to China from the US until then— included our ambassador, Sandy
Randt, and six of my fellow Cabinet members... Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke
and Export-Import Bank head James Lambright also came. The Chinese side included
14 ministry-level oﬃcials, including central banker Zhou Xiaochuan, Finance Minister Jin
Renqing, National Development and Reform Commission chairman Ma Kai, Labor and
Security Minister Tian Chengping, and Commerce’s Bo Xilai. This unprecedented high-
ranking lineup showed the seriousness of both sides.” (Paulson 2015, 198)
A.1.7 Explain
“the Chinese ambassador was put in the picture by Defense at five pm [on March 24th,
2008, about the accidental shipment of ICMBs to Taiwan]. We were very sensitive to the
possibility that our mistake would be misconstrued or misinterpreted by the Chinese, and I
wanted to do everything possible to underscore that it was a mistake, not a covert scheme to
arm Taiwan with nuclear weapons. Throughout, I wanted complete transparency.” (Gates
2014, 241)
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A.1.8 Reassure
“The meeting with Li Yuanchao featured a lengthy personal presentation explaining in
detail why China would not challenge the United States for global leadership and why there
was no inevitable conflict in their interests.” (Bader 2012, 118)
A.1.9 Oﬀer
“To sweeten the deal, the United States approved the license for a supercomputer for
China’s national weather service and oﬀered to lift the sanctions on certain satellites to be
launched on Chinese carrier rockets.” (Suettinger 2003, 174)
A.1.10 Express regret
"On Saturday morning (Washington, D.C., time), Secretary of Defense William Cohen
and Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet issued a joint statement that called the
incident a targeting error and said, ’We deeply regret the loss of life and injuries from the
bombing.’" (Campbell and Weitz 2006, 336)
A.1.11 Propose
“[Ambassador Beam proposed a cease-fire [on Quemoy] first, to be followed by other
measures to reduce tension” (Suettinger 2006, 270)
A.1.12 Promise
“Clinton promised to move quickly to implement the most important commitment on
the US side, to grant China permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status through an
act of Congress.” (Suettinger 2003, 387)
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A.2 Cooperation
A.2.1 Apologize
After being refused a phone call with Tang Jiaxuan, “I decided I would do what I could
from a distance to cool things down. I called the Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General
Joseph Ralston, and invited him to put on his uniform and join me in paying a midnight visit
to the Chinese ambassador. Tom Pickering and the NSC’s Kenneth Lieberthal completed
our delegation. I had known Ambassador Li Zhaoxing from the days when we had both
served at the UN. I told him the bombing had been a terrible accident and that we were
extremely sorry. I said I knew what it was like to have colleagues killed and hoped he would
convey my condolences to the families of those who had died or been injured. I also said I was
worried about the safety of American diplomats in Beijing; it was vital the demonstrations
not grow more violent.” (Albright 2003, 531)
A.2.2 Release nationals
“Beijing responded to the ending of US patrolling of the Taiwan Strait by releasing two
US citizens who had strayed into Chinese waters in February” (Ross 1995, 33).
A.2.3 Cooperative congressional action
“Bush promptly vetoed [the US-China Act of 1991], saying that... ‘If we present China’s
leaders with an ultimatum on MFN, the result will be weakened ties to the West and
further repression... not... progress on human rights, arms control, or trade.’ Bush insisted
his policy of ‘comprehensive engagement’ and ‘targeting specific areas of concern with the
appropriate policy instruments’ had achieved progress that would be undone by the bill’s
restrictive provisions.” (Suettinger 2003, 134)
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A.2.4 Concede
“Ultimately, China compromised to move the negotiations forward. Zhou’s subsequent
message not only welcomed a meeting between Nixon and Mao in Beijing and a preliminary
visit by Kissinger... it also accepted Washington’s formulation that each side could raise
’the issue of principal concern to it.’ Equally significant, Zhou did not press for discussions
on normalization; China was prepared to develop relations without focusing on the diﬃcult
issues associated with Taiwan. The two sides had reached agreement concerning the agenda
of Kissinger’s talks in Beijing, the last political obstacle to his secret visit.” (Ross 1995, 36)
A.2.5 Aid
“When the Reagan administration sought covert Chinese cooperation in arming the US-
supported Contras in their war with the Nicaraguan Sandinista government, Beijing was
pleased to comply. The chief of the military mission at the Chinese embassy in Washington
negotiated the cooperation with White House oﬃcials.” (Ross 1995, 238-239)
A.2.6 Sign agreement
USTR Mickey Kantor signed a “landmark agreement on intellectual property rights”
(Suettinger 2003, 271-272)
A.2.7 Hold summit
“Jiang received the full protocol treatment on his formal arrival at the White House [in
October 1997], including the welcome on the South Lawn, honor guard review, twenty-one-
gun salute, national anthem, and ceremonial speeches. The two sides held a ninety-minute
bilateral meeting, at which the ’building toward a cooperative strategic partnership’ was
fleshed out in somewhat more detail... the two sides would take a more positive approach
to each other and look for new areas in which to develop cooperation and agreement. In
that sense, it was more of an attitudinal change than any alteration in either side’s strategic
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outlook or perspective.” (Suettinger 2003, 324)
A.2.8 Yield militarily
“Washington announced it would withdraw combat aircraft from Taiwan, and by June
1975, all such planes had been withdrawn.” (Ross 1995, 77)
A.3 Criticism
A.3.1 Negative statement
“after midnight on the day the US participants were to depart Beijing, the Chinese side
called a meeting to discuss the US draft statement. In a very tense discussion, Qiao Guanhua
subjected Kissinger to a barrage of blistering criticisms” (Ross 1995, 83)
A.3.2 Congressional hearing
“SFRC chair Fred Thompson (R-Tenn) launched hearings on the campaign finance scan-
dal, which stretched out for months. The Senate hearings were mirrored by the Burton
(R-Ind) hearings in the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, which
stretched into 1999 and culminated in Burton calling the president a ‘scumbag’ in the Indi-
anapolis Star.” (Suettinger 2003, 329-331)
A.3.3 Postpone
“PRC calls for postponement of Warsaw talks until after US election” (MacFarquhar
1972, xvii)
A.3.4 Downgrade protocol
“Lake and Christopher agreed to change the protocol arrangements from a welcoming
banquet to a working dinner, at which America’s indignation at the missile launches would
be conveyed at a very high level.” (Suettinger 2003, 253)
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A.3.5 Refuse
“Human rights issues were... pushed hard during discussions by NSC and State De-
partment oﬃcials, but China was not willing to be seen as giving in to the United States,
particularly in advance of a major party congress.” (Suettinger 2003, 319)
A.3.6 Demand
“Although Li and I had developed a good relationship, he was now very stern; he de-
manded I make a formal apology on Chinese television.” (Albright 2003, 532)
A.3.7 Warn
“I pressed Hu again on continued currency flexibility, warning that the next Congress
would be tough on this issue.” (Paulson 2015, 201)
A.3.8 Threaten privately
Over a working dinner at the Virginia estate of Pamela Harriman, the ambassador to
France, Christopher told Liu Huaqiu “there would be ‘grave consequences’ (meaning Amer-
ican military involvement) if the exercises got out of hand.” (Suettinger 2003, 253).
A.3.9 Ultimatum
“After months of fruitless negotiations, Special Trade Representative Robert Strauss
presented Deng Xiaoping with an ultimatum. Either Beijing compromised in three days
or the United States would break oﬀ the negotiations and unilaterally impose quotas in
accordance with article 3 of the US trade law, which would hold annual Chinese textile
imports to the level of the first twelve of the previous fourteen months. This would actually
reduce imports of Chinese textiles compared to the previous year.” (Ross 1995, 155)
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A.4 Conflict
A.4.1 Threaten publicly
At a press conference, Dulles announced that the US was “prepared to use tactical nuclear
weapons in response to a major communist move in the Taiwan area” (Suettinger 2006, 257).
A.4.2 Obstruct
The Chinese “insisted on remaining noncommittal about the cause of the sinking and
blocked US and South Korean attempts in the United Nations to unambiguously identify
North Korea as the responsible party.” (Bader 2012, 86)
A.4.3 Withdraw support
“the [claims-assets] talks fell apart, and... Beijing withdrew its agreement to the package
settlement,” as China was unwilling to lose face by paying on the claims-assets issue, as
a signed agreement would have been diﬃcult to achieve prior to normalization, and as
normalization looked like an increasingly distant goal due to the Watergate scandal.” (Ross
1995, 75)
A.4.4 Cancel exchanges
After progress in December 1969-February 1970, “the US incursion into Cambodia halted
progress. Thus far, unilateral US concessions had reinforced the thinking of Chairman
Mao and the arguments of moderate Chinese politicians, led by Premier Zhou, that US
policy allowed for US-China cooperation against the Soviet threat. But the US invasion
of Cambodia in the spring of 1970 played into the hands of Lin Biao and other Chinese
hard-liners who had been contending that even in decline, the United States was dangerous.
The invasion thus compelled Zhou and his colleagues temporarily to mute their support for
rapprochement. More important, the invasion aroused Mao’s personal ire, for Washington
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seemed to be taking his interest in improved relations for granted and disregarding Chinese
interests just when he had sanction sensitive negotiations with US ‘imperialists.’ Under
these circumstances, Beijing canceled the ambassadorial-level talks at Warsaw scheduled for
May 20, and Mao wrote a blistering article condemning US imperialism.” (Ross 1995, 34)
A.4.5 Punitive economic action
“the US Export-Import Bank again froze loan guarantees for China, in response to a
request from the State Department. The action, which delayed a $35 million loan guarantee
for the Guangzhou metro-rail project, was probably intended as a warning, but Beijing had
already decided to resolve the issue.” (Suettinger 2003, 269)
A.4.6 Congressional act
“Leaders from both parties hastily prepared a resolution (S. Con. Res. 107) reaﬃrming
the Taiwan Relations Act, particularly those clauses that stated American expectations that
Taiwan’s future would be determined by ‘peaceful means’ and that maintained the right to
sell arms to Taiwan. The resolution also enjoined the president to seek a public renunciation
by Beijing of the use or threat or force. It passed the Senate on July 10 by a vote of 92-0,
with the House version passing ten days later by 390-1.” (Suettinger 2003, 349)
A.4.7 Infringe upon human rights
“China announced it would bring to trial its most famous dissident, Wei Jingsheng, on
charges of attempting to overthrow the Chinese government. ...[Wei] was pronounced guilty
by a three-judge panel and sentenced to fourteen years in prison.” (Suettinger 2003, 242)
A.4.8 Intervene on behalf of dissident
“In Washington, the State Department reacted to the embassy’s handling of Fang with
anger and dismay. Believing that Fang’s arrest after having been denied refuge at the
embassy would precipitate a damaging public outcry, Secretary Baker and Undersecretary
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Robert Kimmitt instructed Acting Assistant Secretary William Clark to have the embassy
recontact Fang and authorize refuge for him and his family. Hoping to keep the situation
low key, Clark telephoned Ambassador Lilley and urged him to ‘send somebody out to tell
him that if he’d like to come to the Embassy, he can.’ Lilley immediately dispatched [acting
DCM] Burghardt and [PA oﬃcer] Russell to the Jianguo Hotel, where they invited Fang to
be the ‘guest of President Bush’ and spirited him and his family out the back door of the
hotel and into a minivan, which drove them past PLA guards to the ambassador’s residence.”
(Suettinger 2003, 70-71)
A.4.9 Incite protest
“As on Saturday, student protesters were transported to staging areas near the embassy,
as were some government workers. But this time, they had to show proof of having secured
permission to demonstrate from the Public Security Bureau. Near the embassy, they were
organized into groups, given a designated route of march and a schedule for completion of
their protest. Some were even given slogans to shout and banners to carry.” (Suettinger
2003, 372)
A.4.10 Arrest nationals
“The seriously damaged [EP-3] U.S. aircraft made a forced landing at Lingshui Military
Airport, Hainan, at 9:33 a.m. The twenty-four member crew left the plane fifty minutes
later, and Chinese personnel escorted the crew to a local guesthouse.” (Zhang Tuosheng
2006, 394).
A.4.11 Espionage
China hacked the US Oﬃce of Personnel Management, gathering data on American
intelligence personnel.
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A.4.12 Develop weapon system
“Despite President Hu’s desire to have my visit be picture-perfect to pave the way for his
state visit to Washington just a little over a week later, in a remarkable display of chutzpah,
the PLA nearly wrecked both trips. Just hours before my meeting with Hu, the PLA rolled
out for the first time publicly its new J-20 stealth fighter. Photos of the plane hit the Chinese
press about two hours before my session with Hu.” (Gates 2014, 527)
A.4.13 Assert territorial claim
“in what seemed to us an unwelcome innovation, the Chinese executive vice foreign
minister gave a lengthy presentation on China’s rights in the South China Sea, highlighting
this as a national priority (though not, as was publicly reported in the US media, calling it
a ‘core interest’ like Taiwan or Tibet).” (Bader 2012, 76-77)
A.4.14 Proliferate
Intelligence reports suggested that “a Chinese corporation had sold 5,000 ‘ring magnets’—
probably for use in uranium enrichment—to the A.Q. Khan Laboratory, long associated with
Pakistan’s suspect nuclear weapons program.” (Suettinger 2003, 249)
A.4.15 Downgrade relationship
“Hoping to head oﬀ legislative restrictions on how to deal with China, Secretary of State
Baker testified before the House Foreign Relations Committee on June 20. He augmented
executive branch sanctions already in place by pledging that all oﬃcial contacts with China
above the assistant secretary level would be suspended, canceling a commerce secretary trip
scheduled for July, and by promising to recommend the suspension of all new international
financial institution lending to China.” (Suettinger 2003, 83)
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A.4.16 Military exercise
We announced “that the aircraft carrier USS George Washington would move into po-
sition oﬀ the Korean coast and join military exercises with the South Korean Navy. In all,
eighteen ships, some two hundred aircraft, and about eight thousand US and South Korean
troops would participate over four days.” (Clinton 2014, 57-58)
A.4.17 Military conflict
“While patrolling oﬀ the coast of South Korea, the American carrier [Kitty Hawk] de-
tected the presence of a Chinese submarine in its vicinity. Anti-submarine warfare aircraft
and other planes from the Kitty Hawk engaged the Han class submarine and pursued it
back toward the Chinese coast in a vigorous manner, dropping sonar buoys and simulating
an attack.” (Suettinger 2003, 209)
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B.2 Daily American Assessments of China
Figure B.1: Daily American Assessments of China
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B.3 OLS Results
B.3.1 Chinese Diplomacy and American Assessments
Models (1)-(3) in Table B.1 explore the relationship between Chinese diplomacy in the
past fortnight and the level of American assessments on day t in an OLS setting. I include
the standard set of controls. The evidence suggests that diplomacy is significantly associated
with improved assessments. Model (4) presents a harder test for the theory: whether diplo-
macy is associated with improved assessments, conditional on no recent Chinese cooperation
within the past 90 days. In the absence of recent cooperation, American policymakers might
be suspicious of Chinese intentions. The association holds, even in this context. Model (5)
continues to employ the conditional subset, and operationalizes the outcome variable as the
mean deviation in American assessments rather than the level of assessments. (As discussed
in the main body of the paper, American assessments do not trend strongly upward over the
analysis period.) The analysis is robust to this modification. It is not, however, robust to
the operationalization of American assessments as the first diﬀerence from the last observed
assessment, shown in Model (5). Here, too, the conditional subset is employed.
Figure B.2 visualizes the results from Model (2). In this simulation, the number of
Chinese diplomatic acts initiated in the past fortnight is varied from its minimum observed
level (0) to its maximum observed value (9). All other values are held at their mean. While
the confidence intervals are large (reflecting the fact that China rarely initiates more than
one or two diplomatic acts per fortnight), the figure suggests that Chinese diplomacy is
associated with more favorable American impressions of China.
B.3.2 American Assessments and American Cooperation
Table B.2 explores whether more favorable American assessments of China are associated
with subsequent American cooperation with China. The outcome variable is American
cooperation one a given day t. Cooperation is quite rare, so I dichotomize this outcome
variable. The explanatory variable is the average level of American assessments in the
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Table B.1: Chinese Diplomacy and American Assessments
Dependent variable: AssessmentsUSAt
Level Mean Dev Delta
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS Markov Markov Markov
Assessments (level)t 15:t 28 0.064 0.029  0.049  0.096  0.096  0.208⇤⇤
(0.047) (0.048) (0.050) (0.061) (0.061) (0.088)
DiplomacyPRCt 1:t 14 0.004 0.019⇤⇤⇤ 0.015⇤⇤ 0.025⇤⇤ 0.025⇤⇤ 0.025
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.012) (0.012) (0.017)
CriticismPRCt 1:t 14  0.009  0.009  0.016  0.016  0.017
(0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.011) (0.016)
CooperationPRCt 1:t 14 0.0001 0.008
(0.018) (0.018)
ConflictPRCt 1:t 14 0.082 0.104⇤ 0.182 0.182 0.121
(0.057) (0.057) (0.133) (0.133) (0.192)
DiplomacyUSAt 1:t 14  0.022⇤⇤⇤  0.022⇤⇤⇤  0.019⇤  0.019⇤  0.019
(0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015)
CriticismUSAt 1:t 14 0.020⇤⇤ 0.022⇤⇤  0.001  0.001  0.001
(0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.014) (0.020)
CooperationUSAt 1:t 14  0.005 0.001  0.008  0.008 0.005
(0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.017) (0.025)
ConflictUSAt 1:t 14 0.0003 0.013  0.028  0.028 0.009
(0.014) (0.014) (0.079) (0.079) (0.114)
Ongoing MIDPRCt 1:t 14 0.027⇤ 0.003 0.003 0.010
(0.015) (0.020) (0.020) (0.029)
Mil. exp.PRC/USAt 1:t 14 0.765
⇤⇤⇤ 0.877⇤⇤ 0.877⇤⇤ 0.154
(0.251) (0.399) (0.399) (0.577)
GDP per capitaPRCt 1:t 14 0.0002⇤⇤ 0.0002⇤ 0.0002⇤  0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Log trade vol.PRC+USAt 1:t 14 0.010
⇤⇤ 0.015⇤⇤ 0.015⇤⇤  0.001
(0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010)
Party congressPRCt 1:t 14  0.174⇤  0.205⇤⇤  0.205⇤⇤  0.291⇤⇤
(0.095) (0.095) (0.095) (0.137)
Election yearUSAt 1:t 14 0.018 0.002 0.002 0.001
(0.017) (0.025) (0.025) (0.036)
Constant 0.642⇤⇤⇤ 0.672⇤⇤⇤ 0.205 0.269  0.417⇤⇤ 0.195
(0.033) (0.033) (0.139) (0.201) (0.201) (0.291)
Admin. fixed eﬀects N N Y Y Y Y
Observations 593 593 593 300 300 300
R2 0.004 0.052 0.120 0.162 0.162 0.070
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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Figure B.2: PRC Diplomacy and USA Perceptions
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preceding fortnight, denoted as t   1 : t   14. The control variables are the same as in the
preceding section.
Models (1)-(5) employ logistic models to estimate the probability of American coopera-
tion in a given fortnight. Model (1) shows that more positive levels of American assessments
are associated with a higher probability of American cooperation the following fortnight, con-
trolling for the standard set of international and domestic factors. Model (2) shows that the
first diﬀerence of American assessments is also associated with a higher probability of Amer-
ican cooperation the following fortnight. The relationship, however, is not significant when
the analysis is restricted to the subset of observations without American cooperation in the
preceding 90 days, as shown in Model (3). Models (4) and (5) shows that the association
holds in the full sample and subset when the explanatory variable is the mean deviation of
assessments.
The results are visualized in Figure B.3. This odds ratio plot shows the probability of
American cooperation after a week in which American assessments exceeded their mean value
126
in the sample. The plots reflect all the controls described above. After a high-assessment
week, American cooperation is more than twice as likely than usual the following week.
Table B.2: American Assessments and American Cooperation
Dependent variable:
CooperationUSAt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean dev assessmentst 1:t 14 2.933⇤ 3.178⇤⇤ 4.385⇤⇤ 5.301⇤⇤
(1.557) (1.607) (1.870) (2.136)
DiplomacyPRCt 1:t 14  0.041  0.035  0.656
(0.315) (0.332) (0.595)
CriticismPRCt 1:t 14  1.543  1.684  2.175
(1.086) (1.125) (1.341)
CooperationPRCt 1:t 14 0.013 0.042 0.243
(0.814) (0.825) (1.139)
ConflictPRCt 1:t 14  13.435  13.372  13.513
(775.698) (765.868) (814.993)
DiplomacyUSAt 1:t 14 0.076 0.039 0.182
(0.298) (0.303) (0.346)
CriticismUSAt 1:t 14 0.519 0.486 1.124⇤⇤
(0.316) (0.313) (0.450)
CooperationUSAt 1:t 14  0.931  0.979
(1.040) (0.971)
ConflictUSAt 1:t 14 0.099 0.110 1.599⇤⇤
(0.694) (0.655) (0.805)
Ongoing MIDPRCt 1:t 14 0.386 0.407
(0.482) (0.511)
Military expenditurePRC/USAt 1:t 14  5.858  3.679
(7.483) (8.498)
GDP per capitaPRCt 1:t 14  0.008⇤⇤  0.008⇤⇤
(0.004) (0.004)
Log trade volumePRC+USAt 1:t 14 0.108 0.082
(0.156) (0.166)
Party congressPRCt 1:t 14 2.109⇤ 2.128⇤
(1.093) (1.106)
Election yearUSAt 1:t 14 0.283 0.575
(0.582) (0.592)
Administration fixed eﬀects No No Yes Yes
Constant  5.312⇤⇤⇤  5.204⇤⇤⇤ 7.241 6.243
(0.202) (0.219) (5.852) (6.287)
Observations 5,328 5,328 5,328 4,556
Log Likelihood  173.102  168.494  162.327  140.276
Akaike Inf. Crit. 350.205 356.989 364.653 318.552
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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Figure B.3: Odds Ratios: US Assessments and Subsequent Cooperation
!
US Cooperation_{t+1:t+7}
>=
 m
ea
n 
US
 p
er
ce
pt
ion
_{
t!
1:
t!
7}
0 1 2 3
128
C | Appendix to Chapter 2
C.1 Figures and Tables
Figure C.1: Chinese Costly Conflict Initiation Toward US (Monthly)
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Figure C.2: Correlation of Selected SSE Indices
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C.2 Robustness Checks
Table C.1: Placebo Tests: Negative Shocks
Dependent variable:
PRC conflictt PRC cooperationt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Negative shock (5%) 0.690  0.370
(0.450) (0.327)
Negative shock (10%) 1.123⇤ 0.230
(0.600) (0.362)
Negative shock (15%) 2.551⇤⇤  0.473
(0.991) (0.517)
PRC conflictt 1  0.022  0.020 0.030 0.022 0.041 0.025
(0.186) (0.180) (0.186) (0.132) (0.133) (0.136)
USA conflictt 1 0.008 0.019  0.197  0.326  0.365  0.329
(0.315) (0.308) (0.347) (0.269) (0.276) (0.273)
CPIt 1  0.050  0.073  0.037  0.064  0.070  0.066
(0.084) (0.085) (0.082) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063)
Party Congresst:t 6  1.003  1.170  1.827 0.891⇤⇤ 0.783⇤ 0.928⇤⇤
(1.386) (1.393) (1.483) (0.411) (0.417) (0.423)
  S&P500t 1 0.023 0.025 0.032  0.0001 0.008  0.0004
(0.056) (0.055) (0.053) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034)
Constant 1.087 3.489  0.049 6.289 6.985 6.540
(8.731) (8.781) (8.539) (6.415) (6.414) (6.370)
Year fixed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month fixed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 253 253 253 253 253 253
Log Likelihood  100.242  99.795  97.948  158.546  159.005  158.765
Akaike Inf. Crit. 278.484 277.591 273.896 395.092 396.011 395.530
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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Table C.2: Placebo Tests: Positive Shocks
Dependent variable:
PRC conflictt PRC cooperationt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Positive shock (5%)  0.464 0.755⇤⇤⇤
(0.495) (0.274)
Positive shock (10%)  0.606 0.383
(0.579) (0.336)
Positive shock (15%)  1.281 0.264
(0.795) (0.426)
PRC conflictt 1  0.014 0.0002 0.001  0.027  0.005 0.034
(0.191) (0.193) (0.181) (0.133) (0.138) (0.133)
USA conflictt 1  0.010 0.001 0.013  0.248  0.309  0.345
(0.308) (0.310) (0.297) (0.278) (0.276) (0.275)
CPIt 1  0.037  0.037  0.005  0.071  0.072  0.073
(0.086) (0.087) (0.088) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064)
Party Congresst:t 6  0.855  0.816  0.911 0.863⇤⇤ 0.914⇤⇤ 0.876⇤⇤
(1.373) (1.374) (1.380) (0.419) (0.416) (0.415)
  S&P500t 1 0.017 0.014 0.006 0.012 0.010 0.006
(0.056) (0.056) (0.055) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033)
Constant  0.207  0.198  3.575 7.047 7.189 7.242
(8.999) (9.059) (9.214) (6.471) (6.442) (6.479)
Year fixed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month fixed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 253 253 253 253 253 253
Log Likelihood  100.835  100.718  99.853  155.468  158.579  159.018
Akaike Inf. Crit. 279.670 279.435 277.706 388.936 395.158 396.035
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
132
Table C.3: Excluding Investor Anticipation
Dependent variable:
PRC conflictt
(1) (2)
  SSEt 1  4.559⇤⇤  4.736⇤⇤
(2.254) (2.250)
PRC conflictt 1  0.141 0.001
(0.315) (0.215)
USA conflictt 1 0.161 0.105
(0.398) (0.366)
CPIt 1  0.045  0.041
(0.115) (0.109)
Party Congresst:t 6  1.152  1.600
(1.568) (1.550)
  S&P500t 1 0.022 0.025
(0.058) (0.058)
Constant  28.124  28.607
(4,382,511.000) (4,251,034.000)
Year fixed eﬀects Yes Yes
Month fixed eﬀects Yes Yes
Observations 228 236
Log Likelihood  83.928  86.855
✓ 0.878⇤ (0.458) 0.896⇤ (0.469)
Akaike Inf. Crit. 243.857 249.711
1 ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
2 Model (1) excludes observations in which China threat-
ened the United States in t  1.
3 Model (2) excludes observations in which either side
threatened the other in t  1.
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Table C.4: Net Tendency and Additional Covariates
Dependent variable:
PRC net conflictt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
  SSEt 1  0.896⇤⇤⇤  0.896⇤⇤⇤  0.897⇤⇤⇤  1.391⇤⇤
(0.245) (0.245) (0.246) (0.573)
PRC net conflictt 1  1.163⇤⇤⇤  1.163⇤⇤⇤  1.163⇤⇤⇤  1.111⇤⇤⇤
(0.139) (0.139) (0.140) (0.217)
USA net conflictt 1 0.388⇤⇤ 0.388⇤⇤ 0.378⇤⇤  0.188
(0.157) (0.157) (0.158) (0.304)
CPIt 1  0.012  0.012  0.013  0.041
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.028)
Party Congresst:t 6  0.175  0.175  0.174  0.070
(0.128) (0.128) (0.128) (0.191)
  S&P500t 1  0.003  0.003  0.002 0.006
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
NPC Meetingt 1 0.134 0.154
(0.171) (0.174)
Public crisist 1 0.137
(0.195)
  Floorspace constructiont 1 1.428
(1.899)
Constant 1.564 1.564 1.645 4.411
(2.185) (2.185) (2.196) (2.907)
Year fixed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes No
Month fixed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes No
Observations 98 98 98 23
R2 0.645 0.645 0.648 0.737
Adjusted R2 0.462 0.462 0.458 0.614
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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Table C.5: Popular Crises
Description:
1998-06 – 1998-07 Chen Xitong corruption scandal
2000-02 Liaoning pensioner protest
2003-04 – 2003-05 SARS
2004-10 Chongqing abuse of power riot
2005-01 Advanced nature of party campaign
2005-05 – 2005-08 Military protests
2005-06 Anhui abuse of power riot
2006-04 – 2006-08 Corruption
2008-01 Southern snowstorms
2008-03 Tibetan riots
2008-05 Sichuan earthquake
2008-06 Guizhou riot
2008-07 Milk melamine scandal
2008-12 Charter 08
2009-05 May 4 anniversary
2009-06 Tiananmen anniversary
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D | Appendix to Chapter 3
D.1 Data Bibliography
Albright (2003)
Bader (2012)
Blair and Bonfili (2006)
Brecher and Wilkenfeld (2015)
Campbell and Weitz (2006)
Chan (1979)
Chan (1978)
Chen Jian (2006)
Christensen (1996)
Christensen et al. (2002-2015)
Clinton (2014)
Garver (2001)
Garver (2006)
Gates (2014)
Halperin (1972)
Kai He (2012)
Kapos Associates (1997)
Keefe (2002)
MacFarquhar (1972)
O’Dowd (2007)
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Paulson (2015)
Rice (2011)
Ross (1988)
Ross (1995)
State Department (2015)
Suettinger (2003)
Suettinger (2006)
Swaine (2006)
Whiting (1960)
Whiting (2006)
Wu Baiyi (2006)
Xia Liping (2006)
Yan Xuetong (2010)
Zhang Tuosheng (2006)
WikiLeaks (2011)
Zhang Baijia (2006)
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D.2 Naïve Logit Models
Table D.1: Naïve Logit Models
Pr(Net cooperationPRCt )
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Congressional hostilityt 0.779⇤⇤ 0.613 0.417 0.420 0.358 0.436
(0.35) (0.36) (0.41) (0.41) (0.40) (0.41)
Net cooperationUSAt 1:t 28 -0.377⇤⇤⇤ -0.365⇤⇤⇤ -0.354⇤⇤⇤ -0.306⇤⇤ -0.403⇤⇤⇤
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.14)
Net cooperationPRCt 1:t 28 0.130 0.067 0.069 0.033 -0.030
(0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09)
Net diplomacyUSAt 1:t 28 0.059 0.064 0.061 0.060 0.020
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Net diplomacyPRCt 1:t 28 0.051 0.067 0.062 0.037 0.072
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Military expenditurePRC/USAt 1:t 28 1.623 0.242 -0.634 29.945
(1.70) (2.30) (3.18) (28.55)
GDP per capitaPRCt 1:t 28 -0.001⇤⇤⇤ -0.000 0.000 -0.002
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Log trade volumePRC+USAt 1:t 28 0.651
⇤⇤⇤ 0.393 -0.015 -1.648
(0.17) (0.33) (0.35) (2.24)
Ongoing MID (initiated)PRCt 1:t 28 0.240 0.194 0.456 0.438
(0.21) (0.22) (0.26) (0.30)
Party congressPRCt 1:t 28 0.203 0.165 0.276 0.496
(0.73) (0.73) (0.74) (0.77)
Independence dayPRCt 1:t 28 -0.679 -0.669 -0.717 -0.602
(0.52) (0.52) (0.52) (0.52)
Constant -4.967⇤⇤⇤ -5.086⇤⇤⇤ -10.304⇤⇤⇤ -8.320⇤⇤⇤ -4.382 -2.188
(0.10) (0.11) (1.45) (2.75) (3.29) (20.64)
Leader fixed eﬀects No No No Yes No No
Administration fixed eﬀects No No No No Yes No
Year fixed eﬀects No No No No No Yes
Observations 15,492 15,464 12,783 12,468 12,774 8,372
Observations
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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D.3 Daily Bill Frequency
Figure D.1: Daily Bill Frequency
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